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1 Executive Summary 
The Problem 
I.  The European Union (EU) has  expressed  its intention to offer membership of the Union to those 
countries of central  and eastern  Europe (the PECOs) with which it bas  Association Agreements. 
Agriculture is thought to be a problem sector in the accession of  the PECOs because of  the high level 
of  support given to it within the Union and the potential cost of  extending this support to countries in 
which agriculture is a relatively large part of the economy. 
2.  The objectives of  this study were to examine these problems of  accession and to develop options for 
policies in the PECOs, and, if necessary,  in the EU, which would facilitate  the integration of the 
agricultural sectors in the EU and the PECOs. 
The Trajectory of the Common Agriadtural Policy 
3.  The accession of the PECOs to the EU will occur at some indeterminate date in the future.  It is 
suggested that this is likely to be nearer 2005 than 2000 because of  internal EU debate about the nature 
and extent of  further economic and political union and the disparities in economic development between 
the EU and the PECOs making lengthy accession negotiations likely. 
4.  The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU is in the process of change.  Some reforms were 
introduced in 1992 and others are currently being considered.  Further change is likely over the next 
decade as a result of  the EU's commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA), irrespective 
of any Eastern enlargement. 
5.  Whilst the domestic support and market access commitments are not expected to cause difficulties, it 
is debatable whether, with current policies and prices,  the EU can reduce its exports sufficiently to 
meet its export volume constraint by the year 2000.  By 2005, it appears highly improbable that the 
constraint could be met and further production restraints are likely to be required. 
6.  Production cuts can be made by further price cuts or more severe supply controls.  Price cuts take 
longer to work, and would have to be substantial because farmers, through the CAP, are paid a price 
higher than is necessary to obtain current output levels.  Supply controls (such as set-aside and quotas) 
have a  more immediate  impact  on supply and are likely to be used  for short term supply (crisis) 
management.  Our judgement, therefore, is that in the absence of Eastern enlargement, there will not 
be large nominal price cuts although real prices will be lower by 2005. 
7.  Given reasonable economic growth in the EU, and therefore increases in the agricultural guideline, the 
agricultural budget is unlikely to be a constraint.  But threats to the budget come from increased direct 
payments and failure to solve the green ECU problem. 
The PECOs 
8.  Compared with the EU-12, the six associated PECOs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and  the Slovak Republic)  are  relatively  poor, have large agricultural  sectors,  have high 
inflation, depreciating currencies, and some have high levels of  external debt and high unemployment. 
However, important differences exist between the PECOs: the economic indicators are best for the 
Czech Republic, but worst for Bulgaria and Romania.  Although there is considerable doubt about the 
reliability of the statistics,  there is little doubt about the large gap that exists between the EU, on 
average,  and the PECOs, on average. 
9.  The agricultural  sector is extremely  important  in Romania,  Poland and Bulgaria in terms of its 
contribution to either GDP or employment.  For Hungary and Bulgaria, the agricultural sector is an 
important positive contributor to their foreign trade balances. 
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10.  Agricultural output has declined substantially in the PECOs.  Part of  this decline was necessary because 
output was wasted, part is due to the reduction in domestic and foreign demand and part is due to the 
chaos and dislocation during transition.  The decline was also exacerbated  by drought during the 
period. 
PECO Agricultural Policy 
11.  Progress in land reprivatisation and farm restructuring is not yet complete.  Different approaches in 
different countries are resulting in the emergence of two common types of structure. Tbe dominant 
structure in terms  of output will be based  on the former large ICAle  farms,  with tbe aew owners 
farming in association.  1be other form are very small peasant-type holdings, which are unlikely to 
be viable in the long term.  Poland's farm  structure has  barely altered  since it bas always been 
dominated by the small private farm. 
12.  Privatisation of the food processing and input supply sectors bas been slow.  Out of  date technology, 
inappropriate scale and location, overmanning, and existing debts have made this sector unattractive 
to investors, and there is little sign of a solution to their problems. 
13.  Price and trade policy has  been  unstable.  In the early years of transition,  farm  gate prices were 
liberalised,  subsidies to farmers  reduced,  but some control of consumer food prices was retained. 
There has been a reaction to this approach,  partly at least  in response to the penetration of PECO 
markets by subsidised EU exports, and partly because of perceived concerns about food security. 
14.  A wide range of  instruments is now used to influence prices and foreign trade levels, including import 
levies,  minimum  import  prices,  import  quotas,  export  taxes,  export  bans,  export  subsidies  and 
intervention buying.  However, the level at which these operate is low because of  lack of  finance, and 
the overall level of  support to the agricultural sector is also low.  In the case of  Bulgaria, it is believed 
that  agriculture  is  effectively  taxed  rather  than  supported.  Producer  prices  in  the  PECOs are 
substantially lower than those in the EU.  The main non-CAP policy instrument in wide usage are 
credit subsidies. 
Agricultural development in the PECOs 
15.  Pre-reform levels of  output are not a good guide to the potential output levels in the PECOs because 
production was centrally planned and not related to real costs. 
16.  The most important determinant of future agricultural development  is the extent of macroeconomic 
stabilisation.  This will stimulate demand, encourage investment in the food chain and accelerate the 
privatisation and development of  competitive markets for agricultural products improving terms of  trade 
for farmers. 
17.  A  modest  rate of development  will occur pre-accession  in all  countries  perhaps  favouring  crop 
production over livestock.  Rapid and strong development can be expected only if  there is significant 
investment in the downstream sector. 
Effects or PECOs adopting the CAP 
18.  1bere are some lessons  from  the Southern enlargement  which bad  similarities with the proposed 
Eastern  enlargement.  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain  were  relatively  poor with  large  agricultural 
populations and agriculture an important contributor to GDP.  The State bad also played an important 
role in setting prices and operating market institutions. 
19.  Although surplus production was expected in a number of  commodities following accession and farm 
size was expected  to increase substantially,  the outcome was rather different.  Farm structure has 
barely  changed,  while  increases  in production  have,  for  the  most  part,  found  a  market  both 
3 domestically or in other EU countries. 
20.  This suggests that where farming is dominated by small scale peasant or family holdings, restructuring 
is a slow process, as is adaptation to new technologies.  In these cases, the supply response to higher 
prices is more muted than under commercial  farming conditions.  In addition, the extra demand for 
food in a relatively poor country with rising incomes should not be under estimated. 
21.  The PECOs differ from southern countries in that their agricultural output is more competitive with 
(rather than complementary to) output from the EU.  In addition, despite a sizable peasant farming 
population, especially in Poland, most land is likely to be farmed in large units albeit under multiple 
ownership and ~rhaps cooperative management. 
22.  Upon accession,  PECO producers  would  enjoy  prices  considerably  higher  than  those  currently 
received.  This, together with the price certainty that the CAP provides, is likely to produce a modest 
positive supply  response.  · There are many  complications  surrounding the precise  timing of this 
response - and differences between PECOs - but the outcome is clear.  At the same time, higher food 
prices will restrict the growth in consumption, putting more pressure on the EU support mechanisms. 
23.  In the long run, farmers in the existing EU would not be affected by these changes, as long as the CAP 
can  continue to provide support at the levels reigning prior to PECO accession.  More research  is 
needed on what the cost of such a policy would be. 
24.  In the short run, PECO producers will have land and labour cost advantages over EU farmers, but as 
their land and labour are less productive this does not necessarily  mean  a cost advantage.  PECO 
producers have disadvantages  in terms of farm structures,  management  and marketing experience, 
Even if  average cost advantages do exist and are sizable, there is no necessary threat to the EU market 
because there is a large range around the average, both in the EU and the PECOs.  Only some PECO 
farmers  would be lower cost producers,  and the least  costly market  to supply first would be  the 
domestic market. 
25.  Notwithstanding the above,  any increase  in trade between  different regions of the EU would be 
indicative of the market at work, with economic gains to consumers.  Reaping these benefits is the 
main economic argument for further enlargement of the EU. Based on GA  TI  estimates of  the benefit 
of trade  liberalisation  due  to  the  URA  (around  2%  of GDP)  we calculate  that  if the  Eastern 
enlargement only gave half the proportional gains, the economic benefit could be around 65 bn ECU 
per year. 
The Implications of the URA on PECO Accession 
26.  Combining  the  Aggregate  Measures  of Support of the PECOs and  the EU should not cause any 
immediate problems because the slack in the EU's AMS can accommodate the tightness in those of  the 
PECOs.  However, the new AMS ceiling would be threatened in the event of  any production increase 
by the PECOs after accession.  There is also a potential problem with the GA  TI "due restraint" clause 
which limits support on a commodity by commodity basis. 
27.  It will be more difficult to contain EU-21 exports within the new subsidised export ceiling.  The EU-12 
will have difficulties anyway, and the PECOs are currently exporting more than their ceilings for the 
year 2000. When the PECOs face EU price incentives, the position can only become more difficult. 
28.  Harmonising tariff ceilings of the EU and the PECOs will require either a loss of  access for the rest 
of the world (with compensation  being payable) or some reduction in protection for EU farmers. 
However, actual tariffs are sometimes much lower than the maximum tariffs and it may be possible 
in these cases to harmonise applied tariffs at the higher level without contradicting URA commitments. 
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,  I The Budgetary Cost of Extending the CAP to the PECOs 
29.  Studies which have included the effect of  the 1992 CAP reform suggest that the long term annual cost 
of  extending the CAP to the PECOs is between 22-37 bn ecu.  In the short term, before any supply 
response, the cost could be as low as 7.5 bn ecu.  Direct payments to farmers are major part of  this 
cost. 
30.  Because none of  these studies take into account the constraints imposed by the URA, both in the EU-12 
and on accession, the costs are likely to be over~imates.  In addition, it is by no means clear that 
direct payments will be available on the present scale to farmers who have not suffered price cuts (ie 
PECO farmers). 
31.  Focusing on budget costs is not helpful.  No only are they difficult to estimate, but it is misleading to 
look at costs without estimating also benefits.  As indicated above the betiefits could be two or three 
times larger than the costs. 
Alternative Accession Models 
32.  There are difficulties associated with the accession of all six PECOs to the EU, because of the URA 
and because of the expected budgetary cost (though this appears to have been overestimated).  These 
difficulties might be circumvented if alternative accession models are chosen. 
33.  Membership of the EU without the CAP could eliminate the agricultural problems of the Eastern 
enlargement but appears incompatible with the Treaty of  Rome and would make nonsense of  the move 
to the single market (and the trade benefits that flow from this). 
34.  A separate lower price CAP could be designed  for the PECOs which would operate alongside the 
existing CAP for the EU-15.  Despite lower price levels in the PECOs, some production response 
would still be expected because of the stable climate created for investment.  The PECOs would also 
make  lower budgetary  contributions  because  they  would not have access  to  the full  benefits  of 
membership.  A complex  system of border controls between the PECOs and the EU-15 would be 
necessary to maintain the price differentials.  The outcome would be a suppression of  one sector in the 
PECOs, an outcome hardly likely to engender feelings of belonging in the EU's newest members. 
35.  Different PECOs could be admitted  to the EU as and when they were deemed  ready,  without any 
necessity to wait for other PECOs to catch up.  For example, in purely agricultural terms, admission 
of the Czech  Republic would create fewest problems and could be undertaken far earlier than  the 
admission of  Bulgaria or Romania.  However, the agricultural costs are only one part of  the equation: 
the benefits and costs across the economic and political spectrum should be considered.  Taking a wider 
view, an early accession of Poland has merit in view of the size of its economy. 
36.  Such staged accession would not solve any of the problems outlined in this report, although it would 
delay facing them.  There would also be extra negotiation costs from dealing with each PECO singly. 
The CAP after Accession 
37.  Assuming the six PECOs join together towards 2005 and have the same rights and obligations as other 
members, the CAP, already under significant pressure from the URA commitments and possibly the 
first WTO round, will face  further pressures.  An attempt could be made to maintain it, with high 
supported price levels, or to meet the problems in the simplest way by reducing prices substantially 
and maintaining support for farmers through other means. 
5 38.  A continued high price regime would require severe supply controls in the PECOs (more severe than 
in the EU-12 today because GATitwrO constraints will be harder to meet).  Such controls would 
require more administrative interference, would freeze PECO agriculture at an arbitrary level of  output 
while it is still developing, and would raise consumer prices substantially in countries where a high 
proportion of income is spent on food.  High domestic prices in the PECOs coupled with controls 
would also make PECO produce uncompetitive on third markets,  for example the FSU. 
39.  A 'low' price regime (prices at or close world market levels) would avoid all the problems outlined 
here because the URA (or subsequent agreement) would no longer be a constraint on production or 
exports.  It would, however, create problems of political acceptability within the EU-15. 
40.  Loss of income support through reductions in price support could be overcome by substituting direct 
payments to farmers based on certain qualifying criteria.  These criteria should not be linked to current 
production in any way, as current direct payments are.  This could increase the budgetary cost of  the 
CAP compared  to the present,  depending on the income support criteria used.  Part of the cost of 
raising rural incomes can come directly from national budgets if  countries wish to raise incomes above 
whatever the EU deems necessary  (or can afford). 
41.  A low price regime negates the need for a large administrative structure controlling quotas, set-aside 
and highly complex subsidy arrangements,  with consequent gains to the economy. 
Pre-accession Policy Options for the PECOs 
42.  In view of the uncertain levels of support that the CAP may eventually offer, and the costs to both 
consumers and taxpayers of  any policy offering substantial protection, and the limitations imposed on 
support anyway by the URA commitments,  the most flexible and affordable course to follow is to 
develop an agricultural sector that will be competitive whether in the EU or outside.  This is best 
achieved by the state doing less,  rather than more, directly in the market.  Rather, the state should 
facilitate  the  operation  of the  market  by  correcting  existing  market  failures,  by  hastening  the 
privatisation process, and by reducing barriers to entry at all levels of  the production-marketing system. 
43.  The option of  creating a pre-accession common agricultural policy in the PECOs is rejected.  It makes 
no sense in the absence of a wider PECO common market and operationally it poses large problems 
of  agreeing the common price level, managing such prices in the face of  exchange rate instability and 
financing  the common policy. 
Pre-accession Policy Actions for the EU 
44.  Uncertainty about the future nature and level of  support under the CAP should be removed if  both EU 
and PECO farmers are to make efficient investment decisions.  To this end, a wider public debate on 
the future of the CAP is desirable, with a clear commitment emerging within two years on the type 
of  CAP that will take the EU well into 21st century.  Our own conclusions on this direction are clear, 
but whatever direction is chosen, it is important for the PECOs to know what they can expect. 
45.  The Association Agreements provide an opportunity for integrating trade policy prior to accession. 
As long as preferential  quotas remain,  then the working arrangements  must be improved.  Quotas 
should be auctioned  within the PECOs rather than allocated  to EU importers. In the longer term, 
quantitative restrictions on preferential access  should be eliminated. 
6 46.  Skill levels in the PECOs are still low, notwithstanding the large amount of  technical assistaDce given 
under the PHARE programme.  Administrators,  professionals and others in the PECOs cannot be 
expected  to acquire  the skills of their  western  counterparts  in a  year or two.  PHARE projects 
involving skills and lcnowledge transfer should be  much  longer term in outlook, with intermediate 
stages for assessment and, if  necessary,  redefinition. 
47.  Subsidised exports to the PECOs should cease.  They have a number of  damaging effects, including 
undermining the PECO market, creating an atmosphere hostile to the EU, and indicating that the EU 
does not follow the advice it Jives to others - to set sovernment out of business and let the market 
allocate resources.  They also encourage the PECOs to erect import protection themselves and to set 
off on the road to inefficient resource use and higher than necessary food prices. 
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1  THE PROBLEM TO BE ADDRFSSED 
The  European  Union  (EU)  is  a practical  expression  of the desire  of citizens  in  fifteen 
European  countries  to  design  institutions  to  enable  them  together  to  live  in  peace  and 
harmony and together develop their living standards.  Since the collapse of communism in 
Europe a strong  desire has been expressed  by  six Central European countries1 and by the 
European Union itself to extend the Union border further to the East.  The motives in this 
enlargement are political (in particular, the security of the region) and economic (the gains 
from  free trade in a larger market).  This report concerns just one of the aspects of the 
economic changes consequent to enlargement,  namely the implications for agriculture and 
agricultural  policy.  The  reminder  that  the  major  motives  for  Eastern  enlargement  are 
political and economic benefits is given  because a negative atmosphere  may be generated 
around the agricultural aspects of  Eastern enlargement within the European Community.  For 
example,  much of the discussion on the issue contains references  to 'fears or and  'threats 
to' EU farmers based on unsupported generalisations and assertions.  Clearly, it is important 
to analyse and understand the issues involved so that problems are identified in advance, and 
costs and benefits are put into perspective. 
The  underlying  concern  behind  the  commissioning  of this  research2  is  that  current 
agricultural developments and agricultural policy both in the European Union (EU) and the 
associated  countries of Central and Eastern  Europe (PECOs)  may be incompatible.  If so, 
this creates an obstacle to the smooth accession of the PECOs to the EU as envisaged in the 
Copenhagen and Corfu summits.  The research  task is to identify the extent to which these 
developments and policies are incompatible and then to identify and analyze policy options 
to ease the problems of agricultural integration. 
The time horizon for this process is somewhat uncertain.  Since the signing of the Europe 
Agreements  and  the statements at the two European  Council meetings cited above,  strong 
expectations about accession to the Union have been aroused in the PECOs.  In the Visegrad 
countries in particular there is a strong desire  to  forge  links at every level to prepare the 
population, businesses, government and officials for entry.  However, the indications are that 
membership  may  still be some  years  away  for  most  of Central Europe.  It has been  said 
publicly  that  detailed  membership  negotiations  cannot  commence  until  after  the  Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 when the European Union has to decide the future 
path of  development of its institutions, the priorities of the Union, the desirability of  one, two 
or multiple  speed  development  and  the  timetable towards  monetary  union  set  out in the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Given the deep differences of view on. these issues in and between many 
member states it is unlikely that such weighty matters can be settled quickly.  It therefore 
seems unlikely that enlargement negotiations could start before 1997.  Given the complexity 
of the negotiations it is  improbable they  could be conducted within four  years.  Thus the 
earliest it is expected that the first of the PECOs could accede is in about six years time.  For 
the group as a whole towards the end of the period 2000 to 2005 seems a more appropriate 
The French acronym for this group PECOs -Pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale will be uled as it is easier to uy  than CEECs-
iD any lanpage!  The countries concerned are those which already have Allociation Agreements with the EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hunaary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
The terms of reference for the study which, unusually, were discussed amongst aeveraJ Directorate• General in the European 
Commission are reproduced in Appendix A. 
8 estimate  of the  likely  period  during  which  accession  will  occur.  This  is  the  working 
hypothesis adopted throughout the study. 
Of course, in view of the political objectives, the timetable could be accelerated or retarded 
if there  were  political reasons  to do  so.  These  points  are  made  in  order to clarify  two 
important aspects about PECO accession and adoption of the CAP.  Some years will elapse 
before PECOs join the EU.  In  the meantime both parties  will have time to change and 
adjust.  Changes in agriculture and  agricultural policy in  the interim period could  make 
accession more difficult or easier.  An important task of this study is to help find means of 
ensuring the latter. 
This report commences by examining the likely  shape of the CAP at the time of PECO 
accession.  It then provides an outline of the situation in PECO agriculture and agricultural 
policy  and  their  prospects  for  recovery  pre-accession.  Chapter  4  examines  the  likely 
response  of PECOs  to  accession  and  the extent of problems  in  trade,  in  meeting  URA 
commitments and with the EU budget.  Chapters 5 and 6 then examine options for dealing 
with these problems,  first without changing the CAP for the EU-15, then by changing the 
CAP.  Chapter  7 discusses  pre-accession  strategies  for  the EU  and  the PECOs  to ease 
convergence.  Our conclusions are presented in section 8. 
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Whether or not the CAP is likely to be a constraint on the accession to the EU of some or 
all of the PECOs will depend upon the type and level of support provided by the CAP at the 
time of accession, and the extent to which that support is extended to the PECOs.  From the 
CAP, any trade tension which might arise and any difficulties caused in meeting international 
obligations.  From the PECO viewpoint,  there may  also be costs of adopting  the CAP, 
notably in terms of  less efficient resource use and higher consumer prices, but there will also 
be benefits from the financial transfers to them from EU taxpayers and consumers.  Both the 
CAP and the agricultural  policies of the PECOs are evolving in order to meet domestic 
objectives and international obligations,  and  an  important question  is the extent to which 
these changes alone will bring about convergence, and whether such convergence compounds 
or eases the problems of accession. 
Convergence of policy does not, of course,  mean that common industry indicators such as 
farm  size,  technical  productivity,  prices,  aggregate  output  and  exports  by  sector  will 
converge.  Whether and how these indicators change will be very much a function of policy. 
·This chapter accordingly examines the probable evolution of agricultural policy within the 
EU, in the absence of  any prophylactic action to prepare for the accession of the PECOs, and 
within the time frame of feasible accession of one or more of the PECOs.  As outlined in 
section 1, this is likely to be nearer 2005 than 2000.  Likely developments in the PECOs are 
examined in chapter 3.  The EU and PECO developments are brought together in chapter 4 
where  the  potential  problems  of convergence  are  discussed  under  the  headings:  trade 
tensions,  international agreements and the budgetary impact. 
2.1  The CAP at present 
Historically, the main policy aim has been to raise EC/EU prices above free market levels 
with the intention of increasing farm  income levels.  This in tum was thought to contribute 
to  other objectives,  such  as  maintaining  the  rural  population,  and  increasing  the level of 
production  which  was  perceived  to  increase  food  security.  Prices  for  most  agricultural 
products in the EU (cereals, oilseeds, most livestock products) prior to the 1992 MacSharry 
reforms  were approximately double those of world  market levels.  The traditional policy 
instruments  used  to  maintain  these  prices  were,  first,  levies  on  imported  agricultural 
products,  second,  intervention  buying  on  the  domestic  market,  and,  third,  subsidies  on 
exports.  The response  to the high  and  stable protection  was,  predictably, an  increase in 
output.  Over the period 1973-1990, output volume in  the EU-12 increased by an average 
of 2 percent per year.  While it can be argued about the extent to which this increase was 
due  to  the  price  support  system  and  how  much  was  due  to  exogenous  technical 
improvements3,  it cannot be denied  that  the  growing  volume of production  gave rise  to 
rapidly expanding budget costs. In real terms, expenditure on price support increased by over 
100 percent, a growth rate of over 4 percent per year on average. 
Many economists would argue that technical change was spurred by the price support system which created the incentives for 
the agricultural supply sector to invest in research and development. 
10 The steady growth in production (with production increases in all the major commodities in 
the late 80s  unsaleable on  the  domestic  market)  gave rise  in  1988  to  the introduction  of 
quotas or limits on  the quantity of production on which  subsidies would be paid
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substantial reform came in  1992 with the adoption of the MacSharry proposals,  themselves 
prompted by the GAIT Uruguay Round negotiations.  It is these reforms which are currently 
shaping agricultural production, consumption and farm  structures,  and which are intended 
to enable the EU to meet its commitments on levels of domestic support, market access and 
export subsidies made in the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA). 
The reforms of 1992 involved a reorientation of support to farmers away from prices to a 
limited extent and towards direct aids (that is, payments per hectare of a crop or per animal 
in the case of beef and  sheep).  The price reductions,  substantial though they were in the 
arable sector, were not expected to be sufficient in themselves to reduce production to a level 
where GA TI export commitments could be met.  The problem of oversupply  of certain 
products was  addressed  by  making receipt of direct aid conditional upon a farmer setting 
aside land from production.  The main reforms were introduced in the 1992-93 production 
year and  are to  be completed  in  1994-95.  Other reforms  in  the  wine,  sugar,  fruit  and 
vegetable, and  milk sectors are currently under consideration. 
The view of the agricultural directorate of the European Commission (DGVI) is that the main 
reforms in  the arable sector are complete and no  more needs to be done5•  The new policy 
instruments in place (livestock 'quotas' and set-aside in conjunction with area payments) can 
be manipulated to  raise or lower output and,  in  conjunction  with  the existing instruments 
(intervention buying, tariffs on imports, and export subsidies), provide sufficient means for 
the EU to meet its Uruguay Round commitments.  Providing the agricultural budget guideline 
is not exceeded, there is no reason to introduce new instruments of policy until the demands 
of the  next  world  trade  agreement  are  known.  Given  the  length  of time  needed  for 
multilateral negotiations, changes needed to comply with the next GAIT Round may not be 
needed  until  around  2004 
6
•  The question  is  whether  the  MacSharry  reforms  can  stand 
unchanged until the middle of the next decade or whether either or both URA and budgetary 
constraints force further changes in  the levels at which existing instruments are applied or 
through the introduction of new instruments.  In this chapter these questions are addressed 
without reference to further enlargement.  That issue is the subject of chapter 4. 
In fact  augar quotas were introduced much earlier, and milk quotas were introduced in  1984. 
Speech by Agricultural Commissioner Steichen in London 24/11/1994. 
The Uruguay  Round  Agreement itself requires  contracting parties to continue the  process of progressive  liberalisation of 
agricultural markets.  It specifies that discussions must commence effectively in  1999 before the end of the  application of the Uruguay 
Round.  Assuming the first wro Round takes the 'nonnal' four years, the earliest the next reduction commitments could be agreed and 
ready for implementation is 2004. 
11 2.2  The EU's agricultural commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement 
(URA) of the GATT 
The EU faces  declining annual ceilings on the aggregate level of domestic support,  on the 
level of tariffs and on the value and volume of export subsidies up to the year 2001.  Beyond 
this, the ceilings remain unchanged, until such time as they are revised in the wro round. 
During  this  period  (say,  1995-2004),  rising  productivity  within  the  EU,  with  its  usual 
corollary of rising production and extra budgetary costs on the CAP, could threaten to breach 
the GA TI ceilings.  Given that many of the technical advances currently in the research 
pipeline will only be adopted towards the end of this decade and beyond, it is certain that any 
potential problem will be more severe the later the year considered.  This is most important. 
Most  analyses  concentrate on  the ability  of CAP  reform  to  deliver  a  particular  set of 
requirements by the year 2001 when the presently agreed ceilings are at their lowest.  Even 
if a consensus suggests that the 1992 CAP reform  will deliver the production and support 
constraints that the Uruguay Round requires,  this is no reason to believe that compatibility 
will exist beyond the year 2001.  The greatest difficulty in ensuring these ceilings are not 
breached will come, not at the end of the of this decade, but beyond, even without a further 
reduction  in  these  ceilings  from  the  next  GAIT Round.  In  fact,  some  analysts  have 
suggested a problem will exist by the year 2000.  This suggests that before 2004 (or other 
putative date for the accession of some or all of the PECOs), policy changes will have had 
to  be introduced  to  contain  rising  production  and  associated  support  costs.  Below  we 
consider the ability of the EU to  meet its support level and export subsidy targets. 
2.2.1  The Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
It is widely concluded that because the commitment is aggregated over all commodities and 
because the area and headage payments are 'blue box' and therefore excluded from the AMS, 
the EU will have no trouble in  meeting this commitment.  Most estimates suggest the EU 
will be 15-20 percent below the AMS ceiling of 60,000 MECU in the year 2001, provided 
intervention prices fixed for 1995-96 do not rise in subsequent years.  Just as important, the 
rate at which the AMS  could trend  upwards  (as a result of rising production of supported 
products) is not expected to threaten the ceiling in the first half of the next decade. 
Figure 2.1  The AMS for the EU 
AMS ceiling and estimated actual level 
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2005 There are no foreseeable threats to this conclusion.  Although the ceiling is not adjusted in 
line with internal inflation in  the EU,  such inflation is  (and is expected to remain) low.  It 
would take continuous EU inflation of 3 percent per year over the next five years (or 1. 7 
percent per year over 10 years),  which was fully reflected in EU support prices, to breach 
the AMS ceiling.  Historically, farm support prices have declined in real terms (albeit from 
very high levels) and it is unlikely that this will change in the future for budgetary and supply 
constraint reasons.  In addition, the level of the AMS  is independent of any movements in 
world prices since it is calculated by reference to a base world price for the period 1986-88. 
2.2.2  Volume and value of export subsidies 
The EU is required by the year 2001  to have reduced both its volume of subsidised exports 
by 21  percent and its expenditure on export subsidies by 36 percent, in relation to average 
1986-90 levels.  While the ceiling value of export subsidies is a constraint, it is unlikely to 
be the most important limitation facing  the EU.  The 36 percent reduction in subsidies for 
most products is likely to be achieved if the volume reduction (of 21 percent) is attained and 
EU prices are reduced (thus reducing the subsidy per unit of output).  In the case of cereals, 
the price reductions over the period  1992-94 in the EU (without any further changes to the 
value of the green ECU) will have been approximately 25 percent.  Thus, an eleven percent 
drop in export volume would enable the value reduction commitment to be met.  Since the 
volume reduction has to be greater than this (21 percent), it is the volume commitment which 
is the real constraint.  For virtually all products, if the volume commitment is achieved, then 
relatively  small  drops  in  EU  prices  (or  increases  in  world  prices)  enables  the  value 
commitment to be mef.  It is the export volume commitment, therefore, which is the focus 
of attention here. 
There have been a number of analyses on  the effects of CAP reform.  The majority were 
undertaken before the Uruguay Round was finalised in December 1993 but when the broad 
picture  was  known  of what  an  eventual  Agreement  would  look  like.  There  is  broad 
agreement that the products likely to  cause most difficulties are cereals,  beef and  cheese. 
These are products where export volumes have been growing, and current export volumes 
are well in excess of 1986-88 export levels on which the required reductions are based.  The 
case of cereals is discussed  here because this product is at the base of the food  chain, and 
it has been subject to greater scrutiny than other products. 
There is  certainly  no  consensus  on  whether the existing  CAP reforms  will  enable URA 
targets on cereal exports to be met.  Different analysts have examined different years (for 
example, 1996, the last year of the current reform, and 2000/1, the final year for reductions 
under the GATI) and provide estimates of annual cereal production ranging from  148m to 
183m tonnes,  (see for example Westhoff P et al (1992) and Folmer et al (1991)).  Given 
similar variation in the estimates of EU consumption of cereals, it is not surprising that some 
There is a (mistaken) general assumption that as a result of GA 1T and the reductions in subsidised exports that world prices 
will generally rise.  They would rise, however, only in relation to what they would have been in the absence of  the GAlT.  Prices could. 
still fall  while being consistent with the above prediction.  Anderson and Tyers (1992) in their model of world food markets show prices 
under a partially liberalised trade  regime being 8 per cent higher than the prices obtaining without any liberalisation by the year 2000. 
However, absolute world prices are on average virtually the same at the end of the liberalising period as at the beginning. 
13 very different conclusions are derived on  the level of export volumes which are calculated 
as the residual after taking into account production, imports and consumption.  It is true that 
the majority of estimates concluded that the required export reduction was achievable within 
the MacSharry reforms, but most of these same estimates had future annual production levels 
below even the current level of 160m tonnes.  This output level has been attained despite set-
aside and the implementation of most of  the planned price reductions, and compares with pre-
reform output level of 169m tonnes. 
An  important reason  for the small  response  to the price cuts in cereals is what might be 
termed the 'quotarisation' of EU agriculture.  Payments are now  made to  farmers  on the 
basis  of historic  production  patterns:  rights  to  cereal,  oilseed  and  legume payments are 
limited to what was grown in a base period, just as rights to beef and sheep payments are 
similarly limited by historic stocking levels8•  It is because the compensation payments for 
alternative farm products are limited to those farms that have previously produced them that 
farmers  cannot  shift  production  patterns  without  financial  loss.  Thus,  cereal  output 
reductions  arise  only  because  of less  intensive  production  and  set-aside.  The  normal 
additional market effect of marginal grain growers transferring cereal area to other uses does 
not occur because of the loss of arable area payment without any compensating premium for 
other products.  It is not difficult to see why the Commission has organised it so, given the 
overproduction  in  most  other  sectors.  However,  it demonstrates  how  the distortions  of 
intervention in one market have a domino-effect on others, and how the resulting system of 
intervention becomes even  more difficult to unravel one sector at a time. 
Our own analyses have suggested that across a range of assumptions about lower input use 
in response to price cuts,  technological improvements (mostly through plant breeding) and 
demand response to lower prices, the required cereal export volume reduction by 2001 can 
be managed without further refonn of the CAP.  But it will almost certainly require changes 
in  the level of quantitative  restrictions  (quotas  and  set-aside)  and prices.  In  fact,  under 
certain sets of quite feasible assumptions the URA target could require significant increases 
in the set-aside rate, or further substantial price reductions (or a combination of both).  Given 
a longer time horizon,  the solution would have to be even more drastic. 
This is the crux.  There is no  certainty either way  that URA export commitments can or 
cannot be met.  But the probability that they will not be met increases the longer the time 
period considered, because annual productivity growth will increase supply at a greater rate 
than the increase in domestic demand.  In  the context of PECO accession during the first 
decade of the 21st century, it seems almost inevitable that further changes will have had to 
have been made to price or supply control levels, whether or not further enlargement occurs. 
Given  the  political  difficulties  associated  with  increasing  set-aside,  not  to  mention  the 
economic inefficiency of enforcing resources  to  remain  idle,  it might be thought that the 
solution would lie in having EU prices close to or at world levels.  This would also remove 
any ceiling on exports,  since it is only subsidised  exports which are limited.  Indeed, the 
purpose of the URA and the GA TI is to encourage undistorted trade. 
As with any complex policy like the CAP, there are qualifications.  Limitations are also imposed based on current stocking rates, 
and a small percentage of the aggregate 'rights' to sheep premia arc given to farmers without historic claims, 
14 Paradoxically, it can be argued that the introduction of quantitative limits in the URA have 
made it more likely that supply controls will be used  rather than price cuts in the event of 
trouble in meeting the export commitments.  This is  because the very existence of supply 
controls implies that there are economic rents being earned.  In other words, producers are 
receiving a price in excess of the level necessary to induce the restricted output.  Thus price 
reductions may have little effect on production decisions until this slack is taken up.  Quite 
a large price cut may therefore be necessary to get any discernible production effect and even 
that may take some time to show up.  This is particularly so in the case of milk (and milk 
products) and sugar where farm level quotas exist.  The argument is less applicable in the 
case of cereals where the quota is effectively on area rather than output.  However, because 
supply is inelastic in  the short term even price cuts in cereals would have little immediate 
effect  on  output.  If the  EU  is  perilously  close  to  its  export  volume  commitment  the 
Commission will almost certainly want to take action which deals directly with the problem 
by the next season at the latest.  This almost certainly points in the direction of tighter supply 
control. 
It  is  a  contentious  point  whether  price  cuts  or  more  supply  control  will  be preferred. 
Efficiency arguments, and the interests of larger farmers,  who already have to set land aside 
and  who  farm  the  majority  of land,  point .towards  price cuts.  However,  because  small 
farmers are exempt from set-aside and the number of member states with smaller farmers and 
a tradition of high prices has increased, this indicates that it may be even harder in the future 
than the past to agree price cuts9• 
2.3  The Agricultural Budget 
The maximum  size of the EU's Agricultural  Budget is determined by the aggregate own 
resources of the Union and the agricultural guideline.  Aggregate own resources are obtained 
from  customs duties, agricultural import levies,  VAT and direct, GDP based, government 
contributions.  Under the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement,  the maximum own resources of the 
EU are set to rise progressively from  1.20 percent of EU GNP currently to 1.27 percent in 
1999. 
The agricultural guideline for price and income support (the Guarantee Fund) was fixed at 
27.5 billion ECU in  1988, and annual increases thereafter were limited to 74 percent of the 
rate of increase in real EU GDP, with full allowance for inflation.  However, following the 
1992 reforms and the disturbances in the currency markets that year, it was recognised that 
the calls on the budget were likely to exceed the guideline as so defined.  Accordingly, the 
budgetary  reserve  of 1000  MECU  was  added  to  the guideline for  1993  and  1994.  For 
subsequent years, fifty percent of the reserve is to be added to the guideline.  The guideline 
for  1993  was  36.66 billion  ECU  and  the estimated  margin  above expenditure was  1300 
MECU.  Given a 2 percent annual increase in EU GDP, the ceiling on Guarantee expenditure 
by  1999 will be just 6 percent higher than the current level. 
It is interesting to observe the recent decision to lower the set-aside rate from IS to 12 per cent for the year 1994-95. This seems 
to signal that the Commission sees set-aside rates as the principal policy tool for achieving production Largets.  But, of  course, it is easier 
to lower set-aside than to raise it. 
15 The Commission view is that this level of resources will be sufficient to finance the CAP. 
The explicit budgetary assumption  is  that compensation payments will continue at current 
levels for the foreseeable future.  However, any increases in set-aside or compensation rates 
(with or without price reductions) could undermine this view.  Even without changes in the 
level of compensation, the budget is potentially fragile:  the still unresolved questions over 
the use of the green ECU, and the tendency for national constituencies to obtain concessions 
in specific areas in return for agreement on EU-wide proposals will both place strains on any 
budget.  The problem is typical of any common property resource (which the budget is). 
Every country stands to gain from a narrow perspective by extracting as much as possible 
from the budget because it only contributes a fraction of the extra resources required.  But 
when every country pursues its narrow interest, the calls upon the resource increase beyond 
its capacity.  In the past, this has resulted in expenditures increasing to meet these demands. 
In two ways, however, the budget may be more manageable in the future.  The importance 
of  fixed payments (per hectare and per head) should make budgeting more accurate compared 
with anticipating world prices and production surpluses and the likely requirement for export 
subsidies.  Budgetary pressure  should  also  be less as a result of the accession  of EFf  A 
countries.  The three countries  recently  accepted  for  membership  are expected to be net 
contributors to the EU budget, with receipts exceeding expenditures by approximately 3-4 
billion ECU (CEPR 1992). 
2.4  Conclusion on the evolution of the CAP 
The main influence on the principal CAP commodities over the next ten years will be the 
URA subsidised  export volume limitation.  It seems inconceivable that by the year 2005, 
production will  not have increased  in  some  sectors  to levels which are incompatible with 
URA commitments.  Notwithstanding the price cuts of the last three years, the large levels 
of research  and  development  in  plant  and  livestock  breeding  and  in  development  of 
agrochemicals  and animal  health  products  over the last  decade  will result  in  substantial 
further improvements in  technical performance.  Because it can take a decade or more to 
bring the results of research to the market, the flow of technical developments over the next 
decade will barely be affected by the present price cuts.  It is current research which will be 
cut back,  and this will not be reflected in  fewer new commercial technologies for another 
decade. 
Given that oversupply is likely to remain a problem within the foreseeable future under the 
present policy,  the major question  is  how  this  would be handled.  The current range of 
instruments could certainly cope with the challenge, and in that sense no further refonn of 
the CAP is necessary.  What will be needed,  though,  is a willingness to use the level of 
incentives (prices, compensatory amounts,  headage premiums) and quantitative restrictions 
(quotas, set-aside and stocking rates)  flexibly in order to meet policy objectives. 
A number of steps are possible.  First, prices (a direct incentive to produce) can be reduced 
and the level of compensation increased.  If the compensation is increased on average by the 
amount that  prices  (and  average  revenue  per hectare)  decrease,  then  not only does  this 
16 increase  budget  costs,  but  it  over-compensates  farmers  for  the  price  reductions10• 
Compensation  on  specific commodities is  in  any  case limited  to  the  1992  level under the 
URA due restraint article.  For this reason, it is suggested that any price reductions that may 
occur  will  not  be  accompanied  by  'full'  compensation,  as  presently  understood  and 
implemented in  the  1992 reforms.  Second,  set-aside could be increased (with or without 
compensation).  Third,  the link between compensation and production could be ruptured 
completely so that area and headage payments are based solely on some historic production 
criterion or social need.  This would eliminate the necessity to control individual crop areas 
which would expand or contract according to their profitability.  Price policy would then be 
a more effective method of  influencing output.  At the extreme, prices could be freed entirely 
so  that production  patterns  and levels  were determined by economics.  In  this  case,  the 
principal budgetary cost would be the compensatory payments themselves.  However,  this 
outcome is  unlikely,  notwithstanding  the economic arguments in its  favour  (and outlined 
recently by the External Expert Group (1994)).  Some level of intervention buying is likely 
to remain to place a floor in  the market.  This will be combined with some level of trade 
protection, albeit at lower levels than today. 
It is  therefore  concluded  that  quite  apart  from  the  Eastern  enlargement,  there  will  be 
substantial pressures for further changes to the CAP within the next decade.  Whilst it may 
be possible for the present range and level of support to survive unscathed until the tum of 
the  century,  it  will  become  progressively  more  difficult  thereafter.  In  the  absence  of 
unforeseeable events, quotas,  set-aside and compensatory payments will still exist and EU 
prices will still be maintained significantly above world market levels although by a smaller 
margin  than  in  the  mid-1990s.  Despite all  the  arguments  in  favour  of market prices  the 
abandonment of supply controls and helping farmers  with direct payments,  the GATT and 
budget pressures alone will be insufficient to force the EU to adopt measures which are in 
its own best general interests. 
1°  Farmers are overcompensated because their revenue remains unchanged but they save on the input costs that would formerly 
have been incurred in earning the extra revenue. 
17 3  PECO AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY PRE-ACCESSION 
To understand the likely agricultural impacts of PECO accession to the EU it is necessary 
to consider the current agricultural situation and  likely developments in the PECOs.  This 
chapter  considers  the  macro-economic  background  to  policy  development,  the  place of 
agriculture in  the different PECO economies  (including its  importance in  trade),  current 
agricultural policy and potential changes, and the likely impact of these factors on changes 
in agricultural output over the next decade. 
There is a general view that the agricultural sectors in the PECOs are in disarray as a result 
of the continuing metamorphosis  from  a centrally planned to a market economy, and that 
recovery to pre-transition levels of output will take 10  to 15  years.  This is certainly the 
impression conveyed in the report by Nallet and Van Stolk (1994).  It is vital that an accurate 
assessment of these issues  is made, based firmly  on fact and not casual observation11•  If 
the  base  situation  is  incorrectly  characterised,  this  could  lead  to  inappropriate  policy 
conclusions.  However, it should be stressed that discovering the real situation in the PECO 
macroeconomies and agriculture is not easy:  the statistical services in the PECOs have not 
fully adapted to the problems of data collection in a market economy and all quoted statistics 
should be treated  with a degree of caution and verified as far as possible from a different 
source.  In  addition,  international  comparisons  between  the PECOs  themselves,  and  the 
PECOs and the EU are bedeviled by the wide disparity in estimates of the most appropriate 
exchange rates to use. 
3.1  The PECOs: macroeconomy and agriculture 
The six PECO countries together are, physically and demographically, an important part of 
Europe.  Together,  the PEC0-6 have a population of about 96 million and a land area of 
877,000 square km.  This is about 28 per cent of the EU-12 population and 24 per cent of 
the EU-12  area.  As  shown  in  table  3.1,  in  terms  of agricultural  area  it is  even  more 
important (40 per cent of the EU-12 agricultural area)12• 
The combined economic output of the PEC0-6 in  1993 was under 200 billion US dollars or 
412 billion when calculated at PPP exchange rates.  The latter is slightly less than six percent 
of the EU  figure of 7,040 billion dollars.  The corresponding  national incomes per head 
shown in the last column of the table indicate that the PECOs, on average have incomes one 
tenth of the EU.  There is much debate on how accurate these figures are.  Most observers 
agree that there is substantial under-recording of  economic activity, particularly in the private 
sector,  much of which is in the service industries.  Another factor which makes a great deal 
of difference to the income figures is the exchange rate used.  The fifth column of the table 
shows GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rates.  This raises 
11  It has to be noted that so inaccurate are some of  the anecdotal references made in the Nallet and Van Stolk report (which contains 
no referenced tables) that it is hard not to wonder on what factual basis they drew some of  their conclusions. (An example is the observation 
that •in Sofia there is more French cheese, Danish pork, Dutch tomato concentrate and Greek pasta than there is of  equivalent Bulgarian 
products•.  It simply is not tNe; it seems a classic case of city-centre shop-window empiricism.) 
12  There are differences in the definitions of  rough grazing in these agricultural area statistics.  Polish figures include rough grazing, 
Bulgarian data does not. 
18 the average PECO income to 21  per cent of the EU average.  These adjustments affect the 
rankings  of the  PECOs;  Poland  falls  from  3rd  to  5th,  while Bulgaria  (5th  to  4th)  and 
Slovakia  (4th  to  3rd)  each  move  up  a  place.  Within  the  group,  Romania  is  lagging 
substantially behind the other five.  Romania was  the only country which requested  to be 
classified as developing for the purposes of the URA commitments. 
Table 3.1: The economic and geographical importance of the PECOs in 1993 
Total area  Agricul·  Population  Nominal  GNP per  GDP per 
()()() km2  tural  million  GDP  capita USD  capita 
area'  billion  (PPP)  USD 
000 ha  USD 
BULGARIA  111  4576  8.9  10.3  4772  1226 
CZECH  76  4550  10.3  29.3  6965  2844 
REPUBLIC 
HUNGARY  93  6484  10.3  35.2  5141  3417 
POLAND  312  18700  38.5  85.2  4265  2213 
ROMANIA  238  14790  22.8  24.6  2382  1088 
SLOVAK  47  2877  5.3  11.0  5033  2075 
REPUBLIC 
I  PEC0-6  I 
877  I 
51977  I 
96.1  I 
195.6  I 
4291  I 
2044  I 
EU·12  2363  130,340  346.2  7040.01  202802  203492 
~ources: Busmess  ~entral Euro  (Se  tember  1994), Planecon,  Swmnen (1994 , ASIC (1993  Eurostat  pe  p 
1 Data for  1992. 
2 Purchasing power standard,  1992, Eurostat 
Apart from Romania, the PPP adjusted income figures place the PECOs in the range of low 
middle-income to middle-income countries.  Bruno (1992) included some social indicators 
like the level of education and health and concluded that all the countries in the region could 
be defined  as  middle income.  This  seems  a better description  of the situation  than  that 
provided by the much lower unadjusted GDP figures.  Further references to income in this 
report will be based on the PPP adjusted figures. 
Table 3.2 summarises the macroeconomic situation in the PECOs over the last four years. 
Bearing in mind the caveats regarding the quality of the statistics,  it is generally a story of 
instability and decline.  The economy contracted in all the PECOs, by most in Romania and 
least in Poland (row 1).  This contraction was caused partly by the necessary adjustment to 
the removal or reduction of price distortions existing under central planning, and partly by 
the privatisation  process.  Not  shown  in  the table is  that the rate of decline of GDP has 
slowed down and, in the case of Poland and Romania, it has been reversed.  Indications for 
19 1994 are that all but Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic will achieve zero or positive growth. 
Inflation (row 2) continues to be high, particularly in Romania and Bulgaria where current 
rates  are  well  in  excess  of what  would  likely  to  be  acceptable  for  EU  membership. 
Unemployment (row 3) has risen throughout the region but the rates shown are not outside 
the  range found  in  the  EU.  There  is  some  doubt  about  the usefulness  of these  figures 
because they do not reflect the disguised  unemployment still present in some state sectors, 
nor the extent of people registered as unemployed yet economically active in the 'informal' 
economy. 
Table 3.2: Macro-economic indicators for PECO countries 
BULGARIA  CZECH  HUNGARY  POLAND  ROMANIA  SLOVAK  EU 
REPUBLIC1  REPUBUC
1 
GDP 
Cumulative change 
1990-94 
Consumer prices 
% change 
1993 average 
Unemploym' 
% labour force 
1993 
: 
Gov't balance 
% GDP 
1993 
Current account 
% GDP 
1993 
External Debt Net 
of Reserves billion 
USD 
Debt Service Ratio 
% of exports of 
goods & services 
Exchange rate (Nat. 
currency per USD, 
annual average) 
1989 
1993 
-25.9 
72.8 
15.3 
-15.1 
-7.0 
12.2 
9.2 
1.82 
27.86 
-19.7  -18.5  -11.8 
20.8  22.5  35.3 
3.5  12.1  15.7 
1.0  -7.0  -2.9 
1.9  -9.6  -2.7 
3.8  19.2  48.4 
7.4  33.7  9.1 
15.1  59.1  1446 
29.2  91.9  18145 
,ources:  Bartholdy  (1994), OECD (1994), Busmess Central Europe, Sept 1994 
1  1989 and 1990 refer to Czechoslovakia 
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-33.1  -29.7 
256.1  23 
10.2  14.4 
-0.1  -6.8 
-6.0  -6.4 
3.5  2.5 
6.4  na 
14.9  15.1 
760.1  30.7 
2.3 
3.3 
10.6 
I~ 
-1.0 
na 
na 
0.907 
0.854 A deficit  in  the public finances  (row  4)  is  a  serious  problem  in  Bulgaria and  a  smaller 
problem in Hungary and the Slovak Republic.  All the PECOs except the Czech Republic 
have a  current  account deficit,  which  is  especially  large  in  relation  to  GOP in  the case 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic.  Three countries have high levels of 
external debt both in absolute and relative terms: Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.  Bulgaria's 
debt is particularly high in relation to GOP.  A large part of PECO debt was accumulated 
under central planning, but Romania only started to accumulate external debt post-reform; 
by  1993  this  had  reached  3.5  billion  USO.  Servicing  the debt in  these countries  will 
undoubtedly put pressure on their economies. 
Not  surprisingly,  given  the  overvaluation  of the  official  exchange  rates  under  central 
planning, all PECOs experienced very large devaluations of their currencies.  The economic 
disruption  during  liberalisation  added  to  this  process  as  the PECOs  moved  from  fixed 
exchange rates  to pegged or floating  rates.  The assumption  is that the major necessary 
adjustments in exchange rates have now occurred in most countries, and future declines will 
become proportionately  less.  However,  where inflation  is  still  very  high  (Bulgaria and 
Romania)  further  substantial  devaluations  are  likely,  and  with  them  a  high  degree  of 
economic uncertainty. 
Turning  to  the place of agriculture in  the economy,  table 3.3 shows  that the agricultural 
sectors in the PECOs are relatively more important than in  the EU.  Romania is the most 
dependent on agriculture with approximately 24 per cent of GOP derived from agriculture, 
followed by Bulgaria (9 per cent) and Hungary (8 per cent).  The average for the PEC0-6 
of 9 per cent is three times higher than the average for the EU.  The country that is closest 
to the EU share is the Czech Republic with 4.5 per cent.  Agricultural employment is even 
more important in the PECOs:  more than a quarter of employment in Poland and Romania, 
and nearly one-fifth in Bulgaria is in agriculture, compared with less than 6 per cent in the 
EU-12.  Notwithstanding its importance and the wider distribution of land ownership as a 
result of the privatisation  process,  agriculture  has  become slightly  less  significant in  the 
PECO economies:  its contribution  to  GDP and  employment has  generally  declined  - as, 
indeed, it has in the EU. 
The last two columns of table 3.3 show FAO estimates of the absolute levels of employment 
in agriculture.  It is most striking that the total number employed in the PEC0-6 is not far 
short  of the  EU-12  total.  It  is  quite  possible  that  in  some  countries  this  number  is 
understated  because  of the  inability  to  record  people  engaged  in  small-scale  private 
agriculture.  In all cases the recorded numbers decreased over the period  1985-1993.  On 
average they fell by 24 per cent, but in Hungary they fell by almost a third. 
Expenditure on food as a proportion of total expenditure is substantially higher in the PECOs 
than  in  the EU-12,  reflecting  the differences  in  income.  In  Bulgaria  and  Romania  the 
importance of food expenditure in the household budget has actually risen as a result of the 
large income decline in those countries. 
21 Table 3.3:  Importance of agriculture for PECOs 
Share of  Share of 
agriculture in  agriculture in 
GDP  employmt 
1989  1993  1989  1993 
BULGARIA  11  9.21  18.1  17.4 
CZECH  6.3  4.5  9.4  6.5 
REPUBLIC 
HUNGARY  15.63  8.52 &3  17.93  9.93 
POLAND  8.2  6.82  26.4  25.2 
ROMANIA  14.4  23.7  28.26  32.2 
SLOVAK  9.4  5.95  12.2  8.6' 
REPUBLIC 
PEC0-6  9.0  19.0 
EU-12.  2.8  5.8 
1  Forestry is included in  1989 and excluded in 1993 
2  Figure for  1992 
Average share  No. People 
of household  employed in 
income spent  agriculture 
on food  '000 
1989  1993  1985  1993 
29.5  35.9  670  485 
31.6  31-32  906'  7242.7 
25.4
4  25.1•  752  517 
50.0  36.0  4676  3700 
49.26  58  2839  2053 
29  27.2 
36.1  9843  7479 
21.7  8353 
3  The share of food  in GDP is 1.8 in 1989 and 4.7 in 1992, the share of 
food in total employment  is 4.3 in 1989 and 4.6 in  1992 
4  Average share of household expenditure spent on food  excluding beverage  and tobacco 
5  The sectoral  share for food  in GDP is 3.4 in 1993 and  in total employment 2.4 in 1993. 
6 Figure for 1985, OECD  1994. 
1  Czechoslovakia 
Source:  Report  from  ad-hoc  experts  OECD,  • ASIC  1993  (figures  for  1992,  1991  or 1990), Jackson  and 
Swinnen (1994) FAO 1993. 
The size of the contraction in agriculture in the PECOs from  1990 to 1993 is shown in table 
3.4 in terms of percentage changes in the volume of gross agricultural output.  Overall, the 
contraction was deepest in 1992, but part of this was due to drought which affected much of 
central Europe.  Some of the "recovery" in  1993 was due simply to an improvement in the 
weather  (for  example,  in  Poland)  rather  than  an  underlying  change  in  economic 
fundamentals.  This emphasises the difficulties of drawing conclusions from a limited range 
22 of  data.  The cumulative decline over the period 1990-93 was large (over 20 per cent in four 
countries)  but  hardly  unexpected,  given  the  transitional  problems  of introducing  private 
ownership (and private decision-making) and the huge changes in absolute and relative prices 
that liberalisation has brought about. 
Table 3.4: Percentage Change in gross agricultural output in PECOs 
1990  1991  1992  1993  Cumulative 
change 1990-1993 
BULGARIA  -6  -0.3  -12  -20  -34.0 
CZECH  REPUBLIC  -3.2  -8.9  -11.8  0.6  -21.7 
HUNGARY  -4.7  -6.2  -19.9  -8.5  -34.5 
POLAND  -2.2  -1.6  -11.9  2.2  -13.3 
ROMANIA  2.2  0.8  -13.3  11.0  -2.4 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  -4.4  -8.2  -12.6  -6.6  -28.3 
,ource:  OECD  1994  .  ( 
The balance of agricultural trade of PEC0-6 is shown  in  table 3.5.  For the six countries 
together  there  was  a  major  decline  in  the  trade  surplus  in  1993  compared  with  1992. 
Agricultural exports fell in virtually all PECO countries, while imports tended to rise.  In 
1993 Poland, Romania and Slovakia were all net food importers.  Despite the halving of its 
positive  agricultural  trade  balance,  Hungary  remained  in  1993  the  most  significant  net 
exporter.  Despite the reductions,  agricultural  exports  remain  an important part of total 
merchandise exports for  the PECOs, as  shown in the final column of the table. 
23 Table 3.5:  Agriculture and food  trade balance  (USD million) and share or agricultural trade 
Agricultural  Agricultural  Agricultural Trade  Share of 
Exports  Imports  Balance  agricultural 
1992  1993  1992  1993  1992  1993  exports in total 
exports ( ~) 1992 
BULGARIA  781  694  267  392  514  228  22.3
4 
CZECH  1069  1005  1050  969  19  36  141 
REPUBLIC 
HUNGARY  2653  1778  660  759  1993  1019 
POLAND  2002  1666  1952  2254  so  -588  15.23 
ROMANIA  290  262  988  813  -698  -551 
SLOVAKIA  304  365  203  416  101  -51  6.82 
I  PECO- 6  I 
7099 
I 
5770 
I 
5120 
I 
5603 
I 
1979 
I 
167 
I  I 
EU- 12  179392  206304  -26912  8.9 
1993 :  rov1s10nal,  based on the trend over the f1rst  ten months of 1993  p 
Source:  OECD (1994),  Country reports from  ad-hoc experts OECD 
1 4.3 in 1989, 10 per cent in 1992 by Kraus and al, 1994; foreign trade is increasing, however at a higher rate 
for exports than for imports. 
2  1993 figure OECD country report Sept.94 
3 12.1 per cent for 1993-1994: Polish agricultural trade is declining in this period following the implementation 
of regulations for agricultural  trade and the increasing protectionism resulting from the pressure of farmers 
organisations on the government to protect domestic producers and to reduce import of  subsidized agricultural 
goods. 
4  The share has declined  in 1993 to 20.5 per cent (OECD,  1994). Some of the largest declines were policy 
induced e.g the export ban of wheat and fodder grain. The development of the two major products were in 
opposite directions:  increase for wine exports and decrease  for tobacco exports. 
3.2  PECO agricultural policy 
In  order to discover what policy and institutional adjustments  may  be needed to integrate 
agricultural policies in the PECOs and the EU it is necessary first to su.mmarize the main 
policy instruments in use.  This is not an easy task because in just five years the PECOs have 
switched from  central planning,  then very briefly to a liberal regime,  and later to a more 
protectionist stance using a wide array of domestic and border measures.  The situation is 
even more complicated because for certain aspects it is impossible to separate agricultural 
policy from  the more general reform measures.  This particularly relates to the restoration 
of private property throughout the economy.  In  agriculture this refers to land reform and 
24 other measures to restructure collective and  state farms. 
3.2.1  Structural reform and progress 
The  restoration  of private  property  rights  on  land  and  the  transformation  of state  and 
collective  farms  is  considered  in  all  the  PECOs  as  a  precondition  for  an  efficiently 
functioning  agricultural  sector.  In  most  PECOs  the land  privatisation  process  has  been 
dominated by  the settlement of historic  claims  on property,  land in particular.  There is 
evidence that the two processes (privatisation including the restoration of historic rights and 
restructuring  of farms)  have clashed  to  some extent in all countries (OECD  1994).  This 
contradiction has been less important in Poland where restructuring only applies to a minority 
of the land (mostly in  former German land in the North and West of the country). 
As far as land claims are concerned, the approaches differ significantly.  Bulgaria is at one 
extreme undertaking comprehensive restitution  of land to the former owners or their heirs 
prior to the collectivisation.  Hungary has used a combination of some land restitution and 
compensation for former owners in order to leave existing structures intact.  Romania chose 
to distribute land to former members of cooperatives, workers on state farms and other rural 
residents.  On the one hand, this has led to the rapid disappearance of the collective farms, 
but  at  the  cost  of significant  farm  fragmentation.  Given  the  lack of a  land  market  in 
Romania, the prospects for land consolidation are remote (OECD 1994). 
A more cautious approach to the removal of the former farming structures was followed in 
some PECOs where collective farms were required to restructure themselves as various forms 
of  business identities such as joint stock or limited liability companies.  However, in Hungary 
and  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics,  the  vast  majority  of collective  farms  registering 
themselves under new cooperative laws are reported to be little changed from the previous 
organisations. 
In general, the implementation of land reforms in all PECOs has been rather slow, but it is 
an  extremely  complex  process  entailing  the  restoration  of  property  rights  and  their 
distribution to former land owners and cooperative workers. 
There are two questions connected with land reform and the restructuring of collective and 
state farms that are relevant to the enlargement.  First, what farming structures will emerge 
from the restructuring and will they differ in any significant way from the prevailing family 
farm  structures in the EU?  Second, what are the potential implications for productivity of 
current land reforms and restructuring?  The second question will be treated in section 3. 3. 
Farming structures emerging from land reforms and transformation or privatisation of state 
and collective farms are far from clear or settled yet.  The only exception is Poland, where 
the structure is dominated by small scale privately-owned peasant farms which existed pre-
reform.  Buckwell (1994) stressed the point that in significant parts of the region (and again 
with the exception of Poland) there is, initially at least, a desire to farm  'in association', as 
opposed to in the classic Western family farms because it keeps closely to the status quo and 
25 requires less adaptation and change, and because the resource mix and technologies available 
and with which the workforce is used  to working are based on larger-scale structures. 
The other prevailing farming structure that seems to be emerging from  the reform process 
is a peasant type farm.  At this stage commercial family farms are emerging, but until land 
ownership questions are settled and until active land purchase and rental markets come into 
being,  these  will  not develop  rapidly.  In  the  longer run,  some argue that the  'climax' 
structure is the family farm, Hagedorn,  (1994) which would provide full-time employment 
for a number of members of the family.  However, in the time horizon covered by this paper 
it is unlikely that this type of farm will be important.  Therefore, the enlargement will bring 
to the EU, a dual structure of  producer cooperatives and peasant type farms, neither of  which 
are likely to prove viable under the conditions of developed markets. 
3.2.2  Privatisation of upstream and downstream industries 
The  pace  of privatisation  and  demonopolisation  of input  supply,  food  processing  and 
distribution has been mixed.  Two general patterns emerge: the more downstream a particular 
activity is from  the farm,  and the smaller its scale of operation,  the greater the degree of 
privatisation achieved.  Consequently, in most countries of the region (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic) almost all retail activities were privatised by 1993.  On 
the other hand,  large scale enterprises  closest to the farm  in terms of supplying inputs or 
processing produce turned out to be the most difficult to privatise.  Thus, grain handling and 
milling, feed compounding and large meat and milk processing plants are still mostly state 
owned.  Small units in these industries have been privatised relatively quickly (eg small scale 
meat plants in  Poland).  Also,  such  industries as  vegetable oil,  sugar,  tobacco, beer and 
wine, with a better technical base or some established market niches in the West have proven 
easier to privatise, often and critically with an important role played by foreign capital.  The 
most advanced in this  respect is Hungary due to its open  (and  successful)  policy towards 
foreign capital since the beginning of transition. 
Given the slow pace of privatisation, it is reasonable to ask whether the PECO's will have 
privatised the food chain pre-accession.  Or inverting the question, will the existence of fully 
or partially state-owned enterprises in the  upstream and downstream sector create a problem 
for the accession? 
The political commitments in PECOs to privatise are beyond doubt.  However, the existing 
administrative capacity, the sheer size of the task to privatise an almost totally state-owned 
economy, as well as  restricted demand for some industries or factories delay the process. 
It is assumed that the privatisation in some cases is not a matter of selling the state-owned 
enterprises as closing them down and encouraging new entries.  Many of the existing state-
owned enterprises are not of interest to private investors due to their huge capacity, out of 
date technology, overmanning and distance from markets.  In some countries (eg Bulgaria) 
they are burdened with accumulated debts,  which in  some cases are still growing.  When 
state owned firms have zero or negative market value, privatisation is not feasible. 
With the combination ·of privatisation and  liquidation of state-owned enterprises  and new 
entries, it could be expected that most of the food chain will be in private hands by the time 
of accession.  If this is not the case, it offers the possibility to the EU to make privatisation 
26 a pre-entry condition.  However,  even  if the process is  not complete this does  not create 
unbearable problems  for  accession.  Monopolised  food  processors  will  be subject to EU 
competition policy and  may  find  some of their activities restricted  by  that policy, but the 
more  important  consequence  is  likely  to  be  the  lack  of quality,  efficiency  and  market 
awareness of such enterprises and the consequent disadvantage for the development of  PECO 
agriculture and  food industry. 
3.2.3  Price, trade and credit policies 
In the early years of transition, particularly in 1991  there was a general move towards price 
liberalisation  whilst maintaining  Government control on prices of some basic foodstuffs. 
Together with trade liberalisation there was a removal of subsidies channelled through the 
food chain.  Poland started domestic price liberalisation earlier than the other PECOs:  the 
link between domestic and  world prices was established in  1990 after the liberalisation of 
trade.  Romania still has extensive Government intervention in food prices. 
Price liberalisation  resulted  in  a significant deterioration of the internal terms of trade for 
agriculture.  The ratio of agricultural output to input prices (1990 = 100) had decreased by 
1993 to between 80 per cent in Hungary and 44 per cent in Bulgaria.  Similarly, farm prices 
increased at slower rate than retail food prices in all countries except Poland and Romania; 
the index ( 1990 =  1  00) in  farm  to retail price ratio ranged  between 46 in Bulgaria and  116 
in Romania for 1993.  This means that the farmers share in retail prices has declined.  This 
is a normal tendency in the developed market economies.  However in PECOs it reflects not 
so  much  the  increased  value added in the downstream  sector as the market power of this 
sector in comparison to farming.  The non-typical situation in Romania may result from the 
deliberate government policy to  stimulate production and  keep consumer prices relatively 
low.  In Poland there was almost no change in the ratio between producer and retail prices. 
There,  the large  change in  relative prices occurred  in  1989-1990 which  is  only partially 
captured by the data in table 3.6. 
27 Table 3.6:  A,rialltunl price aocl market policy in PECOS 
Price b"beralisation  Tenus of tnde for  Market intervention agency  Price _.  market inteneatioll 
agriculture in 1993  mechanisms 
(1990=100) 
BULGARIA  1991  almost all consumer and producer  producer/input 44  No single agency, but intervention by:  Control on profit margins of  basic food 
prices liberalised simultaneously.  - Fund Tobacco, and  (ceiling pricea); administrative price 
control left on some food prices  producer/retail 46  - Fund Zemo (bread wheat) and the  ('tllbolelale price or tNcco); minimum 
- Tax administration (control on profit  guaranteed price: (b....t wheat);  intervention 
margins of basic foods)  (tDbaceo) 
CZECH  1991  price liberalisation, temporary control  producer/input 47  State Fund for Market Regulation  Intervention in export 1Ubaidie1 for surplus 
REPUBLIC  on some food prices  supply millt Guaranteed price• or state 
producer/retail 60  purchase• millt '"-1 whellt.  ~teer 
HUNGARY  1991  price liberalisation; temporary control  producer/input 80  1993 Agricultural Market Regime Office  Taraet pricea; threshold and aluice price; 
on some food prices; 1992 full  price  (AMRO) and Product Councils  guaranteed pricea; intervention llorage &t 
liberalisation  producer/retail 86  Implementation and enforcement of Market  purchase limited lo quota for cereals; 
regulation act  unlimited for pig and poultry 
Directly regulated markets wt-1 millt pipneat 
lteef 
Indirectly regulated markets eupr IUII"-r 
POLAND  1989 libenlisation of food and agricultural  producer/input 79  1990:  Agency for Agricultural Markets - Intervention: purchaae and ulea; ltonge; 
prices;  1990 with liberalisation of foreign  regulation of agric. markets, protection of  i~xporu. 
trade domestic prices influenced by world  producer/retail 101  farm incomes  Minimum pricea (wllel&. .,..IBilk); AAM can 
prices  - formulation of  organisation &t legal  buy with higher prices (IS-30~) 
proposals for the government  Intervention in many markets: ce.-. milt pi& 
,...t. 
Quotas for a~gar 
ROMANIA  In principal market price aetting; in fact  producer/input 73  State Agricultural Fund maintaining the  purchaae price• guaranteed by the state for 
llrong intervention using food security  previous procurement system which centralise  baaic products: oen0. oilleetll • ._.and,... 
argument and aiming aelf-IUfficiency.  producer/retail 116  purchases at a guaranteed price.  potatoea ......  Met. ..............  milk. 
Gradual decrease in intervention 1993  In competition with the market channels  Control of  retail price• lmM. millt and  product~. 
Share of the Fund in purchases:  <~"  ma~t  meat - product~. 
product..  >90" for tupr and aunno-r  Exemption of VAT for meat. milk. lmM. edible 
oil& IMler. 
28 SWVAKIA  1991  price liberalisation; temporary control  producer/input 57  1993: Slovak Fund for Market Regulation  Guaranteed price• within quota ...._ 
on some food prices  (SFMR):  Minimum guaranteed pricet, minimum 
producer/retail 63  It recommends guaranteed price levels and  quotas for intervention purcha.ea  ellw&Jder 
may intervene in foreign trade as a measure  caltJe, cenU, ellwlhfer pip, eupr, JM*toel. 
to stabilise domestic markets.  System of guaranteed price• which come 
into effect if average input prices rise more 
than S'Ai. 
Monitoring of retail price• milk, ""-1. 
Source: Swinnen (1994); OECD (1994) 
29 Subsequent to  the swing  towards  market prices in  1991 , there was a reaction and  market 
support has been progressively introduced.  All the PECOs with the exception of Bulgaria 
have created specialised agencies which cover the whole sector.  Bulgaria, exceptionally, has 
two product oriented state funds for tobacco and grain.  Some of the instruments for price 
support  used  are  those  employed  in  the  EU;  minimum  prices,  intervention  purchasing, 
subsidised  export of surpluses.  However,  there  are substantial  differences  between  the 
PECOs.  Reflecting their earlier contact with the EU, the Visegrad-4 introduced systems 
which  are  strongly  influenced  by  the  CAP.  Romania  is  operating  policy  which  still 
resembles command-economy measures,  while Bulgaria has very limited price support for 
tobacco which is not fully enforced because of lack of funds, and has not built institutional 
structures for agricultural market support.  Because  oversupply is not a problem, none of 
the PECOs have any instruments to restrict supply directly such as individual farm quotas, 
restrictions on livestock numbers or stocking rates, or set-aside.  Likewise, none offer direct 
payments  to  farmers  and  neither do they  have  schemes  of payments  for  environmental 
services. However, some have operated special schemes to assist farmers in disadvantaged 
areas.  For example,  Bulgaria  for  a  few  years  arranged  higher prices  for  some livestock 
products originating in  mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. 
In the absence of settled property rights and given poor information in the possession of both 
borrowers and lenders there are significant failures in the rural credit markets (analysed in 
Bulgaria by Petranov and Roussinov in Schmitz et al (1994)).  These failures have meant that 
access  to credit  has  been  a  significant problem  during  the  transition.  This is  no  doubt 
another contributory factor in the decline in  farm  output in the PECOs.  The failures  are 
manifest  in  several  ways:  an  underdeveloped  commercial  financial  system  and  lack of 
collateral due to the unfinished process of recognition of titles to land, exacerbated by the 
lack of experience of applicant farmers  and  the general uncertainty regarding  the rate of 
inflation of farm prices.  The result has been a perceived lack of funds for purchasing current 
inputs (feeds,  fertilisers,  fuel)  and  for long term investment.  The failure of the financial 
system  to  provide  loans  to  agriculture  is  understandable,  given  the  risks  and  the  more 
predictably profitable outlets for  the limited capital available.  In order to overcome some 
of these problems  most Governments  have intervened in credit markets to provide credit 
guarantees or credit subsidies to farmers.  Some countries use credit ~ubsidies for investment 
credits only (eg Hungary), others for working capital (eg Bulgaria).  The country with the 
largest such scheme for credit subsidies is Romania. 
The use of credit subsidies is highly controversial.  Despite the agreement that some action 
is needed to improve farmers'  access to credit,  it is not clear that the present schemes in 
operation are solving the problems.  The assistance available though large in absolute terms 
is small in relation to potential demand for cheap capital.  It is unclear who get the benefits 
nor  how  the  cheap  credit  is  used.  There  are  suspicions  that  it  may  even  slow  the 
development of efficient capital markets.  The perception is that once credit subsidies are in 
place their removal will be difficult.  Even though all PECOs claim that they are temporary 
measures necessary to smooth the transition and to help the restructuring there is a danger 
that they will stay in place for long period of time. 
Border measures were subject to the same evolution as price policies.  For the first year or 
two  of transition  trade  was  genuinely  liberalised  but  soon  afterwards  protection  was 
30 increased.  In  the internal  political and  public debate the increased  border protection was 
justified by  the argument that it was  necessary  to  give some protection against subsidised 
exports coming from  OECD countries. 
The range of border measures  applied by PECOS  varies from  country to country,  but in 
general they include customs tariffs that have shown a strong tendency to increase,  import 
licensing and variable levies (applied by Visegrad4).  Table 3. 7 is an attempt to summarise 
the main features of the trade instruments used in the PECOs since reform.  The table is not 
comprehensive because of the difficulty of capturing the numerous changes in the border 
measures employed by the PECOs post reform.  Dealing with these changes is one of the 
extra difficulties that  producers and traders have in planning and running their businesses. 
31 Table 3.7  Agricultural trade policy in PECOs 
GENERAL  IMPORT POLICY  EXPORT POLICY  COMMENTS  PSE 
BULGARIA  1991 , general trade liberalisation  Automatic licence:  Automatic licence:  dairy  Very unstable policy  negative 
Import duties up to 55%  (poultry).  alcoholic beverage, tobacco  products, quality wines  "So many  regulations apply to 
Export restrictions (export tax and  products  Non-automatic  licence:  live  agriculture and food products 
bans) in order to increase the supply  Non-automatic licence:  animals,  meat, grain seeds for  that the foreign trade turned out 
or to stimulate export of higher 
plant protection chemicals  sowing, tobacco  to be one of the main generators 
value added products unfermented 
Quotas:  ice cream 
of distortions in the sector"  Minimum import price  Export tax:  oilseeds 
and unmanufactured  tobacco,  grain,  Fruits &. Veg, alcohol drinks,  Minimum export prices:  (Davidova,  1994) 
oilseeds,  raw hides live female  cigarettes  for export to  EU 
animals  in reproductive age,  non- Export ban:  female  livestock 
automatic export licensing (meat,  for breeding, wheat 
live animals) 
CZECH  1.01. 92: Trade liberalisation;  Nov  1994, increased  Export subsidies to reduce  System roughly similar to the  slightly 
REPUBLIC  substantially higher tariffs for  tariffs Import levies:  live  surpluses on domestic  EC, but does not operate to the  positive 
sensitive commodities (agro-food  cattle, live sheep, meat, butter,  market;  use is now  same extent (OECD,  1994) 
products) and import levies (agro- potatoes  reduced  to dairy products 
food products); licences  for 
registration purposes.  Non automatic  licences 
for some products to 
protect domestic supplies. 
HUNGARY  1991:  general  trade liberalisation  Import Quotas: selected  Export subsidies (in  'Hungarian foreign trade policy  slightly 
except  10% of national imports. The prod. under "Global  percentage)  increased in  was strongly influenced by the  positive 
major part of agro-food products  Quota"  1993: milk products, meat and  international trade environment 
remains with restricted licensing  Introduction of licences  meat products,  fruits wine  of trade barriers and export 
rules.  for dairy products and  subsidies' OECD 1994 
Except:  breeding animals, seeds,  wheat as a result of a  Export subsidies are said to 
wood, protein feed.  surge of imports ( 1994)  respond to EC veterinary ban on 
animals and animal products in 
1993. 
32 HUNGARY  I 99 I : general trade liberalisation  Import Quotas:  selected  Export subsidies (in  'Hungarian foreign trade policy  slightly 
except  I  0 9£,  of national imports. The prod. under "Global  percentage)  increased  in  was strongly influenced by the  positive 
major part of agro-food products  Quota"  1993:  milk products, meat and  international  trade environment 
remains with restricted licensing  Introduction of licences  meat products, fruits wine  of trade barriers and export 
rules.  for dairy products and  subsidies' OECD  1994 
Except:  breeding animals,  seeds,  wheat as a result of a  Export subsidies are said to 
wood, protein feed.  surge of imports (1994)  respond to EC veterinary ban on 
animals and animal products in 
1993. 
POLAND  1990: Trade liberalisation,  internal  Mid 91  &  1993:  New  1992/93:  temporary  The EU  is the main trading  positive 
convertibility of  Zloty  customs tariffs with  export ban on rapeseed and  partner in agric.  products with 
higher duties,  1993:  some feedstuffs,  55 9£,  share of total.Polish agric. 
Increasing border protection  specific rate tariffs (in  Occasionally,  export  trade. , increasing exports to the 
ECUs per unit) poultry,  subsidies on sugar, butter,  NIS countries 
eggs, potato flour, sugar  milk. powder 
Border tax:  6 9£, 
06.94: Variable import 
levies applied:  pigmeat, 
poultry, 
1992/93: Suspension of 
tariffs under specified 
quotas grain &  feedingstufTs 
Veterinary licensing syst. 
dairy prod. 
Temporary bans possible 
33 ROMANIA  1990: in theory, trade is liberalised.  Imports generally  Export bans in  response to  In  1993, agricultural trade  not 
In practice the government still  financed by external  perceived domestic  policies were largely determined  available 
plays an important role in foreign  credits and special  govT  shortages for cereals, wheat  by the level of domestic 
trade.  The liberalisation of  credits.  (seeds), rice, sugar, butter, other  supplies.  OECD  1994 
agricultural trade depends on the  12.93: Many food and  milk products. 
interpretation of the domestic market some agricultural products 
situation from the Romanian gov'.  or inputs made  free of 
Situation difficult to assess.  customs duty 
No import quota. 
Renunciation to cereals 
imports for  1994-95. 
SLOVAKIA  Export and import of agricultural  1992: general  increase  in  Export subsidies:  sugar  Customs Union between CR and  not 
products are regulated by a system  customs tariffs;  Variable  dairy beef pigs poultry eggs  SR requires mandatory  available 
of import and export licenses.  import levies;  import  coordination of the licensing 
Alteration of the system in  1994:  subsidies; Preparation of  Enhancing-exports  policy in both states.  Some trade 
range of products to be exported  law of protection against  measures  (which are not  disputes between the two. 
low-quality imports and  direct export subsidies).  Import protection measures  in 
stricter vet &.  phyto  response to the use of export 
measures.  subsidies by OECD countries. 
Temporary import 
surcharge for selected 
commodities (consumer 
goods, foodstuffs) 
Source:  Swmnen  1994 and OECD  1994 
34 Due to variation in domestic supplies and perceptions of  possible food shortages, some of  the 
PECOs,  particularly  Bulgaria,  Poland  and  Romania  have  imposed  obstacles  on exports, 
namely export taxes,  quotas, or in  some cases outright export bans.  Such measures have 
been used for critical crops like bread wheat to achieve food security.  There is little grasp 
that the consequence is a depressed  price and  a threat to longer term  food  supply.  The 
presumption is that with stabilisation of  agricultural sector, and as PECO policy makers gain 
increased trust of market forces,  these measures will disappear. 
The overall  effect of all  the  measures  identified  in  table  3.7 is  to  provide  a  low  (or 
sometimes negative) level of protection to PECO farmers,  and a level of support which is 
considerably  below  that  pertaining  in  the  EU.  The  most  widely  available  method  of 
measuring the extent of  support of  agricultural commodity markets is using Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents (PSEs).  These calculations are now emerging for PECOs, but they have not yet 
been done comprehensively  for all PECOS to a standard methodology.  There are particular 
concerns  over  the  choice of exchange  rates  used  in  the  calculations,  (see Jackson  and 
Swinnen 1994 and Tangermann, 1993).  According to the OECD estimates for Hungary and 
Poland there are roughly three phases over the last 6-8 years; positive PSEs before transition, 
negative ones during the large changes in  price, trade and foreign exchange policies in the 
early years of transition, and afterwards increasingly positive. The calculations for Bulgaria, 
which has not introduced market support policies yet, show that protection is still negative. 
However, even in countries with the highest PSEs (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) they 
are within the range from 8 per cent to 16 per cent in 1992-93 compared with 45-48 per cent 
for the EU over the same period. 
In conclusion,  PECO agricultural policy  makers  found  themselves in a difficult position. 
They had responsibility for presiding over an agricultural sector which is struggling to cope 
with the triple shock of macroeconomic instability,  farm restructuring  and declining terms 
of trade.  Production  seemed  to  be falling  alarmingly,  and the agricultural  trade balance 
reversed as export markets in the old CMEA area vanished and there was a surge of imports 
from the West.  Given the central planning mentality with its desire for physical control of 
food supplies coupled with perceptions of food shortages and the strong influence of the rural 
constituency, it was not surprising that a patchwork quilt of domestic and border measures 
was  developed,  the combined  effects  of which  will  take  much  more  careful  analysis  to 
unravel.  Although the range of protectionist measures employed is wide, the extent of their 
use is still  far short of the levels of protection in  the European Union.  Quite simply the 
PECOs have neither the budgetary nor consumer spending power to match EU farm support. 
The case of Bulgaria  provides  an  instructive  example.  The understandable  government 
response to the rapidly worsening situation in agriculture over the period 1991 to 1994 was 
to try to  contain consumer  food  price  rises  using  a  (weak)  system  of price and  margin 
controls, to prevent a feared grain shortage by taxing or banning exports and to try and help 
farmers  through  credit subsidies.  Ivan  ova ( 1994)  traced  through  the economic transfers 
arising  from  this combination of measures  and  found  that in  1990 the system did  indeed 
protect consumers to some extent, but at the expense of farmers who were effectively taxed. 
In  the  succeeding  years  the  taxation  of grain  and  meat  producers  Continued,  but  the 
beneficiaries of  the transfers have increasingly been the processing/distribution sectors where 
competitive markets do not exist.  The real  assistance  provided to  farmers  from  the state 
35 budget has shrunk dramatically, and is overshadowed by the effects of high nominal interest 
rates,  higher input prices due to a depreciating currency and declining real farm gate prices 
caused in part by the inefficiencies and, one suspects, excess profits earned in some parts of 
the processing and distribution chain. 
Overall, a clear pattern has emerged in the evolution of  policy in the Visegrad-4.  They have 
explicitly moved to adopt what they  call "CAP-like" policies,  even to the extent of using 
export subsidies  and  variable import levies  but  not  yet  supply controls.  Of course  the 
Visegrad-4 cannot afford to implement these policy instruments at the same level as the EU, 
but they  feel  they  are acquiring  'some experience'  in  using  them  to prepare the way  to 
accession. 
Bulgaria and Romania have not followed this path.  Bulgaria has yet to define its approach. 
It has the least intervened-in  sector and  thus  the greatest gap between itself and  the EU. 
Romania is a case on its own because it intervenes strongly in the agricultural sector but with 
instruments  that are more typical  of the  former  central planning system  than  the  market 
economies. 
Alignment of agricultural policy instruments  with  the EU  would be least difficult for  the 
Visegrad-4,  would  not be such  a problem  with  Bulgaria which at least does  not have an 
elaborate alternative system to replace, but would be more awkward with Romania which has 
taken a different route. Having said this, considerable institutional development is necessary 
in all countries to enable implementation of a set of measures as complex as the CAP.  By 
and large, the only area where there is systematic use of support measures not in use in the 
CAP is the  use  of subsidised  credit.  These would  have to  be phased out by the time of 
accession. 
3.3  PECO agricultural development pre-accession 
The collapse in  agricultural output in  the PECOs has been  substantial,  and the variety of 
measures  introduced  over  the  past  two  years  has  not  yet  had  any  discernible  effect  in 
reversing  that  decline.  The question  addressed  in  this  section  is  whether  and  when  a 
sustainable growth in agriculture can be expected and to what extent the growth in output will 
be absorbed in  the region by increased consumption.  The timescale in  this analysis is the 
period up to the point of accession,  that is the next five to ten  years. 
In discussions of this subject comparison is invariably made with the pre-reform levels of 
output.  This is a misleading comparison to make.  The pre-reform output was the outcome 
of  a completely different system with different goals and prices which bore no relation to real 
costs of production.  These historic output levels therefore are not a useful reference point. 
The only relevant question is what rate of future growth in production and consumption can 
be expected. 
The potential supply  and demand  response  in  the PECOs  to  their domestic policies pre-
accession is of crucial importance.  An insight into this can give a firmer view on which of 
two visions of PECO agricultural development is likely to be nearer the truth.  One view is 
that the contraction in PECO agriculture is almost totally due to the temporary transitional 
36 problems,  including the simultaneous reforms of ownership,  price and  trade policies,  the 
removal of subsidies, and the temporary loss of the market in the former Soviet Union.  On 
this view, once the shock of  adjustment is over, with these countries having domestic policies 
providing  stability  and  some  support  to  farmers,  a  substantial  supply  response  could be 
expected.  With EU accession would come an injection of investment and managerial input 
from Western agri-business, which, together with the signal of  higher and more stable prices, 
would enable the PECOs to proouce large volumes of high quality agricultural produce. 
The alternative view, as exemplified by Nallet and Van Stolk, is that by and large the PECOs 
are incapable of ·reversing  the collapse in agricultural  output for  10  to  15  years.  Their 
agricultural performance will continue to show large annual fluctuations  in output and an 
average level of quality of produce which cannot meet EU standards. 
Both adjustment paths are possible.  The most important determinant of which one occurs 
is the extent of macroeconomic stabilisation.  The more quickly inflation is controlled, the 
faster the high nominal interest rates will fall and the currency will stabilise.  This will create 
a  better  environment  for  privatisation  and  the  attraction  of  foreign  capital.  These 
development will do most to create real competition in the food chain and thus better terms 
of trade for farmers.  Compared to these factors  the precise market and trade policies for 
agricultural products are much less important, providing they are not radically different from 
those currently operating. 
Institutions  and  attitudes  are  also  important.  The  PECOs  have  emerged  from  central 
planning,  under which prices were used  mainly as  an accountancy instrument serving the 
fulfilment and control of  physical flows set up by the plan.  Budget constraints were soft, and 
the objectives of enterprises were different from those in a market economy.  Behaviour and 
institutions in PECOs are evolving towards those typical for the market economies, but there 
is  still  a  long  way  to  go.  How  fast  progress  is  made  depends  on  formal  and  informal 
education.  One of the best educators is working with Western companies.  Thus, the more 
open economies will undoubtedly make this transition in attitudes faster. 
Because there are so many factors which will influence the rate of  recovery it is very difficult 
to predict.  The main assumption is that the worse years are over.  The macroeconomy is 
already stabilising in the Czech Republic.  Hungary,  the Slovak Republic and Poland still 
have problems but may not be so far behind.  Romania and Bulgaria are expected to stabilise 
at a later date.  Thus the preconditions for agricultural development are expected to prevail 
in the period up to accession. 
To investigate the prospects for agricultural recovery further, analysis should be pursued at 
a  lower  level:  by  individual  country,  by  individual  reform  measures,  and  by individual 
commodities. 
At the country level, the particularities of reforms underway will determine to a great extent 
the ability of agriculture to respond to the positive incentives. This is summarised in Table 
3.8. 
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Table 3.u: Pre-reform system 1nd reform pursued in PEC06 
Bulgaria  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Slovak Republic 
Pre-reform  Orthodox socialisation of  Orthodox socialisation of  More flexible and mixed  Dual structure, with  80~  Orthodox socialilltion  Orthodox 
agricuhure, lack of  agriculture, lack of  system, not substantial  of land in  small scale  of agriculture, lack of  socialisation of 
entrepreneurial skills in  entrepreneurial skills in the  role of state farms,  private farms  and  20~ in  entrepreneurial skills  agricuhure, lack of 
the generation engaged in  generation engaged in  collective farms  with  large scale state and  in the generation  entrepreneurial 
agricuhure.  agriculture.  more independence from  collective farms  engaged in agriculture  skills in the 
the central authorities,  generation engaged 
small scale private farms,  in agriculture 
some responsiveness to 
prices induced in  the 
centraJiy planned system 
Reform  destruction of the  preservation of  partial land ownership  preservation of the small  at the beginning wild,  preservation of 
pursued  collective farms  inherited  'collective' farming by  restitution combined with  private farming without  afterwards partially  'collective' farming 
from  the previous system,  transformation of  voucher compensation,  explicit schemes for  legalised land  by transformation 
full  restitution of land  collective farms  into  impediments to  excessive  increasing the farm  size  restitution, destruction  of the collective 
ownership burdened with  cooperatives of private  fragmentation,  which in  many cases  of the previous  farms  into 
long lasting disputes  owners, large number of  commercial viability of  might be an impediment  collective structures,  cooperatives of 
members of the co- producer cooperatives  to commercial viability,  fluid  farming  private owners, 
operatives, large number  based on shared  privatisation of the state  structures, big  large number of 
of absentee owners, no big  ownership questionable  farms  facing big  fragmentation of  members of the co-
disruption to the farming  problems because of the  ownership and to a  operatives, large 
system induced by the  lack of demand,  great extent of the  number of the 
reforms,  future  necessity of big  operation  absentee owners, 
commercial viability of  investments in  no big disruption 
these producer cooperative  infrastructure, and  to the farming 
with hundreds members  alternative employment  system induced by 
questionable  for workers in the state  the reforms, future 
farms  and in rural areas  commercial 
in  general  viability of these 
producer 
cooperative with 
hundreds members 
questionable 
Likely  very slow  steady  steady  slow to steady  slow  steady 
speed of 
agricultural 
recovery 
38 In the absence of significant foreign  investment, table 3.8 suggests that a rapid and strong 
recovery  cannot  be  expected.  However,  recovery  will  occur  with  some  considerable 
variation between individual countries.  An important question concerns the implications of 
the land reform  and  farm  restructuring  for  productivity.  Discussion of the restructuring 
problem invariably invokes arguments about scale economies.  The conventional argument 
says that it is foolish to split up the large scale farms in PECOs because this risks losing the 
benefits  of economies  of scale.  However,  the  evidence  in  Western  Europe  on  scale 
economies suggests that once farms have expanded beyond a fairly modest size most (though 
by no  means  all)  size economies are exhausted:  the long  run  average cost curve is 'L' 
shaped.  It is equally clear that other factors are more important than scale per se, including 
farmers objectives, the right incentives and management skills.  That is to say, there is much 
greater variation in economic performance amongst farms in a similar farm size due to these 
other factors than there is between farms of  comparable quality of  management, but operating 
at different scales (Dawson and Hubbard (1987)). 
Buckwell and Davidova (1993) applied these ideas to the post-reform restructuring in PECOs. 
They claim that the land reforms and related farm  restructuring essentially shifts a bimodal 
distribution of farm sizes (with a large number of very small plots and relatively low number 
of large state and collective farms)  towards a more conventional unimodal distribution.  In 
this process there may be productivity gains at each end of the spectrum.  The expansion of 
plots to small  farms,  as owners consolidate newly acquired  land with  their plots,  enables 
them to exploit whatever scale economies there are.  The contraction of the largest units as 
they are subdivided to form  the new private cooperatives or joint stock companies enables 
the  new  units  to  avoid  the  diseconomies  of the  very  large and  unmanageable  state and 
collective farms. 
However, these gains in productivity are potential.  The extent to which they will be realised 
in practice pre-accession depends on the incentives and stability created by PECOs domestic 
policies.  To  the  extent  that  more  coherent  policies  exist  in  the  Visegrad-4,  it  seems 
reasonable to expect gains in productivity there.  On the other hand, Polish agriculture is a 
particular example, where because of different location of private farms and state farms the 
explained  shifts  in  size,  and  particularly  the  increase  in  size  of private  farms  due  to 
restructuring of state farms  will not be always the case.  That is why the countries whose 
agriculture is expected to develop faster in the group are the Czech and Slovak Republics and 
Hungary.  In Bulgaria the pre-reform structures were the largest farming units in the PECOs, 
the  so-called  agro-industrial  complexes.  Potentially there are substantial  gains  from  the 
restructuring and land reform.  However, the delay in the process as well as the continuation 
of taxation of producers do  not give objective signs  that these potential gains could soon 
become real. 
At  commodity  level,  in  grains,  the  production  recovery  could  in  general  be  fast  and 
substantial in all PECOs in which there is not an excessive fragmentation of the operation, 
because in this sector there is not the need for large new investment.  This applies mainly 
to  the Czech and Slovak Republics,  Hungary and Bulgaria.  Polish experts claim that due 
to the peasant character of Polish agriculture, grain production increases will be very small. 
In general,  in most annual crops more rapid development in  productive capacity could be 
expected which has  the potential of creating some problems with excess  supply  mainly of 
cereals and oilseeds (sunflower and  rape). 
39 Perennial crops (such as orchards and vineyards)  are not likely to witness any increases in 
production for  many years.  Investment in  these crops has  been very low for a number of 
years, and current productivity is also low.  Because of recent neglect, replantings are likely 
to be necessary  on a major  scale.  Given  the time horizon  of the crop and difficulties in 
financing any long term agriculture venture in the PECOs, such new plantings are likely to 
be limited in extent and impact in the period prior to likely accession. 
In livestock production  the story  is  more complicated.  There is a perception across  the 
region  that  it  could  recover  quickly,  particularly  in  counbies  with  more  fragmented 
operations (Poland, Romania and partially Bulgaria) because small livestock farms can farm 
more intensively and respond to market signals.  However, this will not be very easy.  The 
cattle production cycle is long and the rebuilding of national herds will take several years. 
Also, as the PECO markets are now open to the world, standards will also have to be raised 
in order to compete on  both  export and  domestic  markets.  The gap in  food  conversion 
efficiency,  in  conformation,  in  animal  health  and  animal  welfare provisions  between  the 
PECOs and the EU is large and will require substantial investment and skill development to 
close it.  It is unlikely that farmers in peasant type agriculture will be very responsive to new 
technologies  which  will  be  restricted  to  the  larger  units  with  professional  management. 
These considerations  will  prevent  the PECOs  from  producing  substantial  extra output of 
livestock products of acceptable international standards for several more years. 
Before conclusions can be drawn  for  the implications of the expected production recovery 
on the EU it is necessary  to treat two more questions:  to what extent the increased  supply 
could  be absorbed  by  domestic  demand  and  to  what extent it could  be absorbed  by  third 
markets outside the EU. 
Domestic demand  has dropped  in the post-reform  period,  first,  because of the decrease in 
real incomes of the mass of the population, and,  second,  due to the emergence of a wider 
range of consumer goods, durables  and  services of a quality previously unavailable to the 
population.  The latter suggests that even when incomes return to the level that existed prior 
to the start of  liberalisation, the level of  food consumption will not return to its previous level 
on a per head basis:  consumers will have a wider range of goods and services on which to 
spend their income.  Typically,  food  consumption  (especially meat) was higher per person 
in the centrally planned countries than in the EU.  Extending the choice of the market to the 
PECOs is likely to lead to a permanent reduction in the demand for food, compared with the 
centrally planned period. 
It is highly likely that with an increase in the standard of living, demand will shift to higher 
value, more healthy food.  Using developments in the EU as a guide, there is large growth 
potential as  real  incomes  grow  in  the consumption  of fresh  fruit and vegetables and  new 
processed  dairy  products.  Considerable  developments  are  required  in  the  marketing 
infrastructure  for  the  distribution  of fresh  produce,  as  well  as  dairy processing.  At  the 
present low rate of privatisation and reinvestment in the food industry it is likely that some 
countries will experience a growth in demand before the modernisation of food processing 
industries can develop  the capacity to meet it.  In these circumstances the growth in high 
quality high value consumption  may be met with  imported rather than  local produce.  An 
increasing share of such imports is already coming from  the EU, aided by the proximity of 
available  supplies  and  the  easier  access  following  the  implementation  of the  Europe 
Agreements. 
40 The capacity of the PECOs to export their surpluses to the non-EU markets is rather limited. 
There are undoubtedly opportunities  to  increase  exports  to  the former  Soviet Union  but, 
following  the disintegration  of the  economic  system  of the FSU,  the capacity  to pay  for 
imports is low.  During 1993 and 1994 some PECOs, particularly Poland in both years and 
Bulgaria in 1994, have expanded trade in this region, but it remains to be seen whether these 
trade developments are sustainable.  It  appears unlikely until greater signs of  recovery appear 
in the FSU. 
The Middle East  has  been  a market  for  PECOs  but mainly  when  the Soviet bloc  had  a 
political influence on some countries in the region. There may be scope for expansion into 
this market, and PECOs have an obvious locational advantage compared to Western Europe. 
However, they face competition in increasing their agricultural exports to the Middle East 
from  traditional suppliers to this market. 
As  far  as inter-PECO  trade is  concerned,  there  is  even  less  scope.  Apart from  trade in 
specific products based  on  climatic differences  (such as  Bulgarian  wine to Poland),  trade 
between  the PECOs  has  been  very  limited.  Their agricultural  industries  were  (and  are) 
perceived to be more competitive than complementary. 
In summary,  the PECOs are recovering  from  the shock to their macroeconomies over the 
period  1989  to  1992.  Their agricultural  sectors  have had  additional  shocks  arising  from 
privatisation and  restructuring.  However,  there are signs  that output declines have either 
ceased or are very small, and that some recovery in output is beginning.  Agricultural policy 
in  the  region  has  been  far  from  stable  with  many  confusing  switches  in priorities  and 
instruments.  There are signs here too that some order is emerging from the chaos.  These 
developments are occurring to different extents in the individual countries.  Thus the PECOs 
differ significantly in their likely rates of recovery and in their readiness both generally and 
agriculturally to join the European Union.  This will be taken up in more detail in chapter 
5.  In  the next  chapter  the  potential  difficulties  of PECO  adoption  of the  CAP  will  be 
scrutinised. 
41 4  EFFECTS OF PECO ADOPTION OF THE CAP 
Given the divergent paths of agricultural development in the PECOs and the EU (discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3), it is inevitable that difficulties will arise in any attempt to integrate their 
respective  agricultural  sectors.  Difficulties  though  are  not  necessarily  obstacles,  and 
obstacles are not usually  insuperable.  It is the solving of problems,  the overcoming of 
difficulties and the removal of  obstacles that are the hallmarks of  development and progress -
and,  one  might  add,  political  skill.  Before  policy  options  are  offered  to  assist  this 
development and progress,  it is frrst  necessary  to assess  the magnitude and nature of the 
problems.  This chapter accordingly attempts to identify these problems and their relative 
importance. 
The chapter begins by examining the likely response to PECO adoption of the CAP.  The 
principal  variables  considered  are  production,  consumption  and  net  trade.  This  leads 
naturally to an assessment of  possible trade tensions which could arise as PECO agricultural 
exports have free access to the rest of the EU market, and vice versa.  The next problem to 
be examined is whether PECO adoption of the CAP will cause problems either for them or 
the EU in respecting the commitments each has made under the Uruguay Round Agreement 
(URA).  This analysis is  concerned principally with the immediate consequences of, and 
problems involved in, harmonising GA TI schedules.  The other area which can be identified 
as  causing  difficulties  is  the budget  cost of PECO adoption  of the CAP.  A number of 
estimates  of these  costs  have  been  made.  These  will  be evaluated  in  the  light of the 
judgements made here of the prospects for PECO agricultural response and the kind of CAP 
which will be operating into the next century.  Before drawing conclusions on the extent of 
the difficulty  of PECO accession,  further  evidence about  what might occur  - based  on 
previous enlargements - is examined for the light it throws on some of these issues. 
4.1  PECO response to adoption of the CAP 
The extent to which all three of the potential problems (intra-EU trade, URA commitments 
and  budget)  might  develop  is  highly  dependent  on  how  much  PECO  production  and 
consumption will change following access to higher CAP prices.  There can be little doubt 
that production would increase because the  CAP (through its intervention system)  would 
provide a level of market stability and  security that the PECOs have not known in recent 
years, while the market support system would provide an incentive to expand production and 
curtail consumption.  But would these production and consumption responses be large and 
what would be the time frame for these responses to develop? 
The answers depend on the size of the price gap between the PECOs and the EU at the time 
of  entry and the response of  PECO producers and consumers to the higher prices.  Evidence 
on the current price gap is provided in table 4 .1. 
42 Table 4.1: Producer prices for selected agricultural products in 1993 (USD) 
Bulgaria  Czech  R  Hungary1  Poland  EU2  EU4 
Feed wheat  94  93  44  132  180  200 
Feed barley  89  93  82  112  173  192 
Maize  117  119  96  120  191  211 
Sugar  462  391  621  688 
Sugar beet  28  26  24  43  48 
Milk  185  200  207  129  527  584 
Cattle (lw)3  682  873  859  696  1,743  1,933 
Pork (lw)3  808  892  988  903  1,200  1,331 
Poultry (lw)3  710  155  914  911  1,126  1,249 
Exchange  27.65  29.15  79.00  18,145  0.854  0.77 
rate used 
(national 
currency per 
1 USD) 
Sources:  Research  Institute of Agricultural Economics,  Prague;  PAU, EC PHARE-Ministry of Agriculture, 
Sofia;  APAU Ministry of Agriculture, Warsaw;  ASIC,  1993; OECD,  1994. 
1 Prices for 1992 
2 Prices for 1992/93 using 1992 exchange rate 
3 For EU and Hungary dead weight prices converted into live weight prices using the following conversion 
rates:  0.56 for cattle,  0. 72 for pork, 0. 74 for poultry 
"Prices for 1992/93 using 1993 exchange rate 
Caution  should  be taken  in  interpreting  these figures.  For the EU alone there are wide 
variations  between  member  states  in  recorded  average  producer  prices.  The  statistical 
services in the PECOs have much catching up to do in developing the ability to gather data 
from large numbers of private farms.  Nonetheless,  it is clear that there are 40-50%  gaps 
between EU and PECO prices.  Bulgarian and  Czech prices are rather similar (except the 
higher cattle prices in the Czech Republic)  and they both are generally about half the EU 
levels.  Hungarian prices are generally a little lower than the Bulgarian and Czech levels 
(except milk, pork and poultry which are higher) and they are therefore slightly less than half 
of the EU levels.  Apart from  milk and cattle, Polish prices are highest amongst the four 
PECOs shown,  they are around 60 per cent of the EU levels (except for sugar beet which 
is half the EU level). 
How will these gaps develop in the years between now and accession?  It has been argued 
that whilst the EU prices are under continual pressure, significant reductions are not expected 
before the end of the century.  Beyond that, they could, and many will argue they should, 
fall significantly.  But this requires a significant change of mind about agricultural policy. 
Chapter two concluded that the intricacies of the interaction between the CAP and the URA 
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early years of the next century will be accommodated by tighter supply control than price 
cuts, if an immediate cut back in production is required.  It therefore becomes clear that the 
biggest argument for cutting CAP prices is the size of the price gap between the Union and 
the PECOs.  Given all this pressure,  even if the prevailing view is not to further reform the 
CAP, there are bound to be some reductions in prices in real terms. 
Perhaps the PECO prices will rise to close the gap.  It  should be clear from the information 
in chapter 3 that this is unlikely.  The public deficits and external debts in the PECOs are 
too great for them to afford protection which makes demands on the state budget, and the 
proportion of expenditures on  food  by  the population  makes  food  prices  too sensitive an 
issue.  However much  the important farm  populations may desire and campaign for high 
prices,  the only way they can be given them is by macroeconomically destabilising policy. 
In other words,  the direct and indirect inflationary consequences of CAP-like price support 
would erode the national currencies of these countries and eliminate any benefit to the farm 
sector at great cost to the economy at large.  If this is not a powerful enough force to prevent 
the  PECOs  significantly  raising  their  prices  pre-accession,  their URA  commitments  will 
provide the necessary constraint.  This issue is considered in the next section. 
The conclusion is therefore that,  in the absence of a change of policy in the EU it is to be 
expected that a significant part (say a half) of the gaps in prices will remain up to the point 
of accession.  What would be the supply response  to,  say, a twenty to twenty five percent 
rise in prices?  Conventional  supply  elasticities  embedded  in  most of the models  used  to 
calculate just these sorts of effects are of the order of 0.3 to 0.6.  So the simplistic answer 
is a production response in the range 6 per cent to  15 per cent.  There are many reasons to 
suspect that the story is rather more complicated than this. 
The strict supply response to price change may be less important than the effects of  structural 
and technical changes. The former is in the hands of the applicant states (see section 3.2.1). 
To the extent that fears of excessive fragmentation are realised, then this will reduce the size 
of any  supply response.  Poland provides  a ready  made example of this.  Its small-scale 
private sector has proved extremely resistant  to change over many decades.  The attitudes 
and  objectives  of the  family  farm  workers  and  the  kind  of technology  they have at their 
disposal do not lend themselves to a large response to higher prices under the CAP.  Much 
will depend on the development of the private production cooperative sector.  If this is able 
to shake off the constraints on management by democracy (ie all members having an equal 
say in how to run the farm), and if good management appears,  then these farms could be in 
a good position to exploit the opportunities of higher prices.  But things are just as likely to 
go the other way.  These farms could be condemned by their institutional structure to fail to 
respond because the members cannot agree and cannot maintain discipline.  This would result 
in a much more muted response. 
The rate of technical  change will  be  greatly  influenced  by  the  extent of investment  and 
technology  transfer  from  the  EU.  This  in  turn  will  depend  on  the  confidence  foreign 
investors  have  on  the ·success  of accession.  Given  the  uncertainties  of the  process  of 
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such investment until it is very clear that the accession  will go ahead.  For possible early 
applicants (like the Czech Republic? see section 5.3) the outlook could become clear in one 
or two years thereby encouraging new investment pre-accession and thus a lively response 
to the price rises upon accession.  For the more difficult applicants (Romania and Bulgaria?) 
this may not happen until after the PECO has actually joined.  Given that the effects of such 
developments then take some time to work through, these longer run boosts to production 
may take several years to appear. 
The other factor which will determine the magnitude of supply response to a price rise is 
how quickly the price rise is implemented.  Will it be instant and complete as in the EFrAn 
enlargement, or will it be phased in over a long transition period?  The longer the adjustment 
period the more restrained will be the short run response, although the medium term response 
(ie ultimate production levels) will be independent of the transition phase.  The practicality 
of transition is examined in section 6.3. 
Turning  to the consumption response,  in principle this  is easier to predict.  If farm  gate 
prices are increased  20-25 per cent,  then  provided  there is some competition in the food 
chain not all will be passed on to consumers·.  However, given the poorly developing PECO 
food industries and distribution, let us assume that all the farm-gate price rise is passed on. 
If farm  prices  account  for  approximately  50  per cent  of the  retail  price  (and  there  is 
obviously  huge variation  around  this  figure,  depending  on  the product),  then  retail  food 
prices would rise by 10-12 per cent.  This reduces real incomes say 4-5 per cent (assuming 
food  is 35 per cent of total expenditures)  and  reduces  food  consumption by  1-2  per cent 
(assuming income elasticities of about 0.4). 
Such crude reasoning serves only to indicate the conclusion that PECO adoption of the CAP 
does have the potential to boost production and curtail consumption thereby intensifying the 
chronic problem of overproduction in the EU.  The events being analysed are so far into the 
future  that this analysis cannot be more definitive.  The problem is  not working  out the 
consequences of the assumptions, but knowing which assumptions are the most reasonable. 
4.2  Intra-EU agricultural trade tensions 
There is a deepseated presumption on the part of farmers in the EU that PECO farmers will 
be lower cost producers of most products and thus will have a competitive advantage when 
they join the Union.  The expectation is that these cheaper products will fmd their way onto 
West European markets displacing the output of EU farmers.  This in tum could cause three 
problems:  unbearable budgetary costs of surplus ·disposal;  problems in living within URA 
commitments; or, it could drive some EU farmers out of business.  If  these fears are felt by 
EU farmers'  groups, they could be the basis of strident opposition to the admission of the 
PECOs  into  the  CAP  and  the  EU.  It is  therefore  important  to  understand  if there  is 
theoretical and empirical basis for the fears,  and if there are other ways of looking at this 
1'  Recent examples are the ulemate in Turkish accession caused initially by the decision by the Union that lhe was not ready, 
and the late decision by Norwegian voten to reject the advice of their government to join the EU. 
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issue to achieve a balanced view. 
The argument proceeds in two stages, the longer run equilibrium situation when the PECOs 
are  in  the  Union  and  economic  adjustments  are  complete,  and  the  interim  adjustment 
problem.  In  the  longer  run,  PECO  production  poses  no  threat  to EU  farmers  for  two 
reasons.  First, once PECO producers are sheltered under the umbrella of the CAP, their 
cost structures will adjust to the new situation and eliminate whatever cost advantage they 
may initially have.  Land prices will be the ultimate sink for the benefits of market support 
in the PECOs just as they have been in the EU.  In the single market there is no reason to 
expect that purchased input prices will be any lower in the PECOs than the rest of  the Union. 
Thus  potential  sources  of lower  production  costs  in  the  PECOs  in  the  longer  run  are 
persistently lower wage costs and any natural advantage they have by virtue of  their resource 
endowments, technology or natural conditions.  How soon wages adjust upwards following 
the general increase in  trade following  accession  is a much  broader economy-wide issue. 
Experience with previous enlargements is that wage adjustment is a very slow process. 
Second,  in  principle,  all EU  producers  will  be  subject  to  the  same  border and  domestic 
protection.  Thus if intervention or market withdrawal is available for one country, then by-
and-large it will be available on the same basis for all, and it should make no difference to 
individual producers in the EU  whether it is their grain or beef or milk which ends up in 
intervention stocks,  or whether it is grain,  beef or milk produced by a PECO farmer.  To 
put these arguments  another way,  if the price of wheat in  the EU  is  set  (by  the indirect 
effects of CAP price and  trade policy instruments)  at 100 ECU/tonne,  then all EU  wheat 
producers will produce until their costs at the margin are 100 ECU; that is until the marginal 
costs are equalised throughout the Union. 
These arguments establish that, provided the CAP continues to provide market support close 
to current  levels,  the fears  of EU  farmers  about the long  run  impact of enlargement are 
groundless.  However,  it is argued  elsewhere (chapter 2)  that the sustainability of present 
levels of support is questionable for reasons quite apart from enlargement.  In other words, 
EU farmers face a more competitive environment in the long run whether or not enlargement 
proceeds. 
The real problem is in the shorter run period as the old and new members adjust to the new 
situation.  There is a fear amongst EU farmers that PECO producers, with their considerably 
lower wages and land costs, would be able to undercut EU prices and thus displace produce 
in EU markets.  Whether this fear will come about depends on two things.  First whether the 
PECOs can and will deliver lower cost produce to EU buyers at the required quality and 
consistency.  Second, it requires there either to be little or no EU support mechanism, or a 
collapse in the support. 
Superficially, it is hard  to avoid  the conclusion that the differences in costs of labour and 
land could enable PECO producers to supply some products at lower cost for some years to 
come.  Whether they will or not depends on many factors discussed in chapter 3.  It is worth 
pointing out that 'costs' are rarely properly defined, and low wage rates do not necessarily 
translate into low costs of production if labour productivity is low.  Labour productivity in 
the West is substantially higher than in the East as measured by gross output per worker, and 
so Western labour costs per unit of output can be lower than  in the East.  This is another 
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that EU farmers have, rather than the usual concentration on differences in wage rates, with 
their dismal and often illogical conclusions. 
It is precisely in these circumstances that economists are asked to identify which countries 
have a potential comparative advantage in which products and thus the extent of possible 
trade.  It is sad  to say,  but true,  that the calculations that are made in response  to such 
questions are invariably poor guides to policy.  If for example, given ample data and much 
intellectual effort, there is little useful quantitative information on what proportion of EU 
grain production would survive in competition with open borders with say North American 
and Australian producers, there is little hope in producing useful answers to questions about 
comparative advantage in PECO agriculture. 
International comparisons are bedeviled by problems of  accounting appropriately for different 
resource endowments, factor prices and exchange rates.  These can easily outweigh indicators 
of  physical productivities such as yields per hectare or per animal, stocking densities and feed 
conversion  efficiency.  The  ultimate  arbiter  of whether  a  country  has  a  competitive 
advantage
14  is  whether,  at  the  margin,  it  can  produce  and  deliver  products  abroad  at 
competitive prices without direct or covert government subsidies.  This is usually something 
that can only be discovered  through  the operation of the market.  The experience of the 
Mediterranean  enlargement (see section 4.5 below) is a clear example that simply having 
some lower production costs does not result in a wholesale takeover of the market. 
In this situation where no objective information exists, opinions and judgements will abound 
based usually on gut feelings, scanty anecdotal evidence or partial indicators such as yields. 
It is hard to resist indulging in  such judgements,  so it is important to recognise that their 
value is extremely limited. 
The mere existence of lower cost production and potential for expanding production at lower 
costs does not mean that EU production will be displaced.  This requires two conditions to 
be met.  First, the market must truly be open and there should be good information.  Despite 
the single market, there are still obstacles to intra-Union trade based on language, culture, 
and health and hygiene standards.  Second, it must be the case that there is either no support 
mechanism, or that the support mechanism cannot cope with an expansion of  production and 
trade. 
It should also be emphasised that even if it can be shown  that on average the East has a 
comparative advantage in certain lines of production, this would not necessarily threaten the 
majority of EU farmers. There will be a range of  cost structures in the East, just as there are 
in the EU, and only a proportion of Eastern farmers would be able to produce at lower cost 
than in the West.  Given the demands of the domestic market (which is always cheaper to 
supply  than  a  foreign  one),  and  the limits  on  supply  from  even the  most  economically 
efficient Eastern farmers,  the large EU market is hardly likely to be taken over by Eastern 
••  h lhoutd be noted lhat comparative and competitive advantage are not the ume concept, althouah lhey are linked.  Comparative 
advantage takes into account lhe opportunity coat of alternative production activities; in lhe lonaer Nn, resources will be drawn from 
production activity with higher opportunity coats to lhose activities with lower ones.  Competitive advantaae is having a lower cOilllNcture 
for a given commodity at a given level of  output than one's competitors. 
47 produce.  In practice the PECO farmers  face enormous problems, including completing the 
land  reform,  creating  efficient  farm  structures,  adopting  and  becoming  familiar  with 
improved  crop  varieties  and  animal  breeds,  building  up  the necessary  links  to the input 
suppliers  and  farm  product  processors.  Successful  completion  of these  tasks  requires 
production, management and marketing skills of a high order.  None of this will be achieved 
very fast unless Western firms themselves put in a large investment of technical assistance 
and training.  The huge increase in the balance of agricultural and food trade in favour of 
the EU following the signing of the Association Agreements is testimony to the importance 
of  sophisticated marketing, processing and distribution in gaining market share, and, it must 
be admitted, the existence of export subsidies. 
The main  categories  of products  for  which  there  is only light protection  in  the EU are 
intensive livestock products and fruit and vegetables.  To the extent that such products are 
produced  to the  necessary  quality  in  the PECOs  they  may  indeed  displace some  EU-15 
production.  For all other products,  protection under the CAP is heavier and  the support 
mechanisms are capable in principle of dealing with growth in surpluses.  The instruments 
and resources for keeping overproduction off the domestic market are available and there is 
considerable experience in using them.  The import displacement fear therefore comes down 
to  the  question  whether  any  potential  increase  in  production  of cereals,  oilseeds,  dairy 
products,  ruminant  meat,  wine  and  tobacco  will  cause  either  contradictions  with  URA 
commitments  or  an  unbearable  increase  in  budgetary  expenditure.  These  issues  are 
considered in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
Ultimately,  if PECOs  do  have  lower  cost  produce,  what  is  the  argument  against  the 
proposition that it is in EU society's general interest that products are produced there and 
imported?  This  is what trade is  for  and  how  it raises  living standards.  The economic 
benefits to all the citizens of  the enlarged Union can only come about through increased trade 
between the members.  We are not aware of any quantification of these economic benefits 
from an eastern enlargement, but we are aware of recent studies on the impact of the URA 
on trade and the benefits that are likely to be generated.  The most recent estimate from the 
GA TI secretariat suggests that the gains from the limited trade liberalisation in the URA will 
be around $500bn or up to 2 per cent of world GDP.  These gains depend on the size of the 
reductions in protection (which have been relatively  modest in the case of agriculture and 
some other sectors) and the proportion of world production affected. ·Enlargement of  the EU 
would  mean  larger tariff reductions  than  anything obtained  under  the URA,  although  the 
range of trade of trade would be smaller.  Even if the prospective proportionate gains per 
unit of GDP were only half of those recently estimated by the GA TI secretariat, the annual 
economic benefits to the EU as a whole would be around 60bn ecu, a sum several times the 
estimated budgetary cost of enlargement. 
Securing this benefit must involve an increase in exports of something from the PECOs.  If 
this includes food and agricultural exports, then the correct response should be to find ways 
to help the higher-cost producers, where ever they are, to move their labour and capital into 
other activities.  These issues are explored in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. 
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The Uruguay Round Agreement binds its signatories to maximum levels of  domestic support, 
to maximum tariff levels, to minimum import access levels,  to maximum export subsidies 
and to maximum volumes of subsidised exports.  All the PECOs under scrutiny in this report 
(except Bulgaria) are GA TI signatories and have committed themselves to maximum levels 
of  protection in each of these categories.  Bulgaria is currently negotiating its entry to GA TI 
and the Uruguay Round and thus its commitments on levels of agricultural protection. 
On accession to the EU, the bindings of each of the PECOs will have to be absorbed into 
those of the EU, and this will have to be done to the satisfaction of the international trading 
partners  of both.  In the case of maximum  domestic  support  levels  it is  assumed  that 
whatever PECO commitment exists is added to the EU commitment.  For maximum export 
subsidies and maximum quan_tities of  subsidised exports it is presumed that the commitments 
are aggregated,  with allowance for  PECO-EU trade in each commodity in the reference 
period.  For market access, where both the PECO and the EU have different maximum tariff 
levels for the same product (as usually occurs), then harmonisation of tariffs at one level or 
the other will involve a loss of protection for the PECO or the EU or a loss of market access 
to the rest of the world.  The implications of this  harmonisation and integration of GATT 
commitments are considered below. 
4.3.1  The Aggregate measure of support (AMS) 
Domestic support commitments for the EU and the PECOs for the year 2001 and onwards 
are given in table 4.2. It will be noted that all are denominated in different currencies in the 
GA TI schedules and derived from measurements of support in a common base period.  On 
accession, the different currency amounts (Hungarian forints,  Czech crowns etc) will have 
to be converted to ECU to arrive at a new maximum aggregate measure of  domestic support. 
Table 4.2:  AMS levels in 2000 under different exchange rate assumptions 
AMS 2000  AMS in m  AMS inm  AMS in m  Percent 
(as in GATT  ECU  ECU  ECU  Change: 
tchedules)  (1986-1988  (1993  (with  2000/Base 
average  exchange  projected 
exchange rate)  rate)  exchange 
rate in 2000) 
EU  61,204 m ECU  61,204  61,204  61,204  0 
Huaaary  33,808 m HF  644  314  148  -77 
C7Mb Republic  13,611 m CKR  859  399  246  -71 
Poland  3,329 m USD  2,563  2,843  2843  +10 
Slovakia  10,140 m SKr (est)  640  330  178  -72 
Romania  0  0  0  0  0 
T01al  65,910  65,090  64,619  -2 
Bulgaria is excluded from the table because its commitment is not yet agreed. 
To harmonise these commitments, the first question is, what exchange rate should be used? 
There are a two possibilities:  the exchange rate that pertained in the base period for which 
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immediately prior to accession.  The former  exchange rate in the PECOs was not market 
determined and is generally considered  to be overvalued.  If this rate was used  to convert 
PECO support levels to ECU values then the new AMS for the enlarged EU would be higher 
than the level obtained using a current market rate (for example, in column 4). 
If the market rate just prior to accession is used,  then, because of substantial and- in some 
cases - continuing depreciations of the PECO  currencies against the ECU,  the individual 
country AMSs would be substantially lower.  For example, since 1989, the Czech and Slovak 
currencies have depreciated  more than  100 percent against the ECU while the Hungarian 
forint has depreciated over 50 percent.  The fact that the Polish zloty depreciated over a 1000 
percent is not relevant because the Polish GA TI schedules are denominated in US dollars. 
Having the AMS denominated in a strong or a weak currency is important for the countries 
with the weak currencies (ie the PECOs), but less  so for the EU.  Table 4.2 shows how the 
total AMS  for  Hungary,  and  the  Czech and  Slovak Republics  could be 70 percent lower 
using a projected exchange rate for the year 200015  than that calculated for the base period. 
Two countries are not affected by any currency depreciations: Romania has an AMS of zero 
and Poland with its dollar denominated AMS  (which over the long term is not expected to 
move significantly against the ECU). 
Potentially,  the definition of the AMS  in terms of a depreciating currency could seriously 
limit a country's scope for supporting its agricultural sector.  However, much would depend 
on  the interpretation of article  18  (4) in  the URA  agricultural provisions  which refers  to 
allowance  for  "excessive  rates  of inflation"  which  may  allow  the aggregate  measure  of 
support to be increased in national currency terms.  Romania has,  however,  foregone this 
choice through its zero AMS.  With its developing country status, it can provide support (as 
defined  for  AMS  purposes)  up  to  10  percent  of its  agricultural  output  value  only. 
Presumably, once Romania joins the EU, this status would be lost, and the allowed support 
would be halved. 
Individual PECO problems in meeting AMS commitments because of  currency depreciations 
or bindings at too low a level disappear on entry to the EU because the EU would assume 
responsibility for commitments at an aggregate level.  Initially, at least, the additions of  these 
bindings to that of the EU should not cause too much of a problem.  As table 4.2 shows,  the 
extra depreciation of the PECO currencies between 1993 and, say, 2000, would only reduce 
the combined AMS  by a further 470 m ECU,  or 0.7 percent.  Even  the full depreciation 
between  1986-88 and  2000 only  reduces  the  AMS  by 2 percent.  As  was  pointed out in 
Chapter 2,  the  EU-12  has  plenty of slack  in  its own  AMS  ceiling.  On  the other hand, 
adoption of CAP prices by the PECOs would, in general, increase domestic support levels, 
and this would eat rapidly into the slack.  Further detailed work should be done in this area 
to determine  how  much  domestic  support  in  the  PECOs  ~ould increase  as  a  result  of 
adoption of the CAP but we suspect that the AMS ceiling could be a real constraint rather 
than a theoretical one in the event of an eastern enlargement. 
u  The projected national eurreocy depreciation was derived from inflation in the latelt available year, an ....  mption that this 
inflation would be rcdueed to S  per eent in equal annualatepa over acven yean, and an auumption that ehanaca in domcatie inflation were 
fully reflected in ehangea in the exehangc ntc. 
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As an indication of how much the AMS level could change from the adoption of the CAP, 
data in table 4.  3 shows the relative importance of the AMS  to gross agricultural domestic 
product,  both  currently  and  ten  years  hence,  on  the  assumption  that  AMSs  remain 
unchanged, and agricultural GDP increases at a faster rate in the PECOs than in the EU as 
a result of stabilisation of the macro-economy, the completion of the land reform, and inter 
alia the contribution of the PHARE agricultural programme. 
Table 4.3:  Potential inaeases in the AMS or the EU on extension or the CAP to the PECO-st 
Actual AMS  Maximum AMS  Maximum AMS 
(1993): Agric GDP  (1995):  (2003): 
1993  Agric GDP  Agric GDP 2003 
1993 
Poland  O.S2  0.33 
Hungary  0.14  0.09 
Czech Rep  0.36  0.23 
Slovak Rep  0.63  0.41 
Romania  0.00  0.00 
TOTAL PECO-S  0.28  0.18 
EU-12  O.S2  0.1S  0.63 
New AMS if PECO-S support level 
were raised to EU actual  level (m  S6,962  S9,4S1 
ECU) 
AMS ceiling (m ECU)  76,107  64,619 
PEC~  less Bul: ana which ts not  g  y  et a member of GATT. 
Table 4.3 illustrates that if the PECOs adopted the CAP now, when the AMS is equivalent 
to 52 percent of EU agricultural GDP, the AMS for the new EU would still be substantially 
below the 1995 ceiling of76,107 m ECU at current exchange rates.  However, ten years on, 
assuming growth rates in the PECOs of 2.5 percent per annum and in the EU of  one percent, 
and with the AMS scheduled to shrink, the adoption of the CAP by the PECOs could mean 
the AMS ceiling being approached.  Any production response to higher CAP prices would 
certainly pose a threat.  This model is crude but it supports the logic that the slack in the 
AMS, while large, could be quickly reduced. 
A related issue on which there might be technical problems is the "due restraint" requirement 
under article 13 of the GATI.  This exempts from  challenge those measures that provide 
support  at levels  no  greater  than  that  "decided  during  the  1992  marketing  year",  on  a 
commodity by commodity basis.  It is not very clear what measures the clause refers to (the 
marketing year differs  between and  within  crops and  livestock,  and at what stage in the 
politico-legal process is a measure actually "decided"?).  On a strict interpretation, this clause 
might be held to mean that for any PECO which tries to adopt CAP price supports where it 
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(enlarged) EU could be subject to a challenge.  There is no case law yet to guide how these 
provisions will be interpreted in practice, but prima facie  there is a problem here for some 
countries, especially Romania which has specified no domestic support. 
4.3.2  Export subsidies and ceilings 
The problems with depreciating currencies discussed above apply equally to the ceilings on 
export subsidies.  In fact, because these subsidy ceilings are commodity specific, there are 
more likely to be problems with the ceiling being breached, especially since the EU-15 might 
be having difficulties in meeting certain of its own commitments during the early years of 
the next century.  Furthermore, there is no prospect of any allowance for inflation on the 
value of export subsidies (as in article 18 for the AMS), which puts further pressure on the 
ceiling. 
The PECOs will of course,  face  these problems  whether or not they accede to the EU. 
However, on accession they become the EU's problems.  Whether the PECO commitments 
on  subsidised  exports  become a problem  for  the EU will  depend  on how future  PECO 
exports compare with those in the base period, and how EU prices compare with world and 
PECO prices.  As argued in chapter 3, production in the PECOs has and will become more 
price-driven over time, and current export patterns (except where there are impediments to 
exports- such as bans or taxes) are a rough guide to future comparative advantage.  At the 
very least, it can be argued, they are a better guide than historic export patterns under central 
planning. 
Figure 4.1 (derived from  tables B.l - B.5 in appendix B)  shows the relationship between 
maximum subsidised export commitments (quantities) for the EU and the Visegrad countries 
for selected products, together with the latest available figures on exports for these countries 
(whether or not they are subsidised,  in  the case of the PECOs).  The index value of 100 
indicates that current exports equal maximum export commitments.  Any value above 100 
indicates current exports above the future ceiling.  For the five products chosen (cereals, 
beef, pork,  milk powder and sugar),  the EU's 1993 exports exceeded its target maximum 
subsidised exports for 2000 in all cases,  thus indicating a prima facie problem for the EU. 
Although the export limits of the PECOs are much smaller than those of the EU, many of 
them are also currently exporting more than their subsidised export targets.  Even though 
they may not be subsidised at the moment, the fact that these exports are possible at prices 
substantially below EU prices suggests that if EU prices were available then exports would 
be even greater.  In such circumstances they would, of course, have to be subsidised. 
Hungary  and  the  Czech  Republic  currently  exceed  their  commitments  on  quantities  of 
subsidised exports in three out of the five examples, Poland in four cases, and the Slovak 
Republic in two instances
16
•  Aggregated together, the current level of exports for all five 
products exceeds the 2000 target,  usually substantially. 
16  The diapm  cannot lhow in index form every ca1e of  current exporta cxceedina fulure ccilinp bccauiC in 10me cues the future 
ccilina is zero (as with cereals for Poland and the Czech Republic, sugar for the Czech Republic and skim mill powder for Hungary). 
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The conclusion is that PECOs adoption of the CAP is therefore likely to exacerbate existing 
EU problems in remaining  within its export subsidy  commitments.  The remedy  will be 
either to renegotiate the commitments  or take actions  to  limit the appearance of export 
surpluses which require subsidies for their disposal. 
4.3.3  Market access 
Harmonisation of tariffs between the EU and the acceding PECOs at  ·the EU'  s level would 
involve either some loss of  protection or some loss of  market access for the rest of  the world. 
Loss of protection would occur when the PECO tariff rate was higher than the EU's, and 
loss of market access would occur if the PECO tariff were lower. 
It is difficult to generalise about the relative size of EU and PECO tariffs since they vary 
from product to product and have been set for most countries at the extremely detailed 8-digit 
level.  Furthermore, in many cases both the EU and PECOs have managed to build in a great 
deal  of 'water'  in  their  tariff bindings.  That  is,  maximum  tariff levels  have been  set 
considerably  above  the  applied  tariffs.  To  give  some  idea  of the  problem,  table  4.4 
summarises  the maximum tariff bindings for a range of products for the final year of the 
URA for the PECOs with GA TI bindings and the EU.  In order to make the comparisons, 
tariffs comprising an ad valorem and specific element are combined into a single ad valorem 
rate using the base period reference price. 
The results  are  not  easily  summarised  even  for  this  small  range of commodities.  For 
example, the Czech and Slovak Republics have lower maximum tariffs on beef than either 
the EU or fellow PECOs, but for lamb these two countries have the highest rates.  Romania 
has the highest tariff rate of all the PECOs on beef, cereals and sugar, while the EU has the 
highest rates overall on butter and sugar.  The Polish tariff schedules are complex and not 
always easy to interpret.  They were intended to give protection levels equivalent to those 
of the EU.  Hungary appears to have protection levels only a half (or less) those pertaining 
within the EU across a broad swathe of products.  On balance, for the Visegrad countries 
there are many more tariffs below the EU level than there are above it. 
54 Table 4.4: Tariff bindings under the GATT for the year 2000; 
All expressed ad valorem (%) 
EU  Czech Republic  Hunaary 
Slovak Republic 
1. Beef meat earcaues  114.8  34.0  71.7 
2. Beef meat boneleu  187.8  34.0  71.7 
3. Frozen beef earcaacs  114.8  34.0  71.7 
4. Frozen beef booeleu  140.8  34.0  71.7 
5. Pork  61.1  38.5  51.9 
6. Lamb  55.8  110  25.6 
7. Frozen lamb  44.8  125  25.6 
8. Powder milk  183  37.0  51.2 
9. Butter  200  68.0  101.8 
10. Durum Wheat  100  3.0  32.0 
11. Other wheat  107  21.2  32.0 
12. Barley  138  21.2  32.8 
13. Maize  102  17.0  32.0 
14. Sugar  216  59.5  68.0 
Notes 
-A Duty Tax applies in Romania and Poland and is represented by the figure in brackets. 
Poland  Romania 
294  (6.0)  288 (0.5) 
294  (6.0)  288 (0.5) 
294  (6.0)  315 (0.5) 
294  (6.0)  315 (O.S) 
102  (6.0)  333  (O.S) 
64  (6.0)  17 (0.5) 
64  (6.0)  17 (0.5) 
267  (6.0)  96  (0.5) 
245  (6.0)  200  (0.5) 
25  (6.0)  240  (0.5) 
108.5 (6.0)  240  (0.5) 
138 (6.0)  240  (0.5) 
104  (6.0)  240  (0.5) 
222 (6.0)  180  (0.5) 
-The Tariffs for EU and Poland arc given as specific amounts in ECUS, the External Reference Prices from the EU Schedule have been 
used in order to obtain ad valorem tariffs: 
Beef: 1729.8 ECU/t; Lamb: 3952.2 ECU/t; Powder Milk: 684.7 ECU/t; Butter: 943.3 ECU/t; Durum Wheat: 148.5; ECU/t; Common 
Wheat: 88.5 ECU/t; Barley: 67.3 ECU/t; Maize: 91.9 ECU/t; Sugar: 193.8 ECU/t except for Pork where the US Chicago price for 1993 
was taken: 8nECU/t. 
-Romania being clauified as a less developed country under the GATT,  its reduction period spans from 1995 to  2004. 
- After their partition, the Czech and Slovak Republics have retained a trade and customs union; a common tariff  and licensing trade policy 
is then agreed by the two states. 
There are two aspects to the harmonisation of  these tariffs: harmonising the maximum tariffs, 
and harmonising the actual applied tariffs.  Bearing in mind that applied tariffs cannot exceed 
the maximum, there are six combinations of the four variables of interest:  EU and PECO 
maximum and actual tariffs.  All six cases are illustrated in Appendix C.  If the maximum 
tariffs of  both the EU and PECOs are above both actuals, then it could be argued that raising 
or lowering  the PECO maximum  should  be of little or no importance,  since it is what 
happens to the applied tariffs that affects PECO producers or consumers or third country 
exporters.  However, third countries are likely to pay attention to maximum tariffs even in 
such cases because that is all they can negotiate about.  If either the PECO maximum or 
applied tariff has to be raised to harmonise with the EU this will cause loss of third country 
access.  There are two possible remedies.  Either, injured third countries could be offered 
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I some compensating trade concession in another commodity sector.  Or, the EU tariff could 
be lowered to offset the rise in the PECO tariff and calculated in such a way as to leave 
overall third country access unimpaired in this commodity.  This approach is explored in 
a little more detail below. 
One solution would be to agree on new maximum tariff levels for the enlarged EU which are 
the trade weighted average tariffs (using third country imports for the period immediately 
before accession  as weights).  If the elasticities of supply  and demand in the importing 
PECOs and the EU are identical then there are neither gains nor losses to exporting countries 
from  such  changes  in  tariffs.  Because  in  most  instances  the  EU  import  levels  are 
considerably greater than those of the PECO's, the resulting weighted tariff would be close 
to the current bound EU tariff.  Table 4.5 below provides an illustrative calculation for the 
feed wheat tariff.  The trade weights should be imports of feed wheat from third countries. 
These were not available so total cereal imports were used simply to illustrate the calculation. 
The result shows that the EU maximum tariff would have to fall by just 9 per cent from 107 
per cent to 98 per cent to offset the 60 or 70 percent increases in tariffs in Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics.  The size of the EU tariff reduction which does not make the 
rest of  the world any worse off  will generally be small where PECO trade is small in relation 
1  to the EU.  The losers from  this compromise are EU producers who may concede some 
. )  protection  and,  of course  consumers  in  the PECOs.  This  approach  to  the problem of 
inconsistent tariff bindings should, in principle, be acceptable to third countries.  Of course 
if harmonisation of the applied tariffs involves greater loss of  access to imports this solution 
may not greatly impress third countries. 
Table 4.5:  Dlustrative calculation of hannonising EU and PECO tariff for feed wheat. 
Cereals  Import volume cereals  Max  tariff: 2000  Weighted max 
latest available year  Feed wheat  %  tariff 
('000 tonnes) 
EU  4847  107 
Hungary  156  32 
Poland  3062  108 
Czech  519  21 
Slovakia  342  21 
Total  8926  98 
In principle the cases where third countries lose market access because of PECO accession 
to  the EU could  be offset by  cases  where  the PECO tariffs  (maximum  or applied)  are 
reduced.  However, there are fewer such cases, and the relative size of the PECOs and the 
EU is such that the gains will be rather small17• 
17  The enlargement in 1995 which embraces the EFT  A countries is presumably confronting theae problema at the moment.  Sioce moll 
of  the EFT  A countries have higher taritfbanien than the EU, tariffs can be hannoniscd at the EU levels without reference 10 the GATT: 
the rell of  the world would have better acceu 10 the EFT  A markets, not worse. 
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accession to the EU is such a political and security gain that it is well worth overlooking the 
fact that some PECO tariffs have to be raised, harmonising market access commitments could 
be a very time consuming problem. 
4.4  Budgetary cost of the PECOs adopting the CAP 
It is widely believed that the budgetary cost of the Eastern enlargement will be extremely 
high.  Contributions to the EU budget from the Eastern countries would be low because these 
are approximately proportionate to income while calls on both the structural and CAP funds 
would be substantial.  It is not our brief to consider the role of the structural funds, but it 
is pertinent to point out that, under current criteria, the majority of the PECOs would be 
designated as objective 1, objective 2 or objective 5b regions and as such would be eligible 
for substantial EU expenditure, just as the present poorest three countries (Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal) currently have the highest level of structural  funds per head of population. 
With the growing importance of structural funds in the budget (currently 32 percent of the 
total budget and intended to double in absolute terms), it may be that their role in the event 
of any eastern enlargement should be examined just as urgently as that of the CAP. 
Current  expenditure  on  the  CAP  for  the  EU-12  is  around  36  billion  ECU  annually. 
However, the increased cost from Eastern enlargement has been estimated to be far greater 
than  the  mere  proportionate  increase  in  population  resulting  from  accession18•  This 
budgetary cost will depend on: 
the size of the difference between CAP and world prices 
the extent to which PECOs are eligible for compensatory amounts; 
the volume of the PECOs agricultural output 
the level of PECO demand for agricultural products 
The results of studies which estimated these extra costs are summarised in table 4.6. These 
cost estimates, of course, depend entirely upon the assumptions behind them.  They are not 
forecasts of what the cost will be, but rather what the costs might be in the absence of policy 
change.  Furthermore, some of them do not take into account the effect of the 1992 CAP 
reform,  and  none of them include the constraints  which  the recently concluded Uruguay 
Round Agreement imposes.  For example, the Tyers and Anderson estimate (the highest in 
the table) arrives at a cost which is based on large levels of export subsidies (which drives 
down  the world  price)  and  increases  in  domestic  support.  Because  these  subsidies  are 
constrained  under GA  TI, policy adjustments  would have to be made which would meet 
GA  TI commitments and which would reduce costs below the Tyers and Anderson estimate. 
In two cases (CEPR and Baldwin) the models used are single equations derived from cross 
sectional data for a single year before CAP reform.  Whatever their merits for estimating 
costs before CAP reform,  they are not suitable for extrapolating costs for new  members 
under very different policy conditions. 
18  JfFEOGA cosu rise in proportion to population (28f,) lhc cunent extra cost would be about 10 billion ECU. 
57 Table 4.6:  Extra CAP expenditure as a result of PECO accession (b ECU) 
CAP  URA 
Source:  Vise  grad  Bulgaria  Association  reform  included? 
Romania  Ag-reement  included? 
countries 
CEPR (1992)  2.8 -7.4  No  No 
UKMAFF 1  5.4- 13.2  Yes  No 
(1994) 
UKMAFF 2  4.9- 14.6  2.6 -7.9  7.5-22.5  Yes  No 
(1994) 
Tyers &.  37.6  Yes  No 
Anderson 
CEPS (1993)  4-31  1- 11  s- 42  No  No 
Tyers (1993)  22-27  Yes  No 
Baldwin  11.6  11.6  23.2  No  No 
(Unpublished) 
Where account has been taken of the 1992 CAP changes, the usual assumption has been that 
farmers  in  the  Eastern  countries  would  qualify  for  area  or headage  payments  as  their 
counterparts in the west do.  However, this is far from likely on both technical and budgetary 
grounds.  Such  support  might be challengeable under  the  "due restraint"  clause in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement (see earlier discussion  in section 4.3.1).  The UK MAFF, in 
their  calculations,  have  separated  these  direct  payments  from  other  support  payments 
(intervention buying and export subsidies) and this shows that the direct payments, if paid 
at the current level, account for between 45 and 95 percent of the total PECO cost to the 
agricultural budget. 
For these reasons, it is necessary to do much more work on the budgetary cost of  an Eastern 
enlargement before a reasonably accurate picture emerges of what these costs might be.  At 
this stage, there are reasons to be cautious before accepting the received wisdom that the cost 
would necessarily be high.  In particular, the conclusion of Chapter 2 was that EU prices in 
the first decade of the 21st century could be lower than  current levels in real  terms (and 
perhaps in nominal terms also).  This would have beneficial effects in both the EU and the 
PECOs  in  stimulating  consumption  above  levels  commonly  assumed,  and  restricting 
production to levels lower than would otherwise exist.  It was also argued (in section 4.3) 
that integrating the GA TI schedules of the PECOs with that of the EU will limit the use of 
subsidies even more than does the EU's current commitment.  The CAP budgetary cost may, 
therefore, not be the barrier that many suppose it to be.  It could certainly be much lower 
than the upper end of the ranges quoted in the estimates shown in table 4.6. 
Lessons from the previous enlargements 
The offer of future membership of the EU to the PECO countries could potentially bring 
about the biggest  single  enlargement that  the  EC/EU  has  ever experienced.  The word 
58 "biggest" is used here in terms of the additional population numbers, the additional land area 
and the additional farm population.  However, in percentage terms the increase in size is not 
significantly different from previous enlargements (see table 4.  7), except for the 90 percent 
increase in farm population: the proportionate increase in total population would be less than 
occurred in 1973 when the UK, Denmark and Ireland joined, while the proportionate increase 
in  agricultural  area  would  be similar to  the increases  that accompanied  the first  and  the 
Mediterranean enlargements. 
Reflecting the large farm population in the PECOs is the difference in average level of GDP 
per person between the existing EU and acceding PECOs.  This income difference is much 
larger than for any other previous enlargement, including that of  the Mediterranean countries. 
Table 4.7  Changes in size in the EC/EU from successive enlargements 
Enlargement:  1973  1980s  1995  Next? 
(UK,  Ire, Dk)  (Or, Esp, P)  (A, F &. Sw)  (PECOs) 
Increase in  64  58  22  96 
population (m) 
Percent pop'n  31%  21%  6%  26% 
increase 
Increase in  27  41  10  53 
agric area 
(m  ha) 
Percent agric  41%  41%  7%  39% 
area increase 
Increase in  farm  pop'n  1.1  4  0.6  1.s• 
(m) 
Percent farm  16%  SO%  7%  90% 
pop  'n increase 
Percent difference in  -10%  -33%  +6%  -792 
ODP per head 
(compared with  EU) 
This 1s the current farm work force,  1t wdl almost certainly fall  faster that the EU m the next decade. 
2  Based on GDP calculated using exchange  rates calculated at PPP. 
Can these previous enlargements provide any insights into how the PECOs and the EU will 
be affected?  The  most  relevant  comparison  is  with  the  1980s  enlargement  when  three 
relatively poor and agricultural countries  (Greece,  Spain and Portugal) joined the EC and 
increased  the  agricultural  area  by  41  percent  and  the  farm  population  by  50 percent
19
• 
These countries had a number of similarities with the PECOs.  They had a large agricultural 
population engaged in what could be described as peasant agriculture.  Thus, their average 
farm  size was small, and much smaller than the EC average.  The state had played a major 
role in operating market institutions and setting prices, and agriculture accounted for twice 
the proportion of GDP as it did in the EC.  They also had large regions with poor soils, and 
"  Greece joined five years before Spain and Portugal, but the similar nature of the problema in these countries makes it legitimate to 
discuss their accession as a single enlargement. 
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inadequate  or  uneven  rainfall.  However,  being  southern  European  countries,  their 
agricultural  output was  for  the  most part complementary  to  that of the then  EC,  where 
production from the northern European countries dominated EC ··farm output.  In addition, 
for  fruit  and  vegetables,  seasonal  differences  in  availability  from  different  parts  of the 
Community reduced the potential for oversupply.  Such is not likely to be the case in future: 
because the current EU is so large with a diversity of regions and farming types, the pattern 
of  output of the PECOs cannot help but be competitive with that of some regions of the EU, 
at least.  This similarity in commodity range between the PECOs and EU at least offers the 
comfort of not introducing  the need  for  any  new,  and potentially expensive,  commodity 
regimes into the CAP. 
In agricultural tenns, the enlargement which embraced Spain and Portugal was "something 
of a gamble", to quote from  a Commission publication of the time (European Community 
1986).  Although productivity  was  low,  there was believed to be considerable scope for 
increased productivity and output from  "the extension of irrigation,  the consolidation and 
restructuring of farms", resowing of fallow land (which in Spain totalled 17.5 percent of the 
total agricultural area}, and "increased use of modem production techniques" (ibidem p.18). 
The report envisaged increases in production as a result of higher EC prices, particularly of 
fruit and vegetables, wine and olive oil20•  This forecast  tendency would no doubt be aided 
by  the  programme  of structural  reform  (land  consolidation,  farm  enlargement,  early 
retirement for elderly farmers,  encouragement of young farmers)  which was implemented. 
What has been the result of this "gamble" after eight years of adjustment to EC/EU support 
mechanisms (13 years in the case of Greece)?  The general conclusion is that the amount of 
change has been small,  and  certainly not enough to justify the prognostications of 1986. 
There has been no dramatic change in the farm  structure - an unsurprising  fact when one 
considers  the social and  economic factors  that limit the  rate of transfer  of land between 
farmers.  Farms over 50 hectares accounted for 0.2 percent of the total in Greece in 1980, 
and a decade later they accounted for 0.5 percent.  In Spain the respective figures are 5.6 
and 6.3 percent, while in Portugal they are 1.8 and 2.2 percent.  There is a similar very slow 
rate of change in the other farm  size groups in each of the countries.  Utilised agricultural 
area in Spain appears to have fallen slightly since 1985 (rather than the land area increasing). 
These observations concerning structure are particularly relevant for the Eastern enlargement. 
The farm structure in Poland has stubbornly resisted decades of pressure for rationalisation 
and  enlargement  including  the  Soviet  inspired  collectivisation  drive.  Undoubtedly,  an 
important part of the structure of farming  in  the other PECOs will be small scale peasant 
agriculture.  Whilst this  poses  a vital  social  question,  it significantly limits the power to 
expand and improve productivity which could 'blow the CAP out of the water'. 
Changes in production in Southern Europe since accession also have not confrrmed the fears 
expressed in the Commission report.  Olive oil production has not increased in either Spain 
or Portugal since accession (though there has been a continuation of a long standing trend 
of increased  production  in  Greece)  and  wine production over the period  1985-91/92 has 
trended down.  In citrus fruit,  the area planted has increased:  by 11  percent in Greece, by 
Although many product prices in Portugal were higher than those in the EC 
60 5  percent in  Spain  and  by  3  percent in  Portugal,  which  coupled  with  higher yields  has 
increased output by around 16 percent in Greece and over 40 percent in Spain.  However, 
this has for the most part met a market demand: consumption increased by over 40 percent 
in the same period, and only Greek produce was purchased by intervention authorities to any 
extent.  In vegetables,  Greek output has  declined,  Portuguese has remained  static,  while 
Spanish increased by around 13 percent.  Very little Spanish production has been purchased 
by the intervention authorities. 
As far as the major EU crops are concerned, neither in grains nor oilseeds has production 
exceeded its mid-1980 level, although Greek production of sunflower only began on entry 
to the EC.  In fact,  the only commodity where production growth has been large and not 
absorbed by the market is butter, the price of which did not rise on accession.  Thomson 
(1994) has concluded that the CAP has "not provoked major structural changes" that might 
have been expected prior to accession. 
There at least two alternative conclusions which could be drawn from this.  First, it takes 
a longer time for the productive potential in farming to be realised than is usually thought. 
Or second, the EU supply control measures have been very effective.  As far as the latter 
is concerned, the direct supply control measures used in the EU have not been important for 
most of the products discussed,  and thus the former explanation seems the more likely.  It 
is widely acknowledged that farming as a business has some different characteristics from 
other businesses because it also provides a place of abode.  The responsiveness of farmers 
(especially  small  farmers)  to restructuring  incentives is usually low, and  the response to 
higher prices is often limited by the technology that is known to the farmer and which can 
be applied on a small farm.  In addition, the extra demand for food in the acceding country 
as a result of rising incomes is often underestimated. 
In short, the lesson from the Southern enlargement is that great care should be taken not to 
confuse  what  could be  the  response  to  a  protective  regime  if farming  were  optimally 
organised from the likely response given actual farm structures.  The structure of farms, the 
management skills and  incentives are just as important than  natural conditions,  soils and 
climate.  Much  of PECO agriculture  suffers  from  dislocated  structures  and  an extreme 
shortage of management skills.  These will take much time to rectify. 
4.6  Conclusion: does the CAP fit the PECOs? 
If  all six PECOs adopt the CAP as it is likely to be in the early years of the 21st century 
there will certainly be problems.  The two largest problems appear to be the ability of the 
enlarged Union to respect its commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement and the 
possible budgetary cost of extending the CAP to the PECOs..  Of these the URA constraints 
are  perhaps  the  most  difficult  to  deal  with,  requiring  either  renegotiations  of certain 
commitments or changes in internal support in the enlarged Union. 
The budget problem may be less than is commonly believed because the impact of the URA 
has not been taken into account in most calculations.  Also it is believed that the ability of 
the PECOs to respond to the higher EU prices will be limited by managerial, structural and 
perhaps even cultural constraints.  The evidence of the Mediterranean enlargement supports 
61 the view that adjustment to a new set of prices is not necessarily fast when the structure and 
skills of the industry are, on average, poor. 
Trade impacts on the EU of  enlargement are probably not negligible, but neither should they 
demand unacceptable adjustments.  PECO farmers operate under a number of  handicaps, not 
just on-farm organisation,  but also in  the processing  and  marketing  of his  output.  Most 
PECO costs are likely to rise to EU levels quite rapidly on entry, and the initial competitive 
advantage would be eroded.  It must also not be forgotten that the PECO market with almost 
100 million people would be growing and would be easier for PECO farmers to supply than 
the rest of the EU. 
Where trade does occur this will be beneficial to the Union.  The fact that Eastern Europe 
may be able to produce certain agricultural and food products at lower cost than in Western 
Europe  should  be viewed  as  one part of the  economic  gains  from  enlargement.  These 
economic  gains  greatly  exceed  the  budgetary  costs  of enlargement  under  any  scenario. 
Whatever budgetary costs are involved should be seen in the wider context of  these economic 
benefits. 
62 S  ALTERNATIVE ACCESSION MODELS 
The conclusion of Chapter 4 is that there are difficulties in the accession of the six PECOs 
to the EU within the time frame discussed and with current policies.  There are significant 
differences  in  the  URA  schedules  of the  PECOs  and  the  EU  which  will require  either 
renegotiation  with  other  wro partners  or changes  in  domestic  arrangements.  This 
conclusion applies a  fortiori if  it is judged that there can be a significant production response 
in the PECOs as they adjust to the generally higher prices in the BU.  The budgetary and 
intra-EU trade problems are less certain because they depend a great deal on the price and 
support levels in the CAP at the time of enlargement and then on the behaviour of millions 
of individual farmers and consumers many years from now.  However, it is hard to escape 
the  conclusion  that,  given  appropriate  incentives,  there  is  some  unrealised  agricultural 
potential in the PECOs which could be realised over the period of the next decade. 
If full adoption of the CAP by all six PECOs causes these difficulties, what options are there 
for reducing or eliminating the problems?  These will be examined in ascending order of 
practicality.  First, to offer membership of the Union but without adoption of the CAP.  A 
second, less radical, option is to offer a different CAP for the new members.  If neither of 
these seem  workable or desirable,  a third option is to offer EU membership only to those 
countries  for  which  the  agricultural  problems  are  of a  manageable  size.  Chapter  3 
demonstrated large differences between the PECOs and thus the likely impact of each on the 
EU  budget.  In  itself,  this  suggests  that  a phased  enlargement  may  lower  the  cost  of 
absorption because the more difficult (ie expensive) accessions can be delayed.  Other things 
being equal, costs are always lower in real terms,  the further ahead they are.  However, if 
the PECOs waiting on membership are able to expand production at a greater rate than they 
would within the EU, then the eventual cost could be higher. 
A phased enlargement, while quite practical,  would not address the fundamental problems 
identified in chapter 4, and would be only be a temporary solution if  accession of  the PEC0-
6 were the ultimate objective. In any case the phasing of enlargement will be taken on much 
wider, political, grounds.  This seems inescapably to lead towards a fourth  option which is 
to reform the CAP for the whole EU-21 21  to avoid at least some of the obstacles discussed. 
To  put  this  another  way;  it  may  be in  the  interests  of the  whole EU-21  to  redefine its 
agricultural policy to take account of the very different circumstances of  the next millennium. 
Discussion of this option is deferred to chapter 6. 
5.1  EU membership without the CAP 
At first sight this seems a revolutionary concept.  After all, the CAP has been the ttailblazer 
for common policy making in the EU for over 30 years, and it has been accepted as a matter 
of faith  that acceptance of EU  membership involved acceptance and full application of the 
C.Apll.  Throughout the history of the Community the CAP. has accounted for a major part 
of the budget, and for most of this period it was the only really common policy that the EC 
had.  The irony is not that the acceding countries do not want the CAP - they can hardly wait 
21  That is the EU-12 plus the three EFTANs, Austria, Finland and Sweden plus the aix PECOs. 
h is also an obligation of the Treaty of Rome, A38. 
63 to join it- rather it is the EU which is reluctant to bestow it. 
The question is whether it is feasible to allow, or require certain countries to opt out of the 
CAP in much the same way as the United Kingdom has opted out of the Social Chapter of 
the Maastricht Treaty and as Denmark and the UK have reserved the right for themselves to 
opt out of the single currency.  If the Union decided that this was the only basis on which 
certain countries could be admitted, then it would be up the governments concerned to decide 
if  they wished to accept membership on these terms.  If they did, what would it mean and 
could it be workable? 
. Any country not operating the CAP would have to decide its own agricultural policy.  There 
would be three constraints on its choice.  First, it should not contradict the requirements of 
the single market.  Second  it should  not run  into problems  with EU competition policy. 
Third,  it should respect its own and the rest of the EU's URA commitments.  The last of 
these should pose no additional problems to those discussed  in section 4.3 above.  Indeed, 
this solution could ease the problems with URA commitments as the individual PECOs would 
not be obliged to adopt the higher protection and prices of the CAP. 
The real problem would be respecting the single market.  Different agricultural policies in 
the EU-15  and  some  of the PECOs  would  imply  different prices.  To  avoid  trade flows 
resulting  from  these  policy-determined  price differences,  there  would  have  to  be special 
agricultural duties on raw and processed products from the low price region.  These would 
seem to be in direct contradiction to the single market and thus infeasible. 
However the issue is not as clear cut as it at first appears.  It is a political question whether 
it is possible to have a major exception to the single market.  There are precedents.  First, 
for many years, whilst it was  moving towards a common market with no internal barriers, 
the Community operated intra-EC taxes and subsidies, the Monetary Compensatory Amounts 
under the CAP.  Since January  1993 these have been abolished.  Second, it can hardly be 
claimed that there is completely free trade for agricultural products within the EU-12.  Trade 
does indeed pass more or less unimpeded over the Union borders (save the occasional truck 
load of British lamb or Spanish tomatoes!) but it cannot be doubted that the volume of intra-
EU agricultural trade is much smaller under the CAP than it would be in the absence of the 
plethora of national  quantitative restrictions  on  the  production  and  marketing  of cereals, 
oilseeds,  sugar,  milk, beef, sheep, and tobacco.  If the EU-12 can live with these domestic 
(rather  than  border)  restrictions  on  trade,  then  why  not  specific  intra-EU  duties  for 
agricultural produce?  It is quite likely that for other reasons (eg sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards) border controls between the PECOs and the EU-15  will not be abolished on the 
day of accession.  Thus no great matter of principle need be at stake. 
Excluded from  the benefits of the CAP, the PECOs could not be expected to contribute to 
the EU on the same basis as other members.  Effectively, this would create a two tier EU, 
with  different  rights  and  obligations.  This  is  presumably  what  two-speed,  or variable 
geometry Europe means.  The 1996 Inter Governmental Conference will address precisely 
these issues.  Only after this conference will it become clear what really is a central part of 
EU membership.  Of course, once the precedent for some countries to be excluded from the 
CAP were accepted, it is not inconceivable that other countries might even volunteer for this 
status,  especially if it was a way of escaping a share of the budgetary costs of the CAP. 
64 When the argument is stretched in this direction it becomes clear why membership without 
the CAP is really a non-starter.  Accession  to the European Union means accession  to the 
various Treaties establishing the Union.  Article 38 of the Treaty of Rome requires that. .. 
"the common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural products" ...  and that 
this ...  •must be accompanied by the establishment of a common agricultural policy amongst 
the Member States".  Now that the CAP is such a major part of the EU and that it contains 
the operational principle of financial  solidarity,  it really  would  seem  to be stretching the 
concept of two-tier  membership  too  far  to  envisage  membership  of the  Union  without 
membership of the CAP. 
5.2  A Different CAP for the PECOs 
Could the problems of  PECO accession be solved by having two agricultural policies one for 
the EU-15  and  one for  the  PECQ-6?  At  the  outset  it has  to  be accepted  that such  an 
approach  would  require an  amendment  to the Treaty of Rome,  but it is  worth examining 
some of the practical challenges of making such an arrangement work. 
It  seems sensible to define the double-barrel CAP approach as having the same objectives and 
instruments for both barrels.  The two parts would be different only in the extent of support 
between the two regions23•  Broadly  speaking,  there are two ways in which support levels 
could be different: in the price support levels and in the direct payments for farmers.  To suit 
their own economic circumstances and in order to live within their URA commitments the 
PECOs would presumably choose lower price levels than the rest of the EU-15.  Although 
it is a far from trivial matter it is assumed that all the PECOs would operate the same lower 
price support levels.  The existence of different prices within a single market would again 
require  some border taxes  and  subsidies  to  prevent the policy-induced price differentials 
leading to massive trade flows.  The arguments about the acceptability of  such controls were 
explored above.  If the Council of Ministers  (and  Parliaments) accept them then they are 
acceptable. 
Even though they would have lower price support, farmers in the PECOs might still find the 
relative  stability  of the  CAP  a  favourable  environment  for  investment  and  productivity 
improvement.  This could lead to an expansion in production.  To contain the problems with 
the URA  commitments,  it is  almost  certain  that the PECOs  would  have to be  subject to 
similar means of supply control as in the rest of the Union. 
Correspondingly,  to manage the anticipated budgetary problem, direct payments to fanners 
in the form of arable payments, set-aside payments and headage payments could be lower in 
the PECOs compared to the rest of the Union.  Such a differential could be justified in two 
ways.  First, the levels of payments introduced or modified in the 1992 CAP reforms were 
set at rates calculated to compensate average productivity producers for losses incurred by 
the price cuts  introduced  in  that reform.  Because  acceding  PECOs  would  generally  be 
experiencing  a price rise  not  a cut,  it could  be argued  that they  are not entitled  to any 
compensation.  A less extreme approach would be to offer some, but lower, compensation. 
21  'lbia doea not preclude member ..  tea from punuir~~ their own domestic aapport mcaauu financed from their own I'CIOUrcea. 
The main constraint on aach meaaurea ia that they should not distort competition. 
65 A second way of justifying differential direct payments for PECOs is based on a different 
view of the purpose  of the payments.  It can  be argued  that by  the early  2000s  the EU 
payments (if they are still being offered) will be viewed as direct income or social payments 
and the rates offered will reflect local variables such as average income levels.  As income 
levels in the PECOs are much lower than in the rest of the Union this could justify lower 
direct payments24• 
Differentiated policy would inevitably, and with justice, lead to requests for differentiated 
payments to the EU Budget.  A formula would have to be defined to scale down payments 
for countries which did not enjoy the full benefits of common policies. 
Administering two separate agricultural policies in the enlarged Europe would not be easy, 
but it could no doubt be attempted.  An organisation which can run an agrimonetary system 
which copes with at least five  changes in the European  monetary system25  and which  can 
manage individual-farm milk quotas and arable land set-aside for millions of farmers  might 
believe  that  the  extra  detail  of running  a twin-track  CAP  could  be  taken  in  its  stride. 
However, Italian milk producers for one would smile at such a claim.  Notwithstanding the 
practical  difficulties  of implementing  separate  policies,  there  is  also  the  desirability  of 
following  such a path. 
In operating this differentiated Policy,  meetings of the Council of Ministers  would take on 
an air of Alice in Wonderland.  Ministers would find  themselves discussing adjustments in 
high prices and generous direct payments for one group of countries who happened to have, 
on average,  large farms and already high incomes, and lower prices and smaller payments 
for the other group who invariably had smaller farm sizes and incomes.  Regressivity in the 
CAP has long history.  Indeed one of the objectives of the 1992 reforms was to redress this 
problem.  It would be very strange indeed to launch the Eastern enlargement with a lurch 
back to an even more regressive agricultural policy.  Twin-track CAP is not a rational way 
to go. 
5.3  Stepwise enlargement 
The  problems  discussed  in  Chapter  4 are  not  the  same  for  all  the  applicant  countries. 
Another approach is therefore to consider phasing enlargement to allow more time for both 
the 'problem' applicants and, if necessary, the EU to adjust.  Thus, if  the general conclusion 
is that full adoption of the CAP by all six PECOs is too difficult, what smaller subset could 
be managed?  What would be the agricultural implications of leaving some out?
26 
Although  the EU  has Europe Agreements  with  six countries and within those agreements 
there is a commitment to their eventual accession to the EU, there is no specified timetable. 
Some countries may be 'ready' for accession long before others, and just as importantly, the 
aa  1bia •me l()Jic would presumably apply al10 to the existing EU memben. 
Bretton Woods adjustable peg- tunnel- make within the tunnel- two-band ERM- aingle wide band ERM. 
215  It it acknowledged that the  political and general economic  implications of deferring entry of aome  countriea may  be more 
important than the agricultural implications, but these arc beyond the acope of this study. 
66 EU itself will be more ready to accept certain countries at an earlier date than others.  There 
is no presumption that the next enlargement has to embrace a bloc of countries (as in 1973, 
1986 and  1995).  Just as  Greece was  a lone entrant in 1980,  so it may be feasible  and 
desirable for the PECOs to join singly or in subsets of the six27•  This section accordingly 
examines  some of the  features  of the  PECOs  to determine  the likely  magnitude of the 
difficulties of accession as far as agricultural developments are concerned and an attempt is 
made to rank the six countries in terms of entry difficulties. 
Apart from solving the inconsistencies in the URA commitments, the main factor affecting 
ease of entry is likely to be the extent to which an acceding country makes net demands on 
the agricultural budget.  It is hypothesised that this will depend on the absolute size of the 
agricultural sector in each country (as measured by value added and by employment), the 
extent to which the output is absorbed by the country or is exported, the relative importance 
of agriculture in the economy,  and  the average income level in the economy as  a whole 
(because wealthier countries contribute  more to  the EU budget).  Apart from  the latter 
variable,  the  more  these  are  complementary  to  the  EU  economy,  the  less  costly  will 
accession be.  The values of these indicators for the six PECOs are summarised in table 5.1. 
While the more relevant indicators will be these values at the time of  potential accession, the 
most recent figures are a guide to future developments. 
Table S.l:  Indicators of impact on the EU agricultural budget. 
Agric GDP  Agric GDP as  Net agric  Agric  GDP per 
(m USD PPP)  % ofTotal  exports  employment as  caput 
19931  GDP  (m USD)  %of total  (USD PPP) 
(1993)  1992/93  (1992 or 1993) 
average  (1993) 
Poland  11,165  (2)  6.8  (4)  -269  (5)  25.2  (2)  4,265  (2) 
Hungary  4,501  (3)  8.5  (3)  1506  (1)  9.9  (4)  5,141  (5) 
Czech  3,228  (5)  4.5  (6)  28  (3)  6.5  (6)  6,965  (6) 
Slovakia  1,574  (6)  5.9  (5)  -25  (4)  8.6  (5)  5,033  (4) 
Bulgaria  3,907  (4)  9.2  (2)  371  (2)  17.4  (3)  4,772  (3) 
Romania  12,871  (1)  23.7  (1)  -625  (6)  32.2  (1)  2,382  (1) 
nb: numbers m brackets are rankinJ s.  g 
1  Calculated from columns 3 & 5 together with populations from table 3 .1. 
In terms of the absolute size of the agricultural sectors (column 1), both Romania and then 
Poland are the largest and thus would potentially make substantial calls on the agricultural 
budget.  However, these two countries in recent years have been the largest net importers 
of agricultural produce amongst the PECOs (column 3).  Romania has long been a major 
importer, presumably due to the Ceausescu agrarian revolution which damaged the social and 
economic fabric of rural areas.  Poland was neither a net exporter nor a net importer for 
most of the 1970s and 1980s, but it briefly became a net exporter after liberalisation, partly 
27  One obvious grouping is for the Viscgrad-4 to be treated en bloc u  they were in the Auociation Agreement oeaotiations. 
67 due to the large fall in consumption at that time.  Currently, the balance of  agricultural trade 
is negative.  The major exporters have been Hungary and Bulgaria. Based on agricultural 
contribution to GDP, political pressure for the maintenance of support levels in agriculture 
is likely to be highest in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, (column 3). However, based on 
farm employment shares the largest three are Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, (column 5). 
Romania,  Poland and Bulgaria have the lowest incomes per head in terms of purchasing 
power parity and would probably make the lowest contribution per person to the budget (and 
the greatest calls on the structural funds)28• 
From the narrow point of  view of  agricultural strategy and based on the above data, the most 
feasible early entrants that present fewest agricultural problems to the EU are the Czech and 
Slovak Republics.  Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria form the next tier for consideration while 
Romania on present performance would present the EU with the greatest problems:  it is 
ranked first on four of the above criteria, and although least difficult as the current largest 
net food importer, there is a presumption that this could be reversed once recovery from the 
upheavals of the last few decades takes place. 
These  characteristics  (and  rank.ings)  might  change  over  the  next  decade.  Progress  in 
privatisation, land restitution,  farm  restructuring and the abandonment of regulated prices, 
all of which would encourage a more efficient agricultural sector, has been greatest - though 
by no means uniform - in the Visegrad countries, as has been the success in stabilising the 
macroeconomy.  However, external debt in the PECOs is substantial: servicing this debt will 
limit investment capacity and retard development.  External debt per person is highest in 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland.  Their difficulty in repaying it can be gauged by the ratio of 
debt to income (see table 5.2). 
Table 5.2:  External debt and the ability to pay  (1993) 
External  Pop'n  GDP per  Debt per  Debt: income 
Debt (bn  (m)  person  person  ratio 
USD)  (USD PPP)  (US D) 
Poland  48.4  38.5  4265  1257  0.29 
Hungary  19.2  10.3  5141  1864  0.36 
Czech  3.8  10.3  6965  369  o.os 
Slovakia  2.5  5.3  5033  472  0.09 
Bulgaria  12.2  8.9  4772  1379  0.29 
Romania  3.5  22.8  2382  156  0.07 
There are many other macro economic considerations,  but this latter analysis supports the 
view based on table 5.1 that the Czech and Slovak republics would be easiest to absorb. This 
conclusion coincides with  the views of other analysts  (CEPR and Baldwin referred  to in 
•  Contributionato the budget are based on actual GDP (inler alia) nther than PPP, 10 Poland may well CODtribute twice u  much 
per caput as either Bulgaria or Romania 
68 section 4.3) that the agricultural cost of the accession of these two countries would together 
be less  than  for  any  other  country29•  Whether  the  net  benefits  are correlated  with  the 
agricultural considerations is another issue, which although beyond the scope of this paper, 
should be noted. It was pointed out in chapters 1 and 4 that economic benefits flow from the 
creation of larger markets and the exploitation of comparative advantages which allow the 
supply of goods and services at lower cost.  The generation of these benefits depends very 
much on the size of the increase in the market.  Thus, although in agricultural budgetary 
terms, Poland may be viewed as a potentially large liability, in terms of its contribution to 
wider market developments,  its accession  may  provide more economic benefits than any 
other country because of the size of its economy. 
Stepwise enlargement offers many advantages. It imposes lower initial cost to the EU. It  will 
generate  less  opposition  from  vested  interests  in  the EU.  It offers  the opportunity  to 
demonstrate that having  some PECOs in  the EU represents  an opportunity rather than  a 
threat. It provides the EU with the chance of testing its policies on a small scale (with less 
financial and other risks).  A small enlargement could also be undertaken earlier than a large 
one, and would demonstrate to the PECOs the EU'  s good faith and intentions.  A bride who 
is kept waiting a long time at the church gate begins to wonder whether she has been jilted. 
Broader political consideration will, of course, be more important than agricultural matters. 
For example,  there is  no doubt that if the Visegrad4  were not admitted in one group the 
omitted country(ies) might be deeply offended.  Also the EU will have its own interests in 
the  issue  of enlargement  en  masse  or stepwise.  There can be no  doubt  that  the entry 
negotiations will be complex and long, there is so much to cover given the very different 
governmental institutions  in  the PECOs and  their recent history.  It would obviously be 
desirable  from  the EU point of view  to  establish  simultaneous  negotiations  based  on a 
common approach.  There are certainly economies of scale from  negotiating with all six 
PECOs simultaneously,  and it would make the imposition of common entry conditions on 
each PECO easier.  To be engaged in piecemeal discussions  with several countries all at 
different stages of the process would place a considerable burden on EU resources.  This 
would especially be so as the later entrants would presumably wish to engage in negotiations 
on improving  the  Association  agreements  all  the  while they  are left out of membership 
discussions.  A further consideration is that at precisely the time entry negotiations are taking 
place towards the end of this century, the first round of the wro  will be underway. It would 
make these negotiations even more difficult if the EU has some PECOs in the Union, some 
about to come in, some who wish soon to come in and some others outside the Union but 
who wish to improve their preferential access to it. Negotiating at the same time different 
complex agreements which impinge on each other could result in the implications of each 
agreement not being fully understood by the negotiators.  On the other hand, it is often useful 
for the waters to be muddied, since this can allow the passage of agreements which on their 
own might be unacceptable. 
However, whatever the decision on stepwise accession or accession of  all six PECOs at once, 
a  The UK MAFF estimate auuests that under a dynamic tcenario there would be pater  aapply raponae in 1be Czech/Slovakian 
Republica than in Hungary and Bulgaria, and their budgetary coat would be alightly greater than that of  the Iauer two countries.  Note that 
while the ellimatea of the various authon on the abaolute coat of enlarJement are disputed (aection 4.4), there ia  no dispute about the 
relative coat of different countries. 
69 the EU is confronted  with  the problem of potential further accession  of the Baltic states, 
Slovenia,  and  perhaps  other  parts  of the  former  Yugoslavia.  Thus,  the  issue  of the 
sequencing of succession cannot be settled with reference to the PEC0-6 alone. 
70 6.  POST ACCESSION CAP 
From the forgoing arguments it becomes clear that the Eastern enlargement does indeed pose 
some difficulties for the EU agricultural sector.  Surmounting the difficulties will be complex 
and take time.  If for political reasons all six must become members at the same time, this 
would stimulate the Union to examine its own agricultural policy, to ask if it has reached its 
'climax' form, or whether it must further evolve as circumstances change. 
Perhaps surprisingly,  but most constructively,  before the EU was even half-way through 
implementing  the most  radical  reforms  it has  undertaken  to date,  the  1992  MacSharry 
reforms, an intensive debate about the future of the CAP has already broken out.  So far, this 
has stimulated the production of several reports (External Expert Group (1994) for DGll of 
the Commission, the UK National Farmers Union's 'Real Choices' document NFU (1994) 
and a paper by the UK Country Landowners Association, CLA (1994)) with another report 
shortly on its way (by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London). 
This activity reflects an internal perception
30 that the CAP, despite recent reforms, still does 
not  perfectly  represent  the  multiple  desires  of various  groups  with  an  interest  in  EU 
agriculture  and  food.  Many  farmers  throughout  the  Union  are deeply  uneasy  with  the 
precariousness of the present compensation payments and are not happy with their production 
decisions  being  so  'boxed-in'  by  set-aside,  livestock production  and  stocking  limits  and 
marketing  quotas.  As  international  competition intensifies,  the direct consumers of farm 
products, the food industry, is not happy that the CAP continues to distort its raw materials 
market.  Taxpayers find it no easier to pay for the continuing growth in budgetary costs of 
farm support.  As more member states become net contributors to the EU budget this will 
make  further  increases  in  the  budget  harder  to agree.  Environmentalists  are  far  from 
satisfied that the reformed CAP, whilst halting the previous trends of ever more intensive 
agriculture,  is providing sufficient incentives for  more environmentally friendly  farming. 
None of these pressures are new.  The point is that they have not disappeared since the 1992 
reforms.  The budgetary pressure and GATI pressures have only temporarily subsided.  The 
eastern enlargement is just an additional pressure. 
The example of the political process during 1986 to 1992 may be instructive.  This was the 
period during which the CAP was under intense international scrutiny and attack in Uruguay 
Round.  It induced the Community to take stock of how well the CAP was achieving its own 
internal objectives.  The conclusion of this review was that a reformed CAP would better suit 
its own needs as well as taking the sting out of external criticisms.  The new challenge is to 
repeat this same exercise by the end of the century.  That is, to use the challenge of eastern 
enlargement for  the EU  to  question  again  the  most  appropriate  set of arrangements  for 
agriculture to best satisfy the aspirations of all with an interest in food, agriculture and the 
rural environment in the much enlarged Europe.  This is not a process of responding  to 
external pressure;  it is a rational  reappraisal  of the best pOlicy  for the EU's present and 
expected citizens. 
Broadly, what are the options for adjusting the CAP to suit the new circumstances?  It will 
:10  b  it really a purely British perception? 
71 be argued that there are really only two.  First, to pursue a 'high' price regime, that is one 
in which agricultural prices continue to be supported significantly above world market prices, 
and the 'low' price regime  where much less market protection is given although there could 
still be other types of support. 
It is not unreasonable to ask why the issue has to be polarised in this way.  Is there not an 
intermediate option in which prices could be reduced, but still offering a 'modest' margin of 
protection  against  international  competition?  Paradoxically,  it may  be  the  URA  which 
prevents this middle route.  It  has been argued in Chapter 2 that by the early years of the 
21st century the EU-15 may be finding its URA obligations harder and harder to live with 
(a fortiori if the next round  further  tightens  the commitments).  It was  further argued in 
Chapter 4 that adding the PECOs  (even without their own responses  to higher protection) 
makes it impossible to achieve many of the URA commitments.  Would internal price cuts 
ease the problem?  For the AMS and export subsidy commitments, they would.  But the real 
problem is  not with these,  but with the subsidised export volumes.  Unless it is  supposed 
there is a strong and quick production response to price cuts, this is not likely to achieve the 
necessary control over excess production.  The conclusion is therefore that the real choice 
is between supported prices and very stringent supply controls or unsupported prices (with 
consequently no need for supply control) and other GAIT-acceptable supports to farmers and 
the rural environment.  Something in between just doesn't work.  The features  of each of 
these two regimes  will now be examined. 
6.1  High price regime 
This is the status quo option.  It represents the application of the aquis comunitaire principle, 
that new members of the Union agree to accept the whole body of existing EU legislation. 
Such an approach has the great virtue of not requiring any direct adjustment by existing EU 
producers.  They are affected indirectly only to the extent that problems of  enlargement mean 
subsequent revisions of support levels.  The principle of this option is that PECOs fully adopt 
all then-existing support  mechanisms  and  levels but have to agree to whatever production 
controls are necessary  on their own agriculture to ensure that no additional strains are put 
on URA commitments by the new member states.  Thus, for example, if a country has zero 
permissible export volume for a particular commodity  in its own URA  schedule,  then its 
production will be limited to no more than its own domestic consumption. 
The obvious problem with this option is that as the PECOs adjust to the protection the supply 
response discussed in section 4.1 will be encouraged.  It is in these circumstances that excess 
supply of farm produce could arise.  At the very least it, would necessitate tightly defined 
and  implemented  supply  controls  in  the  PECOs:  milk  and  sugar  quotas,  base areas  for 
cereals, oilseeds and proteins, and base numbers for beef and sheep.  It is reasonable to ask 
if such  an  approach  is  feasible.  Will  the PECOs  still  have  the necessary  administrative 
structure and resources to implement such farm-level controls?  At one time, they certainly 
had physical planning and control of all production at the farm level.  However such controls 
were implemented over a much more concentrated farm  structure than will be in existence 
in 6 or 7 years time. If EU controls after many years of experience are less than adequate, 
72 what is the prospect for the PECOs'?31  It would also be ironic indeed if the EU had to assist 
the post-communist countries to re-establish and even extend their previous physical control 
systems over agricultural production.  Something along these lines would  be implied by a 
decision  to apply a largely unchanged  CAP to the PECOs  while still trying to respect the 
URA commitments.  Even if such production controls in the PECOs enabled the EU-21 to 
live within its subsidised export volume commitment, it is not clear that all the other URA 
commitments could be met. 
The view has been expressed that if it is politically necessary to include the PECOs into an 
unchanged CAP then a way will be found to do this. Is such an approach desirable?  Three 
considerations  suggest it is not.  First,  it does  not seem  to be in the best interests of .the 
economic development of the PECOs to select a higher food price policy than is absolutely 
necessary.  It was shown in table 3. 3 that the proportion of total expenditure spent on food 
in these countries is, on average, 14 per cent higher than in the EU-12 (36 per cent compared 
to 22 per cent).  Whilst this will surely fall in the pre-accession years given some economic 
growth,  it will  still be higher than  the EU upon  entry.  For them  to  be obliged to inflict 
higher food prices on the population will raise wages, erode their competitive advantage and 
thus reduce their growth.  The social consequences of high food prices could be even more 
serious.  There is little doubt that low  average incomes do  not tell  the whole story in  the 
PECOs.  The distribution  of incomes  is  becoming  more unequal in  these  societies.  It is 
unlikely  that their governments  will  have the resources  to  reverse  this  for  many years  to 
come.  Those  at  the  bottom  of the  scale,  the  old,  unemployed,  sick  and  handicapped, 
particularly in  the urban areas,  would bear the brunt of a high  food price policy. 
The second consideration in pursuing the 'high-price, tight-production control' route is the 
sheer economic waste of such a policy in the PECOs.  Why should the agriculture sector in 
those  countries  be  frozen  arbitrarily  at  whatever  production  levels  they  have  achieved 
immediately pre-entry'?  What is the sense of removing agriculture from  the application of 
the  general  principle  of exploiting  comparative  advantage'?  It is  not  a very  convincing 
argument to  say  that the EU  has  'developed' its agriculture under such controls.  Supply 
controls  in  the  EU  were  introduced  only  after four  decades  of post-war development of 
agriculture.  It would seem inequitable to impose such controls on the PECOs only 10 to 15 
years into economic reforms.  In addition, if the PECOs knew they would be treated in this 
way their entirely rational response would be to do all they can to increase their production 
in  the  pre-accession  period.  This  would  give them  the  most  advantageous position from 
which to negotiate supply controls, but would potentially give the EU greater problems with 
the accession. 
The third argument against this policy concerns the competitiveness of PECO products in 
third (ie non-EU) markets.  Spokesmen for the EU32 often exhort the PECOs to do all they 
can to re-establish  their previous trade links amongst themselves and with the republics of 
the former Soviet Union (FSU).  For many PECOs (but not for example Poland) the majority 
of their trade was with the former Soviet bloc.  There is little doubt that PECO agriculture 
11  Control, of  coune, is exerciled by the nationalaovemmcnta on behalf of  the Commiuion, which explaina why there is a Jrcal 
di1parity in the effective control of agricultural production and the disbursement of subaidiea acrou the EU. 
Including the agricultural Commissioner Mr Steichen in a l!pCCCh  in London on 24th November 1994. 
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of the European Union.  However, there would be little sense in developing trade with the 
FSU if the day after accession  to the EU all competitive advantage is lost as the PECOs 
adopt  the  higher prices  under  the CAP.  The export  capacity  built up  as  such  trade is 
developed would instantly become an embarrassment requiring URA volume 'quotas' and 
budgetary resources which may not be available. 
In short, the high-price, tight-supply regime does not fit the economic requirements of the 
new members.  It has already been argued in chapter 2 that it is unlikely to suit the EU-15 
by the time of enlargement either, and the results of chapters three and section 4.1 suggest 
that it will be difficult to contain the production potential of the PECOs if they are offered 
significantly higher prices. 
6.2  Low price regime 
To avoid the potential problems of stimulating over-production of high-price produce in the 
PECOs and the resulting lack of competitiveness with respect to their Eastern neighbours it 
makes sense to aim for prices at or close to world market levels.  Of course, free from the 
impacts of subsidised  exports,  the world price itself would not necessarily be so 'low', it 
might be better to describe this as the 'no' price option to indicate that the EU has no opinion 
on what the market price should be.  The problems with this approach are the political and 
economic  adjustments  which  would  be necessary  within  the  EU-15,  and,  it has  to  be 
admitted, the disappointment of farming interests in the PECOs who dream of  joining what 
they perceive to be the bonanza of the present CAP.  The accession in January  1995 of 
two
33  even higher cost countries will not make the acceptance of this strategy any easier. 
This is not the place to spell out in detail all the features of this option, and the necessary 
adjustment path to reach it from the current CAP.  Only the broad outlines of the approach 
will  be described.  The essence  is  that  systematic  price  support  significantly  above the 
international market levels is abolished.  This does not remove the need the need for all price 
intervention  mechanisms.  It is  highly  likely  that  the  EU-21  would  wish  to  have  an 
intervention system for market stabilisation reasons only.  Market information systems do not 
operate perfectly, and thus some floor price and minimal intervention system may provide 
a valuable function of injecting a degree of information and certainty into the market. 
The system described will not provide income support.  Such support could be justified in 
many ways: compensation for previous support withdrawn, income parity reasons or social 
reasons such as maintaining a population in mountainous or remote areas.  The payments 
could be provided in several ways.  There could be direct payments linked to land farmed, 
livestock numbers, individuals working in the sector, income levels, region, or even altitude. 
An individual farmer might qualify for more than one such payment.  The transfers could 
be offered as income flows, open ended or time limited, or they could be offered in the form 
of a tradeable capital asset such as a bond.  A principle of all such payments is that they 
should be based on historic income, resource or production levels and payment should not 
depend on current production levels or even the need to produce.  That is they should be 
,, 
Finland and Austria.  Sweden moved away from its very high-price regime a few  years ago. 
74 decoupled from production decisions. 
An obvious problem with the approach is that if  it is judged that farmers must be offered the 
same degree of support as is currently available through a combination of  price support and 
direct payments, then the budgetary cost could be higher than at present.  This would not 
cause a problem with URA commitments as long as the payments were truly decoupled, but 
it could cause a budgetary crisis.  Direct payments are also considered by recipients to be 
more wlnerable.  They are much more visible than price supports and are subject to regular 
scrutiny  and  questioning  through  the  normal  processes  of budgetary  review.  From the 
taxpayers' perspective this is an advantage of course. 
To the extent that agricultural  payments are seen as part of fiscal  transfers  to assist the 
process of convergence and cohesion in the EU, then a share of the expenditures should 
come from the EU budget.  This is correctly part of the income redistribution in the Union. 
However it is likely that there are special natural, social and political reasons in each country 
why certain producers are worthy of more support.  In such cases it is up to member states 
to fund the extra costs. 
The third dimension of the low-price (or no-price) option are payments for environmental 
services  supplied  by  farmers.  In  principle  these  too  should  be  co-financed.  Some 
environmental benefits (freedom from soil and water pollution, reduction in crop protection 
residues,  wildlife and landscape)  may  have a public good element which extends beyond 
national boundaries.  Their costs should therefore be shared.  Others (and the majority) will 
be of national concern and should be paid nationally. 
The fourth issue in defining this option is the extent of supply control.  In principle if EU 
prices are maintained at international levels there is no further role for quotas, set-aside or 
livestock limits. 
There is no denying that agricultural supports delivered principally through direct transfers 
for economic, social and environmental reasons will require administrative resources at least 
as large as exist in running the CAP.  Most of the necessary resources will be within member 
states  (as at present).  Some degree of uniformity  of administration will be necessary  to 
ensure that competitive advantages are not created. 
No budget costs are offered for this option.  This is for two reasons.  First, it is not rational 
to calculate budgetary costs in vacuo.  It has been argued for many years (see Buckwell et 
al (1982))  that the size of budget costs  are not a good indicator of efficiency of policy. 
These are just one item in the economic calculus of policy change.  The economic costs of 
present policy are much  higher than  budgetary costs,  thus  to calculate the latter without 
showing the former would  be misleading.  Second, it is a major exercise to calculate the 
economic benefits and  costs  of a given policy for 21  countries ten years  from  now.  In 
particular, to calculate the income support payments, first requires defining a basis on which 
they are to be paid.  This is a matter of politics as well as economics and requires discussion 
and study beyond the capacity of this report.  That said, there can be no hiding from the 
conclusion that the approach advocated will involve higher budgetary expenditure than at 
present for the EU-21. 
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This depends on the extent of the policy instrument and price differences between the PECOs 
and the EU at the time of accession.  If the PECOs have been unable or unwilling to align 
their policy instruments with those of the EU pre-accession and if they are still operating, 
as now, at much lower prices, then it might be too much of a shock for both parties to have 
full alignment of both instruments and prices on the first day of enlargement.  Likewise if 
the EU is continuing to operate, more-or-less,  the present CAP, this will create a larger gap 
than if  it has moved towards the low-price strategy.  On the other hand if the Union decides, 
pre-enlargement,  to move to the low-price strategy then the case for a transition period is 
. weaker because price differences (and policy instruments) will be much lower, and may even 
be zero. 
There are precedents for quite long transition periods for some previous enlargements; as 
much as  seven to ten years  for the Mediterranean enlargement.  In such transition periods 
prices in the new member state are gradually aligned with those in the Community.  Whilst 
there  are  still  differences  in  the  prices,  border  taxes  or  subsidies  called  Accessionary 
Compensatory Amounts  (A CAs) are applied to prevent the 'artificial' and temporary price 
gap  stimulating  trade  flows.  As  the  ACAs  are  gradually  phased  out  prices  converge. 
However,  these arrangements  were deployed before the so-called completion of the single 
market in December 1992.  On the face of it such border restrictions are a contravention of 
the  single  market  and  would  not  be  permitted.  This  was  one of the  reasons  the EFf  A 
countries were not offered a transition period with gradual price alignment. 
There are three choices available.  Either the CAP and PECO agricultural policy converge 
sufficiently  pre-accession  so  that  no  unbearable  jump  is  demanded  of either  side  upon 
accession.  Or,  the rules  of the single  market  have  to be bent to allow temporary  use of 
ACAs.  The  third  choice  has  already  been  discussed  in  section  5.3,  namely  stepwise 
enlargement.  That is, admit suitably selected countries one at a time or in groups such that 
they  (and the EU)  do not have to make too large an adjustment on accession,  while giving 
time  to  non-acceding  countries  to  adjust  policies  to  make  later  accommodation  easier. 
Stepwise enlargement is really like a transition period, with the countries in transition staying 
outside the EU until they are deemed ready  for admittance. 
It has been argued that the explanation for the success of the 1992 CAP reform was a mix 
of three ingredients:  a workable idea which  gave something  to everyone (price cuts  for 
some, supply control for others),  the machinery of reform was assembled in both the Union 
and the member states, and the political climate for reform was created (both internally, the 
desire to abandon the stabilisers,  and externally because of the GA TI).  There is still some 
way to go on working out the first two ingredients for the next reform.  The political ground 
is  prepared  over  a long  period,  and  it  is  hoped  that  reports  such  as  this  make  some 
contribution  to shaping  opinion  in the direction of the low-price option described  above. 
This can be demonstrated to be in the best interests both short term and long term for all the 
countries in or aspiring to join the European  Union.  The next chapter discusses  what can 
be done in the meantime to prepare the way for a smooth Eastern enlargement. 
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Having identified the problems of PECO accession and two broad strategies for the CAP 
which deal with these problems, the final stage of the analysis is to define policy options for 
both 'sides' to follow in the period before accession.  The objectives are to avoid or mitigate 
the problems of accession by easing the convergence both of policy and the two agricultural 
sectors prior to accession. 
7.1  Options for the PECOs 
It is clear from  the analysis  in chapter 4 that the room for manoeuVre  in the PECOs is 
restricted by the schedules they have submitted in the Uruguay Round.  This is fortunate in 
that it achieves the objective of the Uruguay Round of preventing countries from increasing 
trade distorting  farm  supports.  However it is  unfortunate if it inhibits necessary  policy 
adjustments which could be helpful to the long run development of their agriculture.  There 
is little doubt that their schedules were prepared before they had a clear view of their long 
term agricultural strategy,  especially as it relates  to the CAP.  This is not a criticism of 
PECO GATT negotiators;  such  long term  strategy cannot be clarified until the EU itself 
decides where the CAP is going. 
Within  the confines  of the URA  commitments  the  PECO  governments  have two broad 
choices.  First, they can, as far as possible, move towards the kind of  policy instruments and 
levels of support employed in the EU.  Second, they could take the approach of minimising 
interventions  in  agriculture,  undertaking  only  stabilisation,  institutional  development, 
information  provision  and  other actions  justified  by  the  absence  of markets  or market 
imperfections and failures. 
Justifications for the first strategy are that it would  make entry less traumatic, and, on the 
assumption  that  the  CAP  will  continue  its  high-price  approach,  it ensures  that  PECO 
production is as large as possible so that the PECOs can negotiate the greatest quotas and 
base  arable  areas  upon  entry.  It  also  gives  the  PECO  farmers,  traders  and  officials 
experience in operating CAP-type supports.  The second more open strategy is justified on 
the  standard  economic  grounds  that  it  encourages  production  which  is  internationally 
competitive and  it minimises  the drain  on  the  rest of the economy.  It also gives PECO 
agriculture the greatest opportunity to penetrate markets in the former Soviet Union and other 
parts of the world. 
Within these broad choices what further actions could the PECOs take'?  The document by 
Nallet and Van Stolk 1994 (N&VS) essentially recommended a two prong approach.  First, 
they  proposed  a  common  minimum  or  floor  price  to  be  put  in  place  for  the  major 
commodities  across  the  region.  Second  they  made  concrete  suggestions  about  some 
institutional arrangements, particularly for credit. 
The case for floor or minimum prices is well made.  The suggestion that marketing structures 
are so  under-developed and  price information  is  so  poor that individual farmers  are not 
obtaining the 'market' value of their product is probably true in many instances.  Most of 
the countries are already trying to deal with this by having some minimum or purchasing 
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range of commodities.  There are two difficulties with the precise N&  VS proposals.  First, 
the  definition  of the  level  of minimum  prices.  There  is  absolutely  no  justification  for 
inventing yet another term  'core costs'  to justify the price.  There is  no rational way  of 
defining such a concept.  The floor price will always be a political judgement in relation to 
international prices and the desire not to accumulate unsaleable stocks. 
Second, what is the justification for trying to set up a common system of  floor prices across 
the region?  Operationally it would be very difficult because of fluctuating exchange rates. 
Practically it serves no purpose unless the PECOs are going to contribute to a common fund 
to implement any purchasing at the floor price.  It was shown in table 4.1 that there is a wide 
range of prices in the region, thus agreeing the common price will not be easy.  Whatever 
common price is agreed  will have adverse consequences  for different groups in different 
countries:  consumers  in  countries  where  the price  has  to  be raised,  and  farmers  in  the 
countries  where  the  price  has  to  be  lowered.  A whole  set  of intervention  and  border 
mechanisms  would have to be set up in order to achieve the common price objective, and 
these costs would not fall  evenly across different countries.  Financing these interventions 
are unlikely  to  be  tolerated  by  the  PECOs  who  would  see  the beneficiaries as  being the 
inhabitants of another country.  Would a group of countries operate a burdensome policy for 
one sector,  without any compensations in increased trade in other areas?  For comparison, 
would anyone seriously expect Germany and the UK (the two largest net contributors to the 
EU budget) to continue their generosity in the absence of any economic gains from trade in 
non-agricultural goods? 
In short, proposals for a pre-accession Common Agricultural Policy in the PECOs make no 
sense in the absence of a common  market across  the wider economy.  It is a much bigger 
issue well beyond this study whether it is in the interests of the PECOs (and the EU) that a 
PECO  common  market  should  precede  membership.  It is  suspected  that  such  an  idea, 
whatever its merits, would be viewed by some of the PECOs as a diversionary and delaying 
device towards their political goal of EU membership.  On the agricultural front,  it must be 
recalled that it took the EU-6 over ten years to negotiate and introduce the CAP (from 1957 
to  1968),  why  should  this  be a faster  and easier  task for  the PEC0-6?  To conclude this 
point, a PECO CAP is an unhelpful idea. 
The case for development of the credit system  and  marketing institutions is well  made by 
N&VS.  However caution should be exercised in pushing a single model on all the countries. 
There are no common credit or marketing institutions in the EU.  Institutions develop best 
when  they  arise organically  from  the legal  and  political culture of a country.  The most 
useful contribution the EU and its member states can perform is to provide information on 
the various models in operation in the Union, and let the PECOs themselves choose the most 
appropriate  to  their  circumstances.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  banks  and  credit 
institutions.  It is far from  clear that there is a single optimal model, and the PECOs have 
each been developing their own existing banking institutions for several years.  It would be 
quite wrong at this stage to try and impose a single agricultural bank model. 
What, then, is the best advice that could be given to the PECOs in this pre-accession period? 
Given that neither the form  nor level of support in a future CAP is known, but that all the 
pressures  are for  this  level of support  to be reduced,  PECOs  should  aim  for  an  efficient 
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from  other sectors  of the economy.  This objective holds  whether or not entry to the EU 
occurs at an early date or not.  The means to achieve this are to allow markets to work, and 
where markets do not work, to identify the market failures and undertake corrective action. 
In this context, hastening the privatisation of land, of processing firms,  and of the financial 
sector will be fundamental.  Government,  in fact,  has  to do remarkably little itself,  but it 
does have to release the forces of  enterprise and initiative which have been suppressed by too 
much centralised decision-making in the past. 
Privatisation  in  itself will  not  ensure  a competitive  market,  if a state  monopoly  merely 
becomes  a private  monopoly.  Ensuring  the  market  is  competitive is  best  achieved  by 
reducing barriers  to entry.  This  would have the added advantage of encouraging foreign 
investment  which  would  also  add  to  the  impetus  of modernisation  and  increasing  of 
competitiveness of PECO products. 
7.2  Options for the EU which would ease PECO accession problems 
There are four actions the European  Union could take to help convergence. 
1.  The  most  helpful  step  would  for  the EU  itself to decide and announce the kind of 
agricultural policy it will be operating post accession. 
Given that the Union has only just emerged from an exhausting round of CAP reform, and 
international negotiations on three fronts, within the GA TI, for the EFT  An enlargement and 
with  the  PECOs  over  the  Europe  agreements,  it is  not  reasonable  to  expect  that  it can 
immediately announce its strategy  for  the next decade.  However,  there are three reasons 
why it would  be optimal  to  hold  the debate and  make the decision  in  the next two years. 
First,  the  new  Commission  (with  a new  agricultural  Commissioner  from  a new  member 
state),  commences  its  work  in January  1995  offering an  opportunity to  start with  a clean 
slate.  Second, the 1992 reforms expire by  1996, and Regulations will have to be agreed by 
then either to renew the set-aside and compensation payments or to set out on a further round 
of reforms.  Third, if the broad strategy can be agreed and announced then the negotiations 
for PECO entry which commence in,  say,  1997 can have a clear target to aim at. 
The  choices  have  been  widely  trailed  in  numerous  publications  and,  in  polarised  and 
summary  form,  are described  in  chapter six.  Of course  no  one can  expect any  political 
institution to  make cast iron commitments about detailed policy years ahead of its date of 
implementation.  What would most help the PECOs is a clear indication whether they can 
expect to join a CAP which is attempting to continue much as at present, the high-price tight-
production-control option, or whether they should base their pre-accession  strategy on the 
assumption that the CAP will be more like the low-price option.  It is not of direct concern 
to  the  PECOs  to  know  the  precise  route  the  CAP  will  take  during  the  years  prior  to 
accession.  There could  be a gradual process of price cuts,  or it could be announced that 
price  cuts  will  be  made  after  a particular  interval,  giving  farmers  time  to  adjust  their 
businesses  accordingly.  For the  PECOs  it is  only  the  expected  end  JX>int  that  matters. 
Uncertainty is a great drain on resources.  The EU can offer a great service both to its own 
farmers  and  those  in  the  newly  developing  countries  of Central  Europe by  debating  and 
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2.  The EU should intensify its efforts in providing technical assistance to the PECOs to 
help them complete their adjustment to the market economy. 
This process is, of course, well underway already in the form of the PHARE programme. 
In the early years of the PHARE programme the emphasis has been on institution building, 
the transfer of skills, and emergency relief.  There is scope for continuation of  the first two 
of these programmes.  Information systems, education, training, extension and research are 
all unglamorous but essential activities.  The necessary learning is invariably not a once-off 
activity.  The external input often has to be maintained over many years before sufficient 
skills have been transferred  to the recipients.  What has not been acknowledged, on either 
side, is that administrators,  professionals and others in the PECOs cannot be expected to 
acquire the skills of their western counterparts in a year or two.  After all, western experts 
only attain  their expert status after many years of working  at different levels,  often in a 
variety of institutions.  Projects involving skills and knowledge transfer need to be much 
longer  term  in  outlook,  with  intermediate  stages  for  assessment  and,  if  necessary, 
redefinition.  The criticism of some elements of the PHARE programme by the PECOs and 
corresponding frustration within the PHARE programme at the apparent reluctance of some 
institutions  in  the  PECOs  to  make better use  of what is on offer has  come about partly 
because so much was expected so quickly.  Disappointment on both sides has been inevitable. 
In addition to these institutional, informational and human capital development projects there 
is a great demand for assistance to rebuild the physical infrastructure.  This is one of the 
tasks of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  There could perhaps be 
greater coordination between the PHARE programme and EBRD.  It can only help all these 
efforts to  assist agricultural development if the goal was  more clearly spelled out.  If all 
concerned knew the broad parameters of  policy as the PECOs join the Union this would help 
define concrete tasks to be achieved to smooth the path to accession. 
The  technical  assistance  programme  could  be grouped  around  four  problems  of PECO 
agriculture: 
Improving the operation of the market: 
Poor farm  structure:  assistance in preparation of land and tenancy laws; 
Farm  input  market:  help  with  formation  of farmer  machinery  sharing,  input 
purchasing groups. 
Marketing  farm  products:  help/advice  in  forming  and  operating  food  marketing 
groups. 
Lack of management skills and information: 
Assistance  in  management  education  in  farm  schools,  colleges  and  universities; 
training  for  food  industry  management;  improvements  in  research  and  extension 
systems;  market information systems. 
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Continued  technical  assistance  in  preparing  for  privatisation;  by  clarifying  the 
timetable for accession and the nature of the post-accession CAP this will spur both 
Western investors and PECO governments to pool efforts to complete this process. 
Lack of understanding of market and EU operation: 
Requires continued preparation of  industry representatives, officials and policy makers 
by training and by shadowing of EU counterparts. 
3.  The third action is to improve further the detailed arrangements under the Association 
agreements. 
A welcome package of measures has recently been proposed by the Commission which goes 
in the directions suggested by an earlier (unpublished) report to the Commission, Buckwell 
and Haines 1994.  The main additional line of assistance apart from continuing to increase 
preference quotas and  reduce tariffs,  is  to improve the detailed working arrangements of 
these preferential access arrangements.  It is partly a matter of information.  PECO traders 
simply find it very difficult to discover at any point in time how much of the quotas are still 
available.  The EU could  do  more  to  disseminate  this  information.  Second,  and  more 
radically, it really would solve the information problem if the quotas were auctioned within 
the PECOs rather than allocated to EU importers, this would also transfer the benefits of  any 
price differences to the exporters.  There is little doubt that the present arrangements have 
created bad feeling disproportionate to the importance of the issue. 
4.  The fourth action is that the EU should cease to subsidise agricultural exports to the 
PECOs. 
Subsidised exports to the PECOs have a number of damaging effects.  First, they undermine 
the fragile market which PECO farmers are trying to operate in and reduce the prospects of 
agricultural recovery.  As such, they are also damaging to long run economic welfare in the 
PECOs, even though they provide short term benefits to PECO consumers.  Second, such 
subsidies are interpreted as deliberate hostile actions designed to stifle the development of 
PECO agriculture.  Third,  they  are overt  signs  that  the  EU has  no intention  itself of 
following the advice if offers PECO politicians (and which we have done in this report) - to 
get government out of business and let the market allocate resources.  Fourth, it directly 
encourages the PECOs to erect import protection and to set off on  the road to inefficient 
resource use and higher than necessary food prices.  To refrain from using export subsidies 
on trade to the PECOs alone is obviously a discriminatory policy and distinctly not first best. 
Producers in third countries could reasonably feel affronted· by this measure.  However as 
the PECOs are destined to become members and such refunds will disappear in time anyway, 
this could be interpreted as a preparatory move to smooth accession. 
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The European Union is on the threshold of three more significant steps in its development. 
After absorbing three of  the EFf  A countriesin 1995 and reviewing institutional development 
and progress to economic and monetary union in the Inter Governmental Conference in 1996, 
the next biggest  step  is  the  Eastern  enlargement.  That it can  happen  has  already  been 
decided at the Copenhagen and Corfu summits.  That it wiU happen depends on progress in 
the  countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (called  PECOs  in  this  report)  in  further 
stabilising  their economies and  on  the ability of both parties  to resolve some anticipated 
problems with this accession. 
Eastern enlargement will be a landmark simply because of the absolute increase in size of 
the population and land area (although proportionately the enlargement is not bigger than the 
Mediterranean  enlargement  of the  1980s).  The  other  distinguishing  features  of this 
enlargement is that the applicant countries are significantly poorer than the EU average, and 
they  may  bring  with  them  seven  and  a half million  farmers  compared  to  the present EU 
number of  just over eight million.  It is the sheer size of these numbers that has caused many 
commentators to predict that agriculture poses a significant hurdle for the enlargement. 
Although  the  end  of the  millennium  is  widely  talked  of as  the target enlargement  year, 
practicalities and previous experience suggest that accession of the PECOs is more likely in 
the period 2000-2005, with the later date the more likely if all six PECOs join at the same 
time.  By  that  time  the  CAP  is  likely  to  be  under  severe  pressure  to  live  within  the 
constraints of the Uruguay Round Agreement commitments on agriculture.  It is suggested 
that whilst price levels may be lowered to help meet these commitments, the only way the 
EU  could  meet its subsidised  export volume limit is by  tightening  supply controls.  Price 
reductions  will only  be effective in  reducing  supply  if they are very large (practically  to 
world  price levels),  and  instituted  very  early.  Thus  the  set-aside area,  milk quota,  sugar 
quota, and ruminant livestock limits may all have to be even more restrictive. This in itself 
could precipitate a more radical reform of the CAP even without Eastern Enlargement. 
Within the PECOs, the farm sector has experienced a severe shock as a result of  privatisation 
and liberalisation.  However there are clear signs that all the six countries except Bulgaria 
are beginning to climb out of their general and agricultural recession.  Further progress is 
hard to predict, partly because it depends on the confidence of potential investors both in 
Eastern and Western Europe.  This will depend partly on whether and on what conditions 
the PECOs enter the EU. There is certainly expected to be modest recovery throughout the 
region.  However,  PECO  governments  do  not  have  much  scope  to  influence  this  by 
protective agricultural policies because they are limited by their own resources and because 
they are constrained by their Uruguay commitments.  The latter bite mostly on the aggregate 
measures of support and the export subsidy provisions. 
Upon  entry  PECO  agricultural  prices  will  be  lower  than  in  the  EU.  This  gives  the 
opportunity for response in both production and consumption which  can  only increase the 
export  potential  of the  enlarged  community.  These  responses  are  not  automatic:  they 
depends to a great extent on  the PECOs  successfully  completing the farm  structuring and 
82 privatising the food industry in such a way that a competitive market exists.  They will also 
depend a great deal on the extent of Western investment and technology transfer. 
The potential for increased exports will cause difficulties on three fronts:  with EU farmers 
who feel threatened by lower cost competition, meeting the URA commitments and with the 
EU budget. It suggested that the first and third of these problems are real, but surmountable 
with  the  right  policies.  Estimates  of the budgeted  costs  currently  being  circulated  are 
misleading in our view.  They are not juxtaposed with economic benefits and in any case as 
they do not make allowance for the effects of the URA they are likely to be over estimates. 
These are entirely EU matters.  However, the incompatibilities with the URA commitments 
involve others who will, no doubt, be watching the EU carefully. Simply merging the URA 
schedules of the EU-15 and the PEC0-6 causes difficulties particularly with market access 
and export subsidies.  These can be resolved  only by third countries adopting a  flexible 
attitude and allowing some restrictions to be relaxed (no doubt at a price to be paid in some 
other area of trade) or, if such flexibility is refused, it would require reductions in EU-21 
support levels or tightening of supply controls or both. 
In the face of these various problems, there are four options: 
PECO accession to the EU but without access to the CAP; 
Two CAPs - Eastern and Western 
Stepwise accession 
Reform the CAP 
The first two options appear unworkable.  The third option is to delay facing the agricultural 
problems by admitting frrst those PECOs which threaten least the tranquillity of the CAP. 
This means admitting the Czech and Slovak Republics first,  followed by Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and  last Romania.  However,  this approach ignores  the potential trade benefits 
which enlargement is expected to bring.  If a staggered accession of the PECOs is desirable 
it should be based on wider considerations than the budgetary costs of the CAP.  No doubt 
politics will have the strongest impact on this matter.  Of course, stepwise enlargement does 
not solve any problems- it only delays facing them.  The extra time may be required to face 
the fourth option, which is to reform the CAP. 
It was concluded that post enlargement there are fundamentally two choices for the CAP, a 
high-price tight-supply control option and a low-price option.  The former could be made to 
work,  but  only  at  the  cost  of restricting  any  development  of PECO  agriculture,  and 
preventing them from being a competitive source of  exports for markets in the former Soviet 
Union.  The alternative option is the favoured approach.  The EU should commit itself to 
a minimalist intervention system designed only to provide market stability.  Any additional 
support  for  income,  social,  regional  or  environmental  reasons  should  be  based  on 
appropriately  defined direct payments which  are completely decoupled  from  productions 
decisions. The higher budgetary costs of such a policy will be outweighed by the economic 
benefits.  The budgetary cost itself should be shared  between member states and the Union. 
The most helpful step the EU could take for the PECOs in the next two years is to debate 
these issues thoroughly and to lay down a ten-year strategy for enlargement.  The reduction 
of uncertainty this would achieve would be of enormous value to farmers and agribusiness 
83 in the whole of Europe. 
Two more concrete actions that the EU could take are, first, to further liberalise trade under 
the Association  Agreements  in  particular to  make  the operation of the trade quotas more 
attractive to  PECO exporters.  Second,  the EU  should  eliminate the use  of subsidies  on 
exports to the PECOs.  The cost to  the EU of these actions is not great,  but they cause 
disproportionate  harm  to EU-PECO  relations.  Finally  the PHARE programme and  the 
EBRD have important roles in technology transfer, institutional development, training and 
infrastructural development to assist the Eastern enlargement. 
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87 APPENDIX A 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
Feasibility or an agricultural strategy to prepare the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe for accession 
INTRODUCTION 
These terms of  reference are for a series of  studies on the agricultural policies in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (CEEC), and on alternative systems which could 
be put in place,  having  the objective to  integrate the European  Union's  (EU)  and  the CEEC's 
agricultural sectors. 
The objective of these studies is to develop options for policies in the CEEC's and, as appropriate, 
in the EU. 
The results should aim to help the European Commission in the elaboration of its strategy to prepare 
the CEEC for accession in the European Union. 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives  of the  studies  are  listed  below.  The rationale,  the general  framework  and  the 
hypothesis under which the studies should be undertaken are explained under a separate heading. 
1.  Form an opinion on each country's present agricultural policy, in terms of  compatibility with: 
(i)  their future GA TI undertakings following the Uruguay Round 
(ii)  their budgetary possibilities 
(iii)  their capacity for policy enforcement 
(iv)  their domestic, political and social pressures including the need for a sustainable level 
of farm  income 
(v)  the agricultural policies of their neighbours 
(vi)  the development of efficient and competitive agricultural production, distribution and 
processing 
(vii)  the role of agriculture in the economy and in rural and regional development 
(viii)  the  shared  goal  of  integration  with  the  EU  and  in  world  markets  and  of 
convergence between their agricultural policies with ours, in the light of  foreseeable 
trends in EU support for agriculture. 
88 2.  Recommend a range of  agricultural policy options to be developed by the CEEC, which could 
respond to the above points, with particular relevance to the external constraints (points (i) and (viii)) 
and which could help to achieve greater convergence of agriculture policies. 
3.  Identify how could the EU contribute to the best policies in the CEEC's through trade and 
agriculture policy and financial  and technical assistance (Phare programmes and others). 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE OF 11IE STUDY 
Relations between the EU and the CEEC 
The EU relations with the CEEC are established by the Europe agreements with the six CEEC and 
by the related decisions taken by the Heads of States and Governments in Copenhagen Qune 1993) 
and Corfu (June 1994).  The Europe agreements foresee the establishment of a free trade area for all 
industrial goods  (with different calendar and  arrangements, depending on the goods), with the EU 
granting access earlier, and the CEEC within a maximum period of 10 years.  The agreements also 
establish a wide range of co-operation in the economic, social, cultural and political field. 
The agricultural chapters of  the agreements provide benefits to the CEEC by giving them preferential 
access  to  the EU  market for  a selected  range of agricultural  products,  which,  in  some  cases,  are 
restricted in quantity. 
These agreements represent a broad mutual desire to develop deeper political and economic relations 
between the EU and these countries and create the framework through which the shared objective of 
EU membership could be reached. 
A&riculture in the CEEC 
Agriculture plays an important role in the CEEC economy, both in terms of share of total GDP and 
the percentage of work force employed.  The agriculture production chain must therefore be oriented 
towards long-term competitiveness in world markets as well as in the market of Europe as a whole. 
Agriculture  in  these  countries  has  undergone  a  severe  structural  adjustment  process  which  has 
contributed to  (i) a decrease in the gross agricultural output of up to 30 per cent between 1989 and 
1992 (this trend continued  in  1993, with few exceptions) and  (ii) a decrease of agricultural exports 
and farm  income level. 
Although some work has been undertaken on restructuring CEEC agriculture, existing reports have 
not studied all  aspects  in sufficient detail.  They have not taken sufficient account of the dynamic 
elements in the existing framework defined by the Uruguay Round obligations of the CEEC and of 
the EU, as wen  as by foreseeable trends in EU agricultural policy. 
General Framework for tbe studies 
Some of the most important elements which the experts should take into account are listed below: 
The implications of the change from state trading in the Uruguay Round base period (1986-
1988) to the current measures of protection at the border, if any, and more importantly to the 
measures of protection and support now bound in the Uruguay Round and which limit what 
can be done to improve the situation in the future. 
89 The CEEC's Uruguay Round obligations commit them to limiting their domestic support to 
a ceiling  which  they  have bound  in  GAIT.  The Uruguay  Round  also  commits  them  to 
replacing all existing border measures such as levies with bound ad valorem import duties -
which they have done.  Finally, it prevents them from  introducing export refunds for any 
product not specified in their schedules. 
The developments in agricultural trade flows between the EU and CEEC.  EU expansion of 
its exports (with refunds to the EU exporters) and CEEC stagnation and even conttaction of 
exports  to  the EU have contributed to the current CEEC problems.  An  analysis of the 
preferential ttade flows in both directions and the correction of any anomalies provoked by 
the Community policy are essential if the EU wishes to contribute positively towards price 
stability in the CEEC and towards the development of  their concessionary trade flows to the 
EU. 
Questions to be addressed 
(I)  Which options will encourage efficient and competitive production able to respond to market 
signals and to maintain the possibility of exporting to the world market? 
(2)  What measures need to be taken in the short term to stabilise farm incomes and production? 
(3)  Which options are most consistent with the development of inter-CEEC and CEEC/CIS trade 
relationships?  Given the degree of monetary and  economic divergence,  how can we  best 
move towards convergent agriculture policies in Europe as  a whole? 
(4)  Which policy options are most consistent with the CEEC macroeconomic stabilisation plans, 
IMP standby arrangements and the Uruguay Round commitments? 
(5)  What accompanying policies are needed to make the proposed options workable, for example 
- crop insurance schemes, future markets, input subsidies, private storage aid and marketing 
assistance. 
STUDY ORGANISATION 
This study is being commissioned from several experts who shall work independently.  Visits to the 
countries, in particular those that have introduced agricultural support policies will be necessary. 
The study shall be implemented in 3 months. 
The experts will present a mid-term report and will be available to discuss with the Commission the 
preliminary finds and recommendations, as necessary. 
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TABLE B.1: Cereals export limits and 1993 or 1992 export levels 
CEREALS  Max. subsidised  1993  Exports 
exports (2000) 
('000 t)  ('000 t) 
EU  23409  28034 
Hungary
1  1305  3443 
Poland  0  4 
Czech R.  0  176.8 
Slovak R.  109  152 
TOTAL  24823  31810 
data for  1992 
2 Intervention prices decrease from  1993/94 to  143  USD/t ( 115  ECU/t) 
1 Intervention price 
TABLE B.2: Beef export limits and 1993  or  1992 export levels 
BEEF  Max.  subsidised  199 3 Exports 
exports (2000) 
\000 t)  \000 t) 
EU  817  1323.4 
Hungary
1  83  58 
Poland*  40.9  34 
Czech R.  49.8  5.1 
Slovak R.  28.4  23.5 
TOTAL  1019  1414 
mcludes horse meat  beef mea  t,po  rk meat and lamb meat. 
1 data for  1992 
Producer price 
(USD/t) - 1993 
Wheat for feed 
180
2 
44 
132 
93 
83
3 
-
Producer price 
(USD/t) ..  1993 
Cattle LW 
17462 
859 
696 
873 
863.5
3 
-
2 Intervention prices decrease from 3430 ECU/t in 1992/93 to  3216 ECU/t in 1993/94 
3 Intervention price TABLE 8.3: Pork export limits and 1993 or 1992 export levels 
PORK  Max. subsidised  1993 Exports  Producer price 
exports (2000)  (USD/t) - 1993 
cooo t)  cooo t)  Pork LW 
EU
1  402  536  1200 
Hungary
1  126  102  988 
Poland  0  13  903 
Czech R.  10.1  9.6  892 
Slovak R.  4.7  . 2.8  752
1 
TOTAL  543  663  -
data for  1992 
1 intef\·ention price 
TABLE 8.4: Powder Milk export limits and 1993  or 1992  export levels 
POWDER  Max. subsidised  1993  Exports  Producer price 
MILK  exports (2000)  (USD/t) - 1993 
('000 t)  ('000 t)  Milk 
EU
1  243.3  392  527 
Hungary
1  0  11  207 
Poland  37  127  129 
Czech R.  66.9  85.1  200 
Slovak R.  IS  10.4  186.6
2 
TOTAL  362.2  625.5  -
data for  1992 
2 intervention price 
TABLE B.S:  Sugar export limits and 1993 or 1992 export levels 
SUGAR  Max. subsidised  1993 Exports  Producer price 
exports (2000)  (USD/t) •  1993 
('000 t)  ('000 t)  Sugar Beet 
EU
1  1151  4710  43 
Hungary
1  32  144  26 
Poland  104.4  112  24 
Czech R.  0  85.4  28 
Slovak R.  3.9  9.9  na 
TOTAL  1292.3  5061.3  . 
data for 1992 APPENDIX C:  HARMONISING TARIFFS AND TARIFF BINDINGS 
Tariff bindings: 
Since the Uruguay Round Agreement, the application of  tariffs in agriculture has been binded 
i.e a  maximum tariff is committed by this international trade agreement. In no case tariffs 
applied by the member parts countries can exceed those tariff bindings. 
Actual tariffs: 
However, the actual tariffs (those applied on a day-to-day basis) may differ from the tariff 
bindings. 
ROW:  Rest of the world. 
Situation pre-accession  I. 
Binding EU 
Binding PECO 
•  •  •  • 
Applied EU 
Applied PECO 
Situation pre-accession 2:  B. 
Binding EU 
Applied EU 
Binding PECO 
•  • . -
Applied PECO 
A. 
Harmonisation 
Common  level  of binding  and  applied  tariffs 
after PECO accession 
The PECO binding tariff rises to the  EU binding 
tariff 
The PECO applied tariff rises  to the  EU applied 
tariff 
Gainers:  PECO producers 
Losers:  ROW access 
PECO consumers 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU binding 
tariffs 
Weighted a'·erage of the PECO and EU applied 
tariffs 
Gainers: 
Losers: 
PECO  producers 
EU consumers 
EU producers 
·PECO consumers 
ROW Access: no change 
Both situations 1 and 2 can lead to the harmonisations A or B.  However the amounts of loss 
and gain will vary. Situation pre-accession 3: 
C. 
Binding EU 
Binding PECO ...  -
Applied PECO 
Applied EU 
D. 
Harmonisation: 
Common  level  of binding  and  applied  tariffs 
after PECO accession 
The PECO binding tariff rises to the EU binding 
tariff. 
The  PECO  applied  tariff decreases  to  the  EU 
applied tariff. 
Actual Gainers:  PECO consumers 
ROW access 
Actual Losers:  PECO producers 
The  actual  gainers/losers differ  from  those  that 
would  result  from  the  harmonisation  of  the 
binding tariffs agreed under the GATT. 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU binding 
tariffs 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU applied 
tariffs 
Actual Gainers:  EU producers 
PECO consumers 
Actual Losers:  PECO  producers 
EU consumers 
ROW:  no  change 
The situation 3 can lead to  the harmonisations C or D. Situation pre-accession 4: 
E. 
Binding PECO ...  -
Binding EU 
Applied PECO 
Applied EU 
Situation pre-accession 5: 
F. 
Binding. PECO ... -
Applied PECO 
Binding EU 
Applied EU 
Harmonisation: 
Common  level  of binding  and  applied  tariffs 
after PECO accession 
The  PECO  binding  tariff decreases  to  the  EU 
binding tariff. 
The  PECO  applied  tariff decreases  to  the  EU 
applied tariff. 
Gainers: 
Losers: 
PECO consumers 
ROW access 
PECO producers 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU binding 
tariffs 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU binding 
tariffs 
Gainers: 
Losers: 
EU producers 
PECO consumers 
PECO producers 
EU consumers 
ROW:  No change 
Both situations 4 and 5 can lead to the harmonisation E or F.  However the amounts of loss 
and gain will vary. Situation pre-accession 6:  G. 
Binding PECO . . . -
Binding EU 
Applied EU 
Applied PECO 
H. 
Harmonisation: 
Common  level  of binding  and  applied  tariffs 
after PECO accession 
The PECO binding tariff rises to the EU binding 
tariff. 
The  PECO  applied  tariff decreases  to  the  EU 
applied tariff  . 
Actual Gainers:  PECO consumers 
ROW access 
Actual Losers:  PECO producers 
The actual gainers/losers differ from  those that 
would  result  from  the  harmonisation  of  the 
binding tariffs agreed under the GATT. 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU binding 
tariffs 
Weighted average of the PECO and EU applied 
tariffs 
Actual Gainers:  PECO  producers 
EU consumers 
Actual Losers:  EU producers 
PECO consumers 
ROW:  no  change 
The situation 6 can lead to the harmonisations G or H. 